Full Testimony of Subcommittee Hearing 'Hezbollah's Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat'

Noriega Full Testimony of Subcommittee Hearing 'Hezbollah's Strategic Shift:
A Global Terrorist Threat'
Roger Noriega | Wednesday, March 20th, 2013 |

By Roger NoriegaTESTIMONY OF AMB. ROGER F. NORIEGA BEFORE THE U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
NON-PROLIFERATION AND TRADE

"Hezbollah's Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat"

1:30 PM, Wednesday, March 20, 2013

2172 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, DC

Mr. Chairman, I applaud you and other members of the Subcommittee for
focusing attention on the global threat posed by the terrorist group
Hezbollah and for inviting me to share my insights on that organization's
growing network in the Americas that carries this threat to our doorstep.

This past weekend marked the 21st anniversary of the 1992 bombing of the
Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, which murdered 29 people and injured about
250 others. Two years after that attack, the Jewish Community Center in
Argentina's capital city was leveled by another car bomb, leaving 85 persons
murdered and hundreds more wounded. Mr. Chairman, this is Hezbollah's
despicable legacy in the Americas. And that terrorist group – along with
its sponsor, Iran – has returned to the scene of the crime.

As a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, I head a project to examine and expose the dangerous
alliance between the Venezuelan regime of Hugo Chávez and Iran. To date, we
have conducted dozens of interviews with experts and eyewitnesses on the
ground – including some foreign government officials – from throughout the
world and in the region. We also have obtained reams of official Venezuelan
and Iranian documents from our sources inside these regimes, only a fraction
of which we have published to support our conclusions.

Our principal conclusions reveal why and how Hezbollah has extended its
reach in the Americas so substantially and so quickly:

Hezbollah is not a lone wolf. In this Hemisphere it counts on the
political, diplomatic, material and logistical support of governments –
principally Venezuela and Iran – that have little in common but their
hostility to the United States.

To facilitate its activities in our neighborhood – including
smuggling, money laundering, training and fund-raising – Hezbollah
operatives collaborate with well-financed narcotraffickers and guerrilla
groups with sophisticated societal, smuggling and money laundering networks
in the region.

Hezbollah networks have extended their reach into at least a dozen
countries throughout Latin America.

Some may assess this cooperation between "narcos" and terrorists as a
marriage of convenience between different criminal elements or just another
modus operandi of powerful international drug syndicates that can be tackled
by law enforcement. Instead, this criminal activity is the product of a
conscious strategy of rogue regimes in Iran and Venezuela to wage
asymmetrical warfare against U.S. security, interests and allies close to
the homeland. As such, it requires a much more robust analysis and
coordinated response – from exposing terrorist groups working within
Venezuela, identifying narcoterrorist activities in Central America,
imposing sanctions against state-run entities being used to conceal criminal
transactions, to dismantling transnational money laundering schemes.

Under bipartisan legislation passed by Congress in December, the
Department of State was given six months to provide you with an analysis of
and strategy for dealing with Iran's activities in the Americas. Until now,
the State Department has earned a reputation within the U.S. government of
minimizing this threat. This Subcommittee will have to press the Department
to conduct a thorough and rigorous review of the Iranian and Hezbollah
activities in our region and to expose the extraordinary role that is played
by Venezuela in this regard. U.S. diplomats will then have to inform our
neighbors about this problem and lay the groundwork for a coordinated
strategy for dealing with this phenomenon in our Hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, I fear that these narcoterrorist activities will exact an
increasingly terrible price from our neighbors and our nation until our
national security establishment recognizes the nature of the threat and
fashions an effective response.

KEY OBSERVATIONS

Allow me to describe some of the elements of this narcoterrorist
network, followed by a fuller discussion to provide the necessary context to
understand why this threat is extraordinarily dangerous.

Two terrorist networks proselytize, fund-raise, recruit and train
operatives on behalf of Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas.
One of these parallel networks is operated by a
Lebanese-Venezuelan clan, and another is managed by Mohsen Rabbani, a former
Iranian diplomat and Muslim cleric who is wanted for his role in the 1992
and 1994 Buenos Aires bombings against the Israeli Embassy and Jewish
community center, respectively.
Hezbollah operatives and their radical anti-Semitic allies hold
important senior positions in the Venezuelan government and run a network
that provides logistical and material support to terrorist operatives.
In recent years, the Chávez regime has sent weapons to Hezbollah
(ammunition, grenades, rockets, etc., intercepted in 2009 by Israeli
commandos)[i] and shipped refined fuel to Iran and Syria[ii].
Thousands of authentic Venezuelan travel documents have been
provided to persons of Middle Eastern descent in the last decade, and
numerous Latin American governments have detained many Iranian and Lebanese
persons carrying Venezuelan passports.[iii]
The Venezuelan state-owned airline, Conviasa, operates regular
service from Caracas to Damascus and Teheran – providing Iran, Hezbollah,
and associated narcotraffickers a surreptitious means to move personnel,
weapons, contraband and other materiel.

Hezbollah conspires with drug-trafficking networks in Mexico and
Central and South America as a means of raising and laundering funds,
sharing tactics and "reaching out and touching" U.S. territory.
Venezuela's Margarita Island, best known as a Caribbean tourist
destination, has become a safe haven for terrorists and drug smugglers. We
have published documentary evidence that Hezbollah agents operate numerous
businesses and safe houses on the island and elsewhere in Venezuela. In
addition to fund-raising activities, Hezbollah has provided terror training
in Venezuela for recruits from that country and others in the region.
The "Lebanese Cartel" (Cártel Libanés) was formed by the
Lebanese-born Venezuelan businessman, Walid Makled García, to transport
cocaine from Venezuela in complicity with the military and the Colombian
terrorist group known as the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
Colombianas). Makled also brokered corrupt deals with the Shiite Muslim
communities in Venezuela with close ties to Hezbollah.[iv] Makled is wanted
in the United States for cocaine smuggling and has been detained by
Venezuelan authorities.
The criminal case against Lebanese drug lord Ayman Jouma is very
instructive. Jouma was indicted in November 2011 for a sophisticated
cocaine smuggling and money-laundering scheme benefiting Hezbollah.[v] His
network involves criminal associates and corrupt businesses in Colombia, the
United States, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Lebanon. In June 2012,
Venezuelan-Lebanese dual citizens Abbas Hussein Harb, Ali Houssein Harb
(sic), and Kassem Mohamad Saleh and several Venezuelan and Colombian
companies were sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department for their role in
Jouma's narcoterrorist operation.[vi]
In recent years, Mexico has arrested numerous individuals
associated with Hezbollah engaging in criminal activities – including
smuggling of persons across the U.S. southwest border.[vii] For example, in
September 2012, a Lebanese-born U.S. citizen, convicted in 2010 for a credit
card scheme that raised $100,000 for Hezbollah, was arrested in Merida by
Mexican authorities. Rafic Mohammad Labboun Allaboun, an imam from a mosque
in San Jose, California, was traveling with a falsified passport issued by
Belize. He was extradited to the United States.[viii]

The regime of the late Hugo Chávez was able to broker ties between
Hezbollah and narcotraffickers, because it is a narcostate.
U.S. officials have fresh, compelling information implicating
the late leader, the president of the National Assembly (Diosdado Cabello
Rondón), the former Minister of Defense (Henry de Jesús Rangel Silva), the
current army chief (Cliver Alcalá Cordones), and the newly appointed deputy
Minister of Interior (Hugo Carvajal), and dozens of other senior military
officials in trafficking in cocaine.
These politicians and active duty and retired military officers
are responsible for transporting tons of cocaine to Central America, Mexico,
the Caribbean, the United States, west Africa, and Europe. The very
conservative estimates released by the State Department say the amount of
cocaine transiting Venezuela since Chávez took power in 1998 has more than
doubled.[ix]
Our sources also report that representatives of the Mexican
Sinaloa cartel operate in key cocaine transit corridors in Venezuela in
close coordination with Venezuelan officials. It is a little known fact
that the world's most powerful cocaine smuggler and head of the Sinaloa
cartel, Joaquín Archivaldo "El Chapo" Guzmán conducted his business from
Venezuela for much of 2010, living in a suburb of Caracas and on Margarita
Island until early 2011 under the protection of Venezuelan security
officials working for Chávez.
Senior chavista officials engage routinely in lucrative schemes
involving Hezbollah front companies, Colombian terrorist groups,
narcotraffickers, Venezuelan financial institutions and even powerful
state-run entities.

Today, Venezuela is a key ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
which is carrying its asymmetrical battle to our doorstep. Since Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad paid his first visit to Caracas in September 2006, Venezuela has
become one of Iran's most important allies in the world – certainly
Teheran's closest partner in our neighborhood.
Venezuela has helped Iran launder at least $30 billion to evade
international sanctions. Seventy Iranian companies – many of them fronts
for the IRGC that have been sanctioned by Western governments for their
support for Iran's illicit nuclear program – operate suspicious industrial
facilities in Venezuela. The two governments also cooperate in nuclear
technology and the exploration for uranium, despite UN sanctions.

DISCUSSION AND BACKGROUND

VENEZUELA'S HEZBOLLAH-NARCO NEXUS

It is said that wherever Iran goes, Hezbollah is not far behind. In the
case of Venezuela, Hezbollah blazed the trail in Venezuela, establishing a
network of commercial enterprises meant to raise and channel funds and hide
its financial tracks. These activities have exploded in the last seven
years, as Hezbollah's activities in the region gained the active complicity
of the Venezuelan government, the backing of Iranian security forces and
notorious Muslim radicals, and the cooperation of powerful Mexican and
narcotrafficking syndicates that reach onto U.S. soil.

Research from open sources, subject-matter experts, and sensitive
sources within various governments has identified at least two parallel,
collaborative terrorist networks growing at an alarming rate in Latin
America. One of these networks is operated by Venezuelan collaborators, and
the other is managed by a former Iranian diplomat and infamous Muslim
cleric. These networks encompass more than 80 operatives in at least 12
countries throughout the region (with their greatest areas of focus being
Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile).

The Nassereddine Network. Ghazi Atef Nassereddine Abu Ali, a native of
Lebanon who became a Venezuelan citizen about 12 years ago, is Venezuela's
second-ranking diplomat in Syria. Nassereddine is a key Hezbollah asset
because of his close personal relationship to Chávez's Justice and Interior
Minister, Tarik El Aissami, and because of his diplomatic assignment in
Damascus. Along with at least two of his brothers, Nassereddine manages a
network to expand Hezbollah's influence in Venezuela and throughout Latin
America.

Nassereddine's brother Abdallah, a former member of the Venezuelan
congress, uses his position as the former vice president of the Federation
of Arab and American Entities in Latin America and the president of its
local chapter in Venezuela to maintain ties with Islamic communities
throughout the region.[x] He currently resides on Margarita Island, where
he runs various money-laundering operations and manages commercial
enterprises associated with Hezbollah in Latin America. Younger brother
Oday is responsible for establishing paramilitary training centers on
Margarita Island. He is actively recruiting Venezuelans through local
circulos bolivarianos (neighborhood watch committees made up of the most
radical Chávez followers) and sending them to Iran for follow-on training.

The Rabbani Network. Hojjat al-Eslam Mohsen Rabbani, who was the
cultural attaché at the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Buenos
Aires, Argentina, oversees a parallel Hezbollah recruitment network.[xi]
Rabbani is currently the international affairs advisor to the Al-Mostafa
Al-Alam Cultural Institute in Qom, which is tasked with propagation of Shia
Islam outside Iran.[xii] Rabbani, referred to by the important Brazilian
magazine Veja as "the Terrorist Professor,"[xiii] is a die-hard defender of
the Iranian revolution and the mastermind behind the two notorious terrorist
attacks against Jewish targets in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 that killed
144 people.[xiv]

At the time, Rabbani was credentialed as Iran's cultural attaché in the
Argentine capital, which he used as a platform for extremist propaganda,
recruitment and training that culminated in the attacks in the 1990s. In
fact, he continues to exploit that network of Argentine converts today to
expand Iran's and Hezbollah's reach—identifying and recruiting operatives
throughout the region for radicalization and terrorist training in Venezuela
and Iran (specifically, the city of Qom).

At least two mosques in Buenos Aires—Al Imam and At-Tauhid—are operated
by Rabbani disciples. Sheik Abdallah Madani leads the Al Imam mosque, which
also serves as the headquarters for the Islamic-Argentine Association, one
of the most prominent Islamic cultural centers in Latin America.

Some of Rabbani's disciples have taken what they have learned from their
mentor in Argentina and replicated it elsewhere in the region. Sheik Karim
Abdul Paz, an Argentine convert to Shiite Islam, studied under Rabbani in
Qom for five years and succeeded him at the At-Tauhid mosque in Buenos Aires
in 1993.[xv] Abdul Paz is now the imam of a cultural center in Santiago,
Chile, the Centro Chileno Islamico de Cultura de Puerto Montt. Another
Argentine convert to radical Islam and Rabbani disciple is Sheik Suhail
Assad, who lectures at universities throughout the region and recruits young
followers to the cause.[xvi]

A key target of the Rabbani network—and Hezbollah in general—is Brazil,
home to some one million Muslims. Rabbani travels to Brazil regularly to
visit his brother, Mohammad Baquer Rabbani Razavi, founder of the Iranian
Association in Brazil.[xvii] Another of his principal collaborators is
Sheik Khaled Taki Eldyn, a Sunni radical from the Sao Paulo Guarulhos
mosque. Taki Eldyn, who is active in ecumenical activities with the Shia
mosques, also serves as the secretary general of the Council of the Leaders
of the Societies and Islamic Affairs of Brazil.[xviii] A sensitive source
linked that mosque to a TBA network cited by the US Treasury Department as
providing major financial and logistical support to Hezbollah.[xix] As far
back as 1995, Taki Eldyn hosted al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and 9/11
mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed in the TBA region.

According to Brazilian intelligence sources cited by the magazine Veja,
at least 20 operatives from Hezbollah, al Qaeda and the Islamic Jihad are
using Brazil as a hub for terrorist activity. [xx] The fact that Brazil is
set to host the FIFA World Cup tournament in 2014 and the Summer Olympics in
2016 makes it an inviting target for international terrorism. U.S.
officials should be approaching Brazilian officials to discuss the potential
threat of Venezuelan-Iranian support for narcoterrorism. Unfortunately,
most U.S. diplomats are as indifferent to this reality as their Brazilian
counterparts.

IRAN'S DANGEROUS GAMBIT IN OUR NEIGHBORHOOD

To comprehend what Iran is up to, we must set aside conventional wisdom
about its ambitions, strategies and tactics and follow the evidence where it
leads. For example, in the aftermath of a brazen plot discovered in October
2011 in which Iranian agents conspired with supposed Mexican drug cartel
leaders to commit a terrorist bombing in the heart of our Nation's
capital,[xxi] Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, revealed
that "Iranian officials" at the highest levels "are now more willing to
conduct an attack in the United States…." General Clapper also reported
that Iran's so-called "supreme leader" Ali Khamenei was probably aware of
this planning.[xxii]

Iranian officials have made no secret of the regime's intention to carry
its asymmetrical struggle to the streets of the United States. For example,
in a May 2011 speech in Bolivia, Iran's Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi
promised a "tough and crushing response" to any U.S. offensive against
Iran.[xxiii] At the same time that Iran caught the world's attention by
threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced a
five-nation swing through Latin America aimed at advancing its influence and
operational capabilities on the U.S. doorstep.[xxiv]

The intelligence community's fresh assessment of Iran's willingness to
wage an attack on our soil leads to the inescapable conclusion that
Teheran's activities near our homeland constitute a very real threat that
can no longer be ignored.

Bracing for a potential showdown over its illicit nuclear program and
emboldened by inattention from Washington in Latin America, Iran has sought
strategic advantage in our neighborhood. It also is preparing to play the
narcoterrorism card—exploiting its partnership with Venezuelan operatives,
reaching into Mexico, and activating a decades-old network in Argentina,
Brazil and elsewhere in the region.

Today, a shadowy network of embassies, Islamic centers, financial
institutions, and commercial and industrial enterprises in several countries
affords Iran a physical presence in relatively close proximity to the United
States. Iran is well-positioned to use its relationships with these
countries to pose a direct threat to U.S. territory, strategic waterways and
American allies. Iran also has provided the Venezuelan military with weapon
systems that gave Venezuela unprecedented capabilities to threaten its
neighbors and the United States.

Notably, a half-dozen Iranian companies sanctioned by U.N., U.S. or
European authorities have built suspicious industrial installations at
various sites in Venezuela.[xxv] These facilities were important enough to
attract secret visits by Iranian Major General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the
Revolutionary Guard Corps aerospace commander who previously headed Iran's
missile program, in July 2009 and November 2011.

VENEZUELA'S PIVOTAL ROLE SUPPORTING IRAN AND TERRORISM

In recent congressional testimony, investigative journalist Doug Farah
describes "the merging of [Hugo Chávez's] Bolivarian Revolution's
criminal-terrorist pipeline activities and those of the criminal-terrorist
pipeline of radical extremist groups (Hezbollah in particular) supported by
the Iranian regime."[xxvi] Such ties are invaluable to groups like
Hezbollah, as they afford them protection, safe havens in which to operate,
and even diplomatic status and immunity. In short, Venezuela plays a
singular role as a platform for the Hezbollah threat in the Americas.

It is important to bear in mind that Venezuela is not just another
developing country that is unable to control its territory. Venezuela is an
oil-rich state that has collected about $1.1 trillion in oil revenue in the
last decade. It also is not just an isolated hostile state: Venezuela has
collected $28 billion in loans from China in the last two years, and has
purchased at least $9 billion in arms from the Russians in the last
decade.[xxvii]

With the success of the U.S.-backed Plan Colombia, about six or seven
years ago, South American narcotraffickers had to adjust their smuggling
routes. They had to look no farther than Caracas. Chávez doled out
lucrative drug trafficking deals as a means to secure the loyalty of
military subordinates and to generate billions in revenue and make them
complicit in his corrupt regime. As described above, dozens of senior
military officials closely associated with Chávez have been implicated in
narcotrafficking crimes. The de facto head of the Venezuelan Cártel del
Sol is Diosdado Cabello, National Assembly president and ruling party chief.

That military syndicate operates parallel to a civilian network known as
the Cártel Libanés, which was formed by the Lebanese-born Walid Makled
García. According to journalist and narcoterror expert, Douglas Farah, "The
supplier of the cocaine [to the Makled cartel] was the FARC in Colombia…."
Farah's sources also reported that Makled was a key link between various
criminal groups and Venezuela's Shiite Muslim communities that have a strong
financial relationship with Hezbollah."[xxviii] Makled is wanted in the
United States for cocaine smuggling; after being detained in Colombia, he
gave a series of media interviews implicating dozens of Venezuela officials
in cocaine smuggling. Colombia surprised many observers by extraditing
Makled to Venezuela, where his closed-door trial began in April 2012.[xxix]

Even before Chávez won power in 1998, he established intimate links to
the Colombian guerrilla group FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
Colombianas) – which wages a terrorist war against a democratic government
and ally of the United States. For many years, FARC commanders and troops
have operated in and out of Venezuela with the complicity of the Chávez
regime. A principal activity of the FARC today is the transportation of
cocaine to safe havens operated by the Venezuelan military for transport to
the United States and other countries.

In September 2012, pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act of 2003, President Obama determined that
Venezuela was one of three countries in the world (along with Bolivia and
Burma) that "failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to
their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements…."[xxx]

Venezuela's internal security apparatus has been organized and directed
by Cuba, a country designated by the U.S. State Department as a state
sponsor of terrorism. That same report cited Venezuela's "economic,
financial and diplomatic cooperation with Iran…."[xxxi] Chávez's aides make
no secret of ongoing oil shipments to a third terrorist state, Syria. Just
as Hezbollah, Cuba, Syria and Iran are considered terrorist threats to U.S.
national security interests, Venezuela's crucial support for each of them
should be, too. Although this support may not pose a classical conventional
threat, it is precisely the kind of asymmetrical tactics that our enemies
favor today.

The chavista regime also has served as the principal interlocutor on
Iran's behalf with other like-minded heads of state in the region, primarily
Rafael Correa (of Ecuador) and Evo Morales (of Bolivia), both members of the
Chávez-sponsored Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA)
and both of whom have established dubious networks with criminal
transnational groups.[xxxii]

CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP REQUIRED

Mr. Chairman, our project has shared substantial information about these
aforementioned threats with U.S. government officials—either directly or
through Members of Congress. Too often the attitude we have encountered in
the executive branch has been one of skepticism or indifference.
Apparently, this indifference has left senior U.S. officials uninformed on
the subject. For example, President Obama told a Miami journalist in July
2012, "[M]y sense is that what Mr. Chávez has done over the last several
years has not had a serious national security impact on us." U.S. General
Douglas Fraser (USAF), the former regional commander of U.S. Southern
Command, subsequently supported the appraisal that Venezuela does not
represent a threat to U.S. national security.[xxxiii] "As I look at Iran and
their connection with Venezuela," said Fraser, "I see that still primarily
as a diplomatic and economic relationship."

Mr. Chairman, I believe the foregoing discussion of the facts on the
ground will lead most reasonable observers to a very different conclusion.
Important exceptions to executive branch neglect is the work of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury to sanction numerous Venezuelan
officials and entities for their complicity with and support for Iran and
international terrorism; in addition, U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, Preet Bharara, has investigated and prosecuted key
cases to attack this international conspiracy. Inexplicably, according to
law enforcement sources, State Department officers systematically resist the
application of sanctions against Venezuelan officials and entities, despite
the fact that these suspects are playing an increasingly important role in
Iran's operational capabilities near U.S. territory.

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that Congressional attention, such as this
hearing, is essential to encourage Executive branch agencies to act. For
example, sanctions against Venezuela's state-owned petroleum company for
transactions with Iran were the direct result of pressure by the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, acting in part on information uncovered by
AEI's project.

As I mentioned earlier, the "Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere
Act of 2012," authored by Representative Jeff Duncan (R-SC), passed with
strong bipartisan support, require the Executive branch to report to
Congress on Iran's activities in a host of areas and to provide a strategy
for countering this threat.

I believe that such a thorough, Congressionally-mandated review will
require the Executive branch to apply additional needed intelligence
resources to collect on subject matters in Venezuela, Mexico, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Central America and beyond. Once national security officials study
the scope and depth of the problem, I hope for a whole-of-government
response to protect our security, our interests and our allies against the
threat posed by a narcoterrorist network in the Americas. Once Congress
receives this report, perhaps this challenge will be treated as a budgetary
priority so that law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the
resources to respond urgently and effectively. Of course, our project at
AEI is prepared to cooperate with this policy review by providing the
Subcommittee documents and analysis regarding suspicious transactions and
installations operated by Iran in Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia and
elsewhere in the region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The involvement of Venezuelan officials and state-run entitites in
drug trafficking, terrorism and/or Iran must be on the table as the State
Department presents conditions for normalizing bilateral relations with
Chávez's successor. In the mean time, this involvement must be publicized
and punished in the form of federal indictments. Sanctions by the
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control are good
interim measures. However, in the case of Venezuelan officials and
state-run entities, indictments are much more meaningful. The Department of
Justice headquarters should be asked to explain why such prosecutorial
actions have failed to meet this extraordinary lawlessness.

Congress should demand U.S. diplomats be more cooperative with law
enforcement and intelligence efforts aimed at exposing and punishing
criminal behavior and terrorist activities in the region. Specifically, the
Department of State must be more cooperative in raising this phenomenon with
our neighbors. We also must find a way to talk about this problem with our
friends in a way that it is not misunderstood as an accusation against those
governments as they work with us to confront the problem.

Congress should give U.S. intelligence and security agencies the
resources required to expand their capabilities to confront extra-regional
threats and cross-border criminality.

U.S. national security agencies, led by the Department of State,
should increase the dialogue and cooperation with regional and European
military, intelligence, and security agencies on the common threat posed by
the Hezbollah-Iranian-Venezuelan alliance.

Congress should use its oversight functions to determine if U.S.
Northern and Southern Commands, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration have adequate programs and funding to support
U.S. anti-drug cooperation with Mexico and Central America.

CONCLUSION

As I stated before another Congressional subcommittee nearly two years
ago, the "Hezbollah/Iranian presence in Latin America constitutes a clear
threat to the security of the U.S. homeland…. In addition to operational
terrorist activity, Hezbollah also is immersed in criminal activity
throughout the region – from trafficking in weapons, drugs, and persons….
If our government and responsible partners in Latin America fail to act, I
believe there will be an attack on U.S. personnel, installations or
interests in the Americas…" as a result of this dangerous conspiracy.

The narcoterrorism on our doorstep, perpetrated by Hezbollah with
Iranian and Venezuelan support, demands a response from those whose job it
is to keep us safe. Our government must take effective
measures—unilaterally and with willing partners—to disrupt and dismantle
illicit operations and neutralize unacceptable threats.

Roger F. Noriega was U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American
States from 2001-03 and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State from 2003-05. He
is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, managing director of Vision Americas LLC, which represents U.S.
and foreign clients, and contributor to www.interamericansecuritywatch.com.

[i] http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/05/world/fg-israel-arms-boat5

[ii]
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/world/americas/chavez-appears-to-use-venez
uelan-fuel-to-help-syrias-assad.html

[iii] One of the 9/11 attackers had ties to a man traveling on an
authentic Venezuelan passport bearing the name "Hakim Mohamed Ali Diab
Fattah." Diab Fattah was detained by the FBI and deported to Venezuela;
when the FBI asked the Venezuelan government for access to this man,
authorities there claimed that he never entered the country.

[iv] "The Further Narco-Terrorist Ties of the Chávez Government," by
Douglas Farah, November 12, 2010.
http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/543/the-further-narco-terrorist-ties-of-
the-chavez-government

[v] "Ties Between Hezbollah and Mexican Drug Cartels Revealed," by
Rebecca Anna Stoil, The Jerusalem Post, December 15, 2011.
http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=249684

[vi] "Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering Network Linked to Drug
Trafficker Ayman Joumaa and a Key Hizballah Supporter in South America,"
U.S. Department of the Treasury press release, June 27, 2012.
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1624.aspx

[vii] "Exclusive: Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into the U.S.,"
Washington Times, March 27, 2009.

[viii] "Mexico Extradites Suspected Hezbollah Member," September 11,
2012.
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/09/11/mexico-extradites-suspected
-hezbollah-member/

[ix] International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2013, U.S.
Department of State, March 3, 2013.
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/vol1/204052.htm#Venezuela

[x] This organization was founded in Argentina in 1972 to unite Muslims,
namely the Syrian and Lebanese communities, in Latin America and has spread
rapidly throughout Latin America, with offices in Argentina, Chile, Brazil,
Cuba, Venezuela, Guadalupe Island, Antigua, and Uruguay. It is overtly
anti-Israel; supportive of anti-American regimes in the Middle East and
Latin America; and used as a platform for Hezbollah to raise money, recruit
supporters, and solicit illegal visas.

[xi] "Reis-Jomhour-e Arzhantin Dar Sazeman-e Melal: Tehran Ba
Mohakemeh-ye Maqamatash Dar Keshvar-e Sales Movafeqat Konad" [The President
of Argentina: Tehran Should Accept Trial of Its Authorities in a Third
Country], Asr-e Iran (Tehran), September 25, 2010, www.asriran.com
(available in Persian, accessed September 29, 2011).

[xii] "Din va Siasat Dar Amrika-ye Latin Dar Goftegou Ba Ostad Mohsen
Rabbani" [Religion and Politics in Latin America in Conversation with
Professor Mohsen Rabbani], Book Room (Tehran), May 3, 2010.

[xiii] "The Terrorist 'Professor,'" Veja (Brazil), April 20, 2011.

[xiv] Marcelo Martinez Burgos and Alberto Nissman, Office of Criminal
Investigations: AMIA Case (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Investigations Unit of
the Office of the Attorney General, 2006),
www.peaceandtolerance.org/docs/nismanindict.pdf (accessed September 27,
2011). Eight Iranian officials are considered fugitives by Interpol for
their role in the Argentina attacks, including

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (former Iranian president); Ali Fallahijan
(former Intelligence minister); Ali Akbar Velayati (former Foreign Affairs
minister); Mohsen Rezai (former head of the Revolutionary Guards Pasdaran)";
current Defense minister Ahmad Vahidi; Mohsen Rabbani (former Cultural
affairs officer at the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires); Ahmad Reza Asghari
(former third secretary at the Iran embassy in Buenos Aires); and Hadi
Soleimanpour (former Ambassador in Argentina).
http://en.mercopress.com/2012/06/19/jewish-centre-asks-for-arrest-of-iranian
-terrorist-suspects-if-they-attend-rio-20

[xv] "Goftegou Ba Sarkar-e Khanom-e Ma'soumeh As'ad Paz Az Keshvar-e
Arzhantin" [Conversation with Lade Ma'soumeh As'ad Paz From Argentina],
Ahlulbayt (Tehran), June 13, 2011.

[xvi] Marielos Márquez, "'El Islam es una forma de vida': Sheij Suhail
Assad," DiarioCoLatino, August 27, 2007.

[xvii] "Sourat-e Jalaseh" [Agenda], Iranianbrazil (Brazil), March 17,
2010.

[xviii] "Aein-ha-ye Ramezani Dar Berezil" [Ramadan Traditions in
Brazil], Taghrib News (Qom), September 5, 2010.

[xix] US Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Designates Islamic
Extremist, Two Companies Supporting Hizballah in Tri-Border Area," news
release, June 10, 2004.

[xx] "The Terrorist 'Professor,'" Veja (Brazil), April 20, 2011.

[xxi] "Notorious Iranian Militant has a Connection to Alleged
Assassination Plot Against Saudi Envoy, by Peter Finn, The Washington Post,
October 14, 2011.

[xxii]

[xxiii] "Sanction shows US weakness, says Iran minister," Iranian
Students' News Agency, June 1, 2011; "Iran Warns of Street War in Tel Aviv
If Attacked," Fars News Agency, November 8, 2011.

[xxiv] "Iran Seeking to Expand Influence in Latin America," by Joby
Warrick, The Washington Post, January 1, 2012.

[xxv] Iranian companies sanctioned on repeated occasions by the U.S
Treasury, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the U.N. Security Council
(United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1747, 1803, 1929), the European
Union (2008, 2010, 2011), the United Kingdom (2007,2008), Germany (2005),
and Japan.

[xxvi] Douglas Farah, "Hezbollah in Latin America: Implications for U.S.
Security," Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, July 7, 2011,
www.homeland.house.gov/sites /homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Farah.pdf
(accessed September 27, 2011).

[xxvii] In the last four years, the Russians have sold at least $9
billion in arms to Venezuela and has constructed a factory in Maracay,
Venezuela, that can produce about 25,000 assault rifles per year. The
latest $4 billion Russian line of credit announced in June 2012 will go
toward arming chavista militias – shock troops loyal to the regime and meant
to intimidate the opposition.

[xxviii] "The Further Narco-Terrorist Ties of the Chávez Government," by
Douglas Farah, November 12, 2010.
http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/543/the-further-narco-terrorist-ties-of-
the-chavez-government

[xxix] "5 Things to Watch for in Venezuelan Kingpin Walid Makled's
Trial," by Elyssa Pachico, Latin America Monitor, July 31, 2012.
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0731/5-th
ings-to-watch-for-in-Venezuelan-kingpin-Walid-Makled-s-trial

[xxx] See the September 14, 2012, Presidential Memorandum at this site:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/14/presidential-memorandu
m-presidential-determination-annual-presidential-d.

[xxxi] http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195546.htm

[xxxii] José R. Cárdenas, "The Chávez Model Threatens Ecuador," AEI
Latin American Outlook (March 2011), www.aei.org/outlook/101037; Douglas
Farah, Into the Abyss: Bolivia under Evo Morales and the MAS (Alexandria,
VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2009),
www.strategycenter.net/files/2011/10/06/20090618_IASCIntoTheAbyss061709.pdf
(accessed September 27, 2011).

[xxxiii] "Top U.S. General: Venezuela not a Threat," by Frank Bajak,
The Associated Press, July 31, 2012.
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/top-us-general-venezuela-not-threat


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