Iranian Strategy in Syria

 

Iranian Strategy in Syria

http://understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria

 

by Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer

 

Executive Summary

 

The Islamic Republic of Iran has conducted an extensive, expensive, and

integrated effort to keep President Bashar al-Assad in power as long as

possible while setting conditions to retain its ability to use Syrian

territory and assets to pursue its regional interests should Assad fall.

 

The Iranian security and intelligence services are advising and assisting

the Syrian military in order to preserve Bashar al-Assad's hold on power.

These efforts have evolved into an expeditionary training mission using

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces, Quds Force,

intelligence services, and law enforcement forces.  The deployment of IRGC

Ground Forces to conflict abroad is a notable expansion of Iran's

willingness and ability to project military force beyond its borders.

 

Iran has been providing essential military supplies to Assad, primarily by

air.  Opposition gains in Syria have interdicted many ground resupply routes

between Baghdad and Damascus, and the relative paucity of Iranian

port-visits in Syria suggests that Iran's sea-lanes to Syria are more

symbolic than practical. The air line of communication between Iran and

Syria is thus a key vulnerability for Iranian strategy in Syria.  Iran would

not be able to maintain its current level of support to Assad if this air

route were interdicted through a no-fly zone or rebel capture of Syrian

airfields.

 

Iran is also assisting pro-government shabiha militias, partly to hedge

against Assad's fall or the contraction of the regime into Damascus and a

coastal Alawite enclave.  These militias will become even more dependent on

Tehran in such a scenario, allowing Iran to maintain some ability to operate

in and project force from Syria.

 

Lebanese Hezbollah began to take on a more direct combat role in Syria as

the Assad regime began losing control over Syrian territory in 2012.

Hezbollah has supported Assad with a robust, well-trained force whose

involvement in the conflict aligns with Iranian strategic interests as

Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah acknowledged on April 30 in Tehran.

Hezbollah's commitment is not without limitations, however, because

Nasrallah must carefully calibrate his support to Assad with his domestic

responsibilities in order to avoid alienating his core constituency in

Lebanon.

 

Iraqi Shi'a militants are also fighting in Syria in support of Assad. Their

presence became overt in 2012 with the formation of the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas

Brigade, a pro-government militia that is a conglomerate of Syrian and

foreign Shi'a fighters, including members of Lebanese Hezbollah and

Iraq-based Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah. Like other paramilitary

forces operating in Syria, these militants escalated their involvement as

the conflict descended into civil war. The open participation of Iraqi Shi'a

militants in Syria is an alarming indicator of the expansion of sectarian

conflict throughout the region. 

 

The Syrian conflict has already constrained Iran's influence in the Levant,

and the fall of the Assad regime would further reduce Tehran's ability to

project power. Iran's hedging strategy aims to ensure, however, that it can

continue to pursue its vital interests if and when the regime collapses,

using parts of Syria as a base as long as the Syrian opposition fails to

establish full control over all of Syrian territory.

 

==========================================

(F)AIR USE NOTICE: All original content and/or articles and graphics in this

message are copyrighted, unless specifically noted otherwise. All rights to

these copyrighted items are reserved. Articles and graphics have been placed

within for educational and discussion purposes only, in compliance with

"Fair Use" criteria established in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.

The principle of "Fair Use" was established as law by Section 107 of The

Copyright Act of 1976. "Fair Use" legally eliminates the need to obtain

permission or pay royalties for the use of previously copyrighted materials

if the purposes of display include "criticism, comment, news reporting,

teaching, scholarship, and research." Section 107 establishes four criteria

for determining whether the use of a work in any particular case qualifies

as a "fair use". A work used does not necessarily have to satisfy all four

criteria to qualify as an instance of "fair use". Rather, "fair use" is

determined by the overall extent to which the cited work does or does not

substantially satisfy the criteria in their totality. If you wish to use

copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you

must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to:

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml

 

THIS DOCUMENT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS

PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS.