South Korea's Maritime StrategySummary KIM JAE-HWAN/AFP/Getty Images South Korean navy vessels near Yeonpyeong Island Over the past decade, South Korean leaders have encouraged the creation of a stronger, more independent and far-reaching navy. This would be significant for a country whose maritime security has long been provided by the United States. Indeed, Seoul's growing desire and ability to operate far beyond its immediate coastal waters independently of the United States reflects a deeper shift in the region's geopolitical makeup. In upcoming decades, power in East Asia will increasingly be determined at sea, not on land. This means that South Korean imperatives and strategy have become defined by its immediate maritime environment. This was not the case previously, when Seoul focused primarily on the ground conflict over the Korean Peninsula while relying on the United States for maritime protection. While Pyongyang is still Seoul's most immediate security concern, it is just one factor in the South's broader strategy. South Korea's desire to consolidate its place within the region -- one now dominated by China and Japan -- will define its foreign policy in the coming years. Analysis Three interrelated factors shape South Korea's evolving maritime strategy: First is the rise of East Asia as a major maritime sphere, as Seoul has subsequently shifted toward a more balanced military policy that lessens its focus somewhat on relations with the North. Second is the United States' evolving military presence around the peninsula. South Korea has become a military partner with the United States rather than essentially just a U.S. base within a larger Cold War framework. The United States will maintain a presence on the peninsula, but it will no longer exercise complete control over the South's command structures. The third factor is Seoul's efforts to build a better, more autonomous navy -- one that will allow it to defend its commercial interests abroad, its claims near home and, if necessary, its own territorial sovereignty. Regional CompetitionSouth Korea is effectively an island state wedged between two greater powers: China and Japan. Seoul's goal is to maintain autonomy from these larger neighbors through a multifaceted strategy. First and foremost, the country seeks to make itself economically competitive yet politically cooperative with Japan and China while expanding ties with them. This would support South Korea's economic strategy of becoming the hub of the East Asia maritime sphere, both as a transshipment anchor and as a financial and shipbuilding center. Even as it competes with other regional players economically (often undercutting Japan), South Korea will try to become a keystone in their trade flows. Seoul hopes to turn its greatest geopolitical weakness -- its unfavorable location between massive, fundamentally competitive powers -- into an advantage by serving as the primary economic intermediary binding the region together. This would also better enable South Korea to achieve another fundamental maritime goal: ensuring the flow of resources and raw materials from other countries to its own ports and factories. For a country that imports virtually all of the raw materials fueling its industries, resource protection requires a maritime security force. Building such a force, however, would be time-consuming and costly, even in a political vacuum. South Korea sits in a highly aggressive sphere, and it is competing against two countries with greater naval capacities, higher budgets and wider international influence. In many ways, South Korea's tenuous supporting role within Asia's key power structure forces Seoul to develop a more subtle and varied maritime strategy than its more powerful neighbors. Addressing the North and the SeaStill, South Korea's primary strategic imperative is to deter any destabilizing development in its relations with North Korea. While tensions with the North center around the Demilitarized Zone, confrontations often occur in coastal waters, allowing both countries to make military displays without risking a fundamental break. Seoul's view of North Korea has two dimensions: Pyongyang continues to pose a very real threat to South Korean maritime security, as the North is capable of striking along many parts of the South Korean coast (including Seoul) or laying mines along the South's primary sea-lanes. On the other hand, the threat from Pyongyang allows Seoul to justify its ongoing naval buildup as a defensive procedure. This provides South Korea some space as it culls a navy capable of defending interests elsewhere -- for example, on the Jeju and Dokdo islands -- against the larger, longer-term threats posed by China and Japan. The South Korean navy is currently deployed primarily to defend against North Korea's coastal and naval forces. Indeed, over the past few years, the South's navy has developed considerable littoral capabilities and experience in deterring North Korean missile boats, minelayers and submarines. The navy also remains consistently on alert for North Korean attempts to insert special operations forces into the South via small landing craft or midget submarines. By developing Sejong the Great class guided missile destroyers, the South has enhanced its deterrence capabilities against the threat of North Korean (and potentially Chinese) ballistic missiles. The destroyers are equipped with air-defense and surface-to-surface missiles, as well as Aegis Combat Systems, which can track and monitor ballistic missile launches and trajectories. However, the South is also actively expanding its ability to safeguard its economic and energy interests in the wider East Asian sphere. The navy intends to greatly improve its submarine force through the production under license of nine sophisticated and air independent propulsion-equipped Type 214 submarines. Submarines are versatile platforms and would be useful against either North Korea or a stronger maritime opponent. Similarly, the navy is expanding its destroyer and frigate fleets, which provide the South with a relatively large and capable surface force that is flexible for use against the North as well as in scenarios farther abroad. Seoul is also commissioning an amphibious landing ship capable of deploying assets in local, regional and international operations. In many ways, these developments lay the foundation for a navy with broadened security and strategic interests that exceed the original U.S. security framework. This represents something of a break with Washington's original strategy in the region. For the most part, the United States welcomes the shift. It requires less direct involvement of U.S. troops on the peninsula, and it serves Washington's primary interest in East Asia: maintaining a force structure that prevents China (or Japan) from gaining regional hegemony. For the United States, North Korea exists as a remnant of the Cold War framework, which no longer exists. Shifting Maritime PrioritiesAs Seoul's focus gravitates from the North to the sea, diplomacy and trade will become core tactics for ensuring the country's place as the region's maritime hub. Over the past decade, right-wing and left-wing administrations alike spearheaded free trade agreement negotiations with the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and countries in Latin America (Colombia, Chile, Peru and Mexico), North America (Canada and the United States), the Middle East (Turkey) and Asia (India, China and Japan). Some of these deals have met significant opposition (or have been used politically by opposition parties), and some will certainly fail. But as a whole, they suggest a coherent attempt to maximize Seoul's competitive advantage against larger rivals with overlapping economic and energy interests. At the same time, South Korea knows that trade agreements, while expedient, are often subject to domestic political whims, external crises or foreign military interventions. Seoul also understands that the only way to protect against such contingencies is to develop its own security force. Surrounded on three sides by water, South Korea will inevitably need its force to be naval. And while the South's ability to truly project power beyond the East Asian maritime sphere will be heavily constrained by nearby powers as well as by U.S. naval dominance, Seoul will nonetheless work to build a navy capable of deterring immediate interference by either China or Japan. Ultimately, South Korea must do this because it exists in a region where political fault lines are both deep and unstable. How South Korea's role in the East Asian maritime sphere evolves will depend largely on developments in China and Japan. A stagnant Japan combined with a stable, highly aggressive China poses one kind of threat. Economic collapse in China combined with a normalizing, expansionary Japan poses another. An environment in which China and Japan are both strong and increasingly competitive would undermine South Korea's competitiveness and potentially pose real threats to its sovereignty. Seoul must be prepared for each possibility, militarily and diplomatically. |
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