The Coming Battle for Damascus

http://francona.blogspot.com/2013/02/the-coming-battle-for-damascus.html

February 8, 2013

The Coming Battle for Damascus

Aleppo

The two-year old civil war in Syria may be reaching a tipping point. Fighting rages across the country in almost all of the major cities and large portions of the countryside. It is hard to determine who is "winning" because it really does not matter. All that matters is who emerges as the victor at the end.

That end will be determined in the streets of the capital - the fighting elsewhere is important, but the fate of the Syrian people will be, as it always has been, in the streets of Damascus. It will be the battle FOR Damascus, not the battle OF Damascus.

The regime of Bashar al-Asad is keenly aware that Damascus is the center of gravity for control of the country. From what I can gather through viewing hundreds of videos posted by the Syrian media and the information offices of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), it appears that the Syrian armed forces have shifted their focus from defeating the FSA and its Islamist allies, to an aggressive defense of Damascus. The two army divisions tasked with protecting the regime from internal threats, the 4th Armor Division and the Republican Guard, have been re-deployed from operations in the south and north of the country to their home garrisons in Damascus.

The 4th Armor Division and the Republican Guard are the best-trained and best-equipped formations in the Syrian Army, and are made up mostly of 'Alawis (the President's Shia' Islam offshoot sect). The senior leadership of these two units reads like a who's who of the 'Alawi families in Syria. Their livelihood depends on the continuation of the al-Asad regime.

By re-deploying the 4th Division and the Republican Guard back to Damascus, President al-Asad has in effect ceded control of the large portions of the north and northeast to the opposition. While there are daily punishing air, artillery and ballistic missile attacks on the cities believed to be supportive of the opposition, the focus of the regime's operations is now to, if possible, prevent an FSA/Islamist assault on the capital, and failing that, to defeat that attack.

The situation is quite clear to anyone who has been following the fighting, as is the strategy of both the regime and the opposition. The combat is vicious and constant. Many of Syria's cities have been reduced to rubble - scenes of huge sections of Aleppo and Homs rival those of Germany's cities in 1945.

The opposition is pushing closer and closer to the city of Damascus itself. It is doing so on three sides (the fourth side is Qasiyun mountain), from the Harasta-Duma area on the northeast, the eastern suburbs known as the East Ghutah, and from the south near al-Mizzih air base and the upscale section of al-Mizzih.

The regime is relentlessly fighting the opposition on all three fronts with virtually every weapon (short of chemicals) in their inventory. There are constant bombardments from rockets, artillery, mortars, supported by armor assaults - all complemented by MiG-23 (NATO: FLOGGER) and Su-22 (NATO: FITTER C) fighter-bombers dropping thermobaric and white phosphorus cluster munitions.

Here is a graphic that illustrates the situation:

The red lines indicate the progress made by the opposition. The blue indicates the operations by the regime to disrupt that progress. In the Mu'adhamiyah and Daraya areas south of al-Mizzih air base, regime tanks conduct daily raids into the two cities. These 4th Division normally assaults (armor and artillery) Mu'adhamiyah since its home garrisons are just west of the city. The Republican Guard normally attacks Daraya in the same manner.

The regime is also trying to maintain control of the road to Damascus International Airport, although the airport has come under opposition rocket attacks. To the area east of the city, the opposition has made good progress, to the point that the regime does not venture much into the area, being content to hammer the entire region with artillery and air power.

The regime seems very concerned about an opposition assault into the 'Abasiyin section of Damascus itself (shown in black). This may be the opposition's best avenue of attack. The rabbit warren-like streets favor small bands of lightly armed fighters, although the regime has shown no reticence in basically flattening the entire area.

As I have said, it comes down to the "last man standing" in Damascus - everything has been leading to this fight. It is not a coincidence in the Syrian dialect of Arabic, the word for Syria (the country) and Damascus (the city) is one and the same.

http://francona.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-coming-battle-for-damascus-addendum.html

March 9, 2013

The Coming Battle for Damascus - Addendum

Note: This is an addendum to my article of one month ago, The Coming Battle for Damascus.

Al-Tadamun section of south Damascus

The Syrian rebels - an amalgam of the the loosely-organized mostly Sunni Muslim Free Syrian Army and a few Islamist groups, notably the Jabhat al-Nusrah, have made significant advances against the armed forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Asad.

The rebels have been effective enough to seriously alter the military operations and planning of the Syrian government. Over the last month, the opposition has been able to down a number of armed assault helicopters as well as fighter-bomber aircraft using what I believe to be Chinese-manufactured shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles. Additionally, they have been able to take over a number of cities in the north of the country, some in the oil-rich northeast governorates.

At the same time, the rebels gathering around Damascus, despite being pounded around the clock by artillery, rockets and air attacks, have been able to push to within about a mile of al-'Abasiyin Square, considered to be a key target for the rebels. I believe that Bashar al-Asad has realized that the battle for Damascus is about to begin in earnest.

The Syrian general staff has made some alarming decisions to address the military situation. To understand the significance of these military moves, perhaps a quick look at Syrian defense strategy will be illustrative. The "normal" (pre-revolution) deployment of Syrian forces were to provide defense against what Syria considered its primary threat - Israel. Four divisions - the 1st Armor, 5th Armor, 7th Mechanized and 9th Armor were arrayed south of Damascus from the Lebanese border on the west, across the foothills of the Golan Heights to the Jordanian border in the east.

To protect the regime, there were two divisions stationed in the southern and western suburbs of Damascus whose primary mission was regime protection - the 4th Armor Division and the division-equivalent Republican Guard. These two units were officered almost solely by members of Bashar's 'Alawi sect.

As events unfolded this week, the Syrian general staff ordered the main combat units of the four divisions in the south to redeploy to defense positions in and around the capital city. In almost 40 years of watching the Syrian military, I have never seen these military units allowed into downtown Damascus. This leaves the borders with Israel, and to some extent Jordan, virtually unprotected. I believe the Syrian regime has determined that there is much less of a threat from either of these neighboring countries than the internal threat from the Free Syrian Army and the Islamists.

For President Bashar al-Asad to move these forces into Damascus indicates the level of concern over the gravity of the situation and the realization that his worst nightmare is about to commence - the bloody street battles that will determine the fate of Syria.

Bashar is also concerned for his minority 'Alawi sect, centered in northwest Syria near the Latakia coast. He has ordered additional army units to that area to protect this group from what might easily become a bloodbath of retribution for years of oppression. Deploying forces to this area lessens the number of forces to address the burgeoning revolution in the north and northeast - Aleppo, al-Raqqah, Dayr al-Zawr and al-Hasakah governorates. That area now has basically one armor division to quell the violence - it is not working. Bashar has likely made the calculation to cede this area to the rebels and concentrate on the defense of the 'Alawi homeland and the city of Damascus.

Things are happening quickly in the Levant. Syria is basically up for grabs. How far is Bashar and the regime prepared to go to remain in power? Would they rather see the country destroyed and have a chance at remaining in power, or will they opt for some way to prevent further bloodshed in return for a way out? I am guessing the former - it is going to get ugly.