Iran's Global Force Projection Network: IRGC Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah

Iran’s Global Force Projection Network: IRGC Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah

By Will Fulton

March 20, 2013

http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/fulton-iran-global-force-projection-network-irgc-quds-force-lebanese-hezbollah-march-20-2013

Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade hearing on “Hezbollah’s Strategic

Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat."

 

The Islamic Republic of Iran is first and foremost concerned with regime

preservation, and its strategic calculus and behavior are deeply influenced

by this concern. It is therefore essential that Iran’s global terror

campaign is considered within this context. Iran’s global force projection

network, to include the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the

Quds Force, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Gaza, is

primarily a deterrence and retaliatory force, nested within a strategy

designed to protect the regime from external threats. By demonstrating a

capability to strike U.S. and Israeli interests anywhere in the world, or

creating a perception of this capability, Iran’s leaders hope to stave off a

military strike, or at least make it extremely costly for their foes.

 

This has been a component of Iran’s strategic thinking since the earliest

years of the Iranian Revolution. In 1980, while the regime was still in its

infancy and officials were debating the direction of Iran’s foreign policy,

the official organ of the IRGC published an editorial describing why Iran’s

global terrorist network is fundamental to regime survival. It reads in

part:

 

In order to achieve ideological, political, security and economic

self-reliance we have no other choice but to mobilize all forces loyal to

the Islamic Revolution, and through this mobilization, plant such a terror

in the hearts of the enemies that they abandon the thought of an offensive

and annihilation of our revolution…. If our revolution does not have an

offensive and internationalist dimension, the enemies of Islam will again

enslave us culturally, politically, and the like, and they will not abstain

from plunder and looting.[1]

 

This, in my view, is an accurate reflection of Iranian strategic thinking

still today. In order to understand the Iranian global terrorist activity

that we see currently, it is important to bear in mind the strategic

thinking out of which this behavior has emerged.

 

It is noteworthy that this sentiment was articulated by the IRGC, as this is

the organization that is primarily responsible for managing Iran’s global

force projection network.

 

The IRGC is a revolutionary, ideological military organization and an

economic and political powerhouse within Iran. The IRGC’s self-described

primary mission is to defend Iran’s Islamic Revolution; in other words, to

preserve the regime.[2] To accomplish this mission, the IRGC is tasked with

internal security, conventional deterrence and defense, internal and

external intelligence collection, and foreign military operations.

 

The IRGC’s senior leadership consists of a core network of individuals who

developed professional military experience and enduring personal

relationships during Iran’s eight-year war with Iraq (1980-1988).[3] The

commander of the IRGC, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, reports to Iran’s

Supreme Leader and each of the IRGC’s five combat service commanders report

directly to Jafari, with the exception of one. Quds Force Commander Major

General Qassem Suleimani also reports directly to the Supreme Leader.[4]

 

 

This point is extremely important to understanding the extent to which

Iran’s senior leadership is complicit in the global activities of the Quds

Force, its partners, and proxies. There is no intermediary between the

Supreme Leader and Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimani. Any Quds Force

activity has, at a minimum, tacit approval of the Supreme Leader.

 

The notion that Quds Force operations – such as the 2011 plot to assassinate

the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. in a mass-casualty attack in Washington,

D.C. – is undertaken by rogue elements of the Quds Force without the

approval of Qassem Suleimani and the Supreme Leader is anathema to the

IRGC’s command structure.[5]

 

The IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah have a well-known historical relationship

that continues to this day. The IRGC deployed one of its brigades to

southern Lebanon in the early 1980s to create and stand up Hezbollah.[6]

Since that time Iran has provided continuous financial and materiel support

to Hezbollah, and their partnership has materialized in the form of multiple

mass-casualty terrorist attacks around the globe, targeted assassinations,

and military operations in wartime environments.[7] This last element of

collaboration is well-documented and provides insight into the depth of

cooperation between the Quds Force and Hezbollah in their operations.

Moreover, the Quds Force personnel known to have been involved in these

operations continue to play senior roles in Iran’s global force projection

network today.

 

During the Iraq War, the Quds Force teamed with Lebanese Hezbollah to train,

fund and arm Iraqi Shia militant groups, and plan and execute attacks

against U.S. and Coalition Forces. In one such example, Deputy Commander of

the Quds Force External Special Operations Unit, Abdul Reza Shahlai, along

with senior Hezbollah operative Ali Musa Daqduq, planned a sophisticated

attack in 2007 that resulted in the death of five U.S. soldiers in Karbala,

Iraq.[8]

 

Shahlai later went on to help plan and facilitate the failed 2011 plot to

assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. in Washington, D.C.[9] Daqduq,

who had been appointed in 2005 by Hezbollah to coordinate training for Iraqi

militants inside Iran with the Quds Force, was detained by Coalition Forces

in 2007.[10] He was released by the Iraqi government in 2012.[11] Reports

indicate that Daqduq fled Baghdad for Lebanon after his release.[12]

 

The third highest-ranking commander of the Quds Force, Operations and

Training Deputy Mohsen Chizari, was also active in Iraq. Chizari was

detained by U.S. forces in Baghdad in 2006 along with another unnamed Quds

Force officer and detailed information on the import of sophisticated

weaponry from Iran to Iraq.[13] The Iraqi government quickly released

Chizari and his co-conspirator, citing diplomatic immunity.[14] Five years

later, in May 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Chizari,

along with Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimani, for their role in

supporting Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria.[15]

 

Iran’s involvement in Syria is not surprising. Iran maintains a number of

strategic interests that have been affected by the ongoing crisis, and the

centrality of Syria to Iran’s regional objectives has necessitated an

integrated effort. Syria has long been Iran’s closest state ally and

provided crucial access to Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as Hamas in Gaza,

and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank. Iran has used Syria as a hub to finance

and transport personnel and weapons to these groups. Furthermore, Iran has

invested in Syria as a strategic partner as part of its deterrence strategy

vis-à-vis Israel and as an Arab ally in its rivalry with Turkey and the

Persian Gulf states. Iran is, therefore, implementing a two-track strategy

in Syria, undertaking efforts to both preserve the Assad regime for as long

as possible while working to create a permissive operational environment in

post-Assad Syria.[16]

 

This effort has been led primarily by the Quds Force, which has deployed

senior personnel into Syria in order to arm, train, and advise elements of

Assad’s security forces.[17] The assassination of senior Quds Force

commander Brigadier General Hassan Shateri in Syria last month is evidence

of ongoing Quds Force activity directed at the highest levels.[18] Iran’s

efforts have also increasingly involved Lebanese Hezbollah. The Quds Force

and Hezbollah have cooperated in ensuring the passage of Iranian arms

shipments to Syria since at least 2012.[19] They have also cooperated to

train pro-Assad forces inside Syria.[20]

 

Hezbollah has recently increased its direct combat role in Syria. Hezbollah

forces launched an attack in February 2013 in coordination with Assad’s

forces against rebel-held villages near al Qusayr, Syria.[21] The January

2013 Israeli strike on a Hezbollah military convoy transporting SA-17

anti-aircraft missiles revealed that the organization was working to move

more sophisticated weaponry out of Syria into Lebanon.[22] The emergence of

the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade in Syria, a conglomerate of Syrian and

foreign Shia fighters, including members of Hezbollah and Iraqi militia

groups which purports to protect the Shia Sayyeda Zeinab shrine and

surrounding neighborhood in Damascus, could provide Iran and the Quds Force

another avenue to both assist Assad militarily and influence the conflict

after regime collapse.[23]

 

The extent of Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in Syria reflects the

centrality of Syria to both. The loss of Syria as a state ally will

significantly impact Iran’s ability to deter Israel, project power in the

Levant, and supply its proxies.

 

Iran may achieve some success with this two-track strategy, prolonging the

conflict and creating conditions whereby it can retain some of its

operational capacity in the Levant. The loss of Syria as a state ally,

however, will significantly limit Iran’s strategic depth. A rump Alawite

state cannot provide Iran with the same level of deterrence, or political

and economic support as Assad’s Syria. Moreover, a rump Alawite state cannot

be sustained indefinitely. [24] Iran’s efforts in this regard offer only a

temporary solution to a much greater problem.

 

Iran is certainly aware that the loss of Syria will significantly degrade

its ability to project power in the Levant and has planned for such a

contingency. In order to compensate for this loss and continue to present an

effective deterrence force, Iran may look to expand its activities in other

countries and regions. The interception earlier this month of an Iranian

weapons shipment containing sophisticated Chinese-made antiaircraft

missiles, and large quantities of arms, ammunition, and explosive material

destined for al Houthi rebels in Yemen suggests that, in at least one area,

Iran has ramped up its support for militants elsewhere.[25]

 

The Quds Force’s recent escalation of global activity over the past two

years, including a plot to conduct a mass-casualty attack in Washington

D.C., a mixed bag of failure and success in its terrorist plots against

Israeli interests in Georgia, India, and Azerbaijan, and plans to carry out

attacks in Bahrain, Kenya, and Nigeria, indicate that Iran is growing and

operationalizing its global force projection network.[26] This is likely an

effort on Iran’s part to demonstrate that it, indeed, has a robust deterrent

and retaliatory force in place. As the conflict in Syria stretches on,

Damascus slips from Assad’s control, and Iran sees its strategic depth

continually eroded, we are likely to see not just increasing Iranian

military activity in Syria but a more risk-prone Iranian regional and global

strategy.          

[1] “tahlili bar zarourat-e tashkil-e sepah dar seh bod-e ideolozhi, siyasi,

nezami” [An Analysis of the Necessity of Establishing the Guards in the

Three Dimensions of Ideology, Politics, and Military], Payam-e Enqelab

(Tehran), March 19, 1980, p. 32. Translation from: Ali Alfoneh. Iran

Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards is Turning Theocracy into Military

Dictatorship (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, forthcoming).

[2] “dafa’ az enghelab-e eslami mohemtarin mamuriyat-e sepah” [Defending the

Islamic Revolution is the Sepah’s Most Important Mision], Bultan, December

13, 2012. Available in Persian:

http://www.bultannews.com/fa/news/114985/%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D8%

B2-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C

-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1%D

B%8C%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87

[3] Will Fulton, “IRGC Command Network: Formal Structures and Informal

Influence,” AEI Critical Threats Project, October 10, 2012. Available:

http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/fulton-irgc-command-network-october-10-2

012

[4] “baraye hezf-e Israel yek bahaneh va 24 sa’at vaght lazem darim” [We

only need an excuse and 24 hours to destroy Israel], Jahan News, September

29, 2012. Available in Persian:

http://jahannews.com/vdcbgzb5grhba8p.uiur.html

[5] “Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador

to the United States,” U.S. Department of Justice, October 11, 2011.

Available: http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-ag-1339.html

[6] “farmandeh-ye jedid-e sepah-e mohammad rasoulallah kist?” [Who is the

new IRGC Mohammad Rasoul Allah Commander?], Tabnak, November 12, 2009.

Available in Persian:

http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/72683/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%8

7-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF

-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%84%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%B

3%D8%AA%D8%9F

[7] “Hizbullah,” National Counterterrorism Center: Counterterrorism 2013

Calendar. Available: http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/hizballah.html

[8] “Treasury Designates Individuals and Entities Fueling Violence in Iraq,”

U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 16, 2008. Available:

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1141.aspx

“Iran Arming, Training, Directing Terror Groups in Iraq, U.S. Official

Says,” U.S. Department of Defense, July 2, 2007. Available:

http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=46606

[9] “Treasury Sanctions Five Individuals Tied to Iranian Plot to Assassinate

the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States,” U.S. Department of the

Treasury, October 11, 2011. Available:

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1320.aspx

[10] “Iran Arming, Training, Directing Terror Groups in Iraq, U.S. Official

Says,” U.S. Department of Defense, July 2, 2007. Available:

http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=46606

[11] “Iraq releases suspected Hezbollah operative Daqduq,” Reuters, November

16, 2012. Available:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/16/us-iraq-daqduq-release-idUSBRE8AF0

SS20121116

[12] “Iraqi PM cites lack of evidence in release of man wanted by US in

killings of soldiers,” CNN, November 19, 2012. Available:

http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/17/world/meast/iraq-us-militant-charges

[13] Sudarsan Raghavan and Robin Wright, “Iraq Expels 2 Iranians Detained by

U.S.,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2012. Available:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/29/AR2006122901

510_pf.html

[14] Ibid.

[15] “Treasury Designates Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security for

Human Rights Abuses and Support for Terrorism,” U.S. Department of the

Treasury, February 16, 2012. Available:

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1424.aspx

[16] Joseph Holliday, Will Fulton, Sam Wyer, “Iranian Strategy in Syria,”

Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project,

forthcoming.

Joseph Holliday and Elizabeth O’Bagy of the Institute for the Study of War

have done considerable work on the Syrian conflict. For more information on

the current operational environment in Syria, including Iran’s involvement

in that conflict, see:

Joseph Holliday, “The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency To Civil War,”

Institute for the Study of War, March 6, 2013. Available:

http://www.understandingwar.org/report/assad-regime

Elizabeth O’Bagy, “Jihad in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War,

September 17, 2012. Available:

http://www.understandingwar.org/report/jihad-syria

[17] “Administration Takes Additional Steps to Hold the Government of Syria

Accountable for Violent Repression Against the Syrian People,” U.S.

Department of the Treasury, May 18, 2011. Available:

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1181.aspx

[18] Will Fulton, “The Assassination of Iranian Quds Force General Hassan

Shateri in Syria,” AEI Critical Threats, February 28, 2013. Available:

http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/fulton-assassination-iranian-quds-force-

general-hassan-shateri-syria-february-28-2013

[19] “Treasury Targets Iranian Arms Shipments,” U.S. Department of the

Treasury, March 27, 2012. Available:

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1506.aspx

“Treasury Designates Syrian Entity, Others Involved in Arms and

Communications Procurement Networks and Identifies Blocked Iranian

Aircraft,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 19, 2012. Available:

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1714.aspx

[20] “Treasury Sanctions Al-Nusrah Front Leadership in Syria and Militias

Supporting the Asad Regime,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 11,

2012. Available:

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1797.aspx

[21] Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Laila Bassam, “Hezbollah fighter, five Syrian

rebels killed on border,” Reuters, February 17, 2013. Available:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/17/us-syria-crisis-hezbollah-idUSBRE9

1G0CX20130217

Patrick McDonnell, Nabih Bulos, “Hezbollah fighters reported killed in

clashes with Syrian rebels,” The Los Angeles Times, February 18, 2013.

Available:

http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-hezbollah-fighters-repor

ted-killed-20130218,0,7954864.story

[22] “White House warns Syria over 'weapons to Hezbollah',” BBC News,

January 31, 2013. Available:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21281923

[23] Nicholas Blanford, “Video appears to show Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiites

fighting in Syria,” Christian Science Monitor, January 18, 2013. Available:

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0118/Video-appears-to-show-H

ezbollah-and-Iraqi-Shiites-fighting-in-Syria

Statement #1 by Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade posted on Facebook, January

2013. Translated from Arabic.

Suadad al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ite militants fight for Syria’s Assad,” Reuters,

October 16, 2012.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/16/us-syria-crisis-iraq-militias-idUS

BRE89F0PX20121016

[24] “Sen. Carl Levin Holds A Hearing On U.S. Central Command And U.S.

Special Operations Command,” CQ Transcriptions, March 5, 2013. Available on

Lexis-Nexis.

[25] Robert F. Worth and C.J. Chivers, “Seized Chinese Weapons Raise

Concerns on Iran,” The New York Times, March 2, 2013. Available:

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/world/middleeast/seized-arms-off-yemen-rai

se-alarm-over-iran.html

[26] “Bahrain convicts six of plotting with Iran,” Reuters, May 27, 2012.

Available:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/27/us-bahrain-plot-trial-idUSBRE84Q08

P20120527

“Azerbaijan arrests plot suspects, cites Iran link,” Reuters, January 25,

2012. Available:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/25/azerbaijan-israel-plot-idUSL5E8CP3

LB20120125

Ethan Bronner, “Israel Says Iran Is Behind Bombs,” February 13, 2012.

Available:

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/world/middleeast/israeli-embassy-officials

-attacked-in-india-and-georgia.html

Dan Williams, “Israel blames Iran after attacks on embassy staff,” Reuters,

February 13, 2012. Available:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/13/us-israel-security-embassies-idUST

RE81C0QZ20120213

Jason Straziuso, Tom Odula “Iranians in Kenya planned Israeli, US attacks,”

Associated Press, July 2, 2012. Available:

http://news.yahoo.com/ap-iranians-kenya-planned-israeli-us-attacks-172250609

.html <

Camilius Eboh, “Nigeria says arrests Iran-linked cell targeting U.S.,

Israel,” Reuters, Februar 21, 2013. Available:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/21/us-nigeria-iran-idUSBRE91K09420130

221?irpc=932

 

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