WESTERN INFLUENCE ON ARAB MILITARIES: POUNDING SQUARE PEGS INTO ROUND HOLES

WESTERN INFLUENCE ON ARAB MILITARIES: POUNDING SQUARE PEGS INTO
ROUND HOLES

Norvell B. DeAtkine Gloria March 18, 2013

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff greets the
various commanding generals of U.S. Forces, Iraq in Baghdad on July 27,
2010. Mullen's final stop in Iraq wraps up the ten-day, around the world
trip to meet with counterparts and troops engaged in the war on
terrorism. DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad J.
McNeeley

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff greets the
various commanding generals of U.S. Forces, Iraq in Baghdad on July 27,
2010. Mullen's final stop in Iraq wraps up the ten-day, around the world
trip to meet with counterparts and troops engaged in the war on
terrorism. DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chad J.
McNeeley

This article is a personal account of U.S. Army Colonel Norvell
DeAtkine's experience in dealing with Arab militaries for over 40 years.
Based on observation and study of Arab military establishments, he
concludes little of significance has happened to change the deeply
embedded character of the Arab military mindset. While there is some
evidence that Arab soldiers historically performed better under European
officers, there is no evidence that the Western tradition of command
ethos outlived the departure of the officers. There is indeed a distinct
Arab military tradition and attempts to recreate it in one's image are
not only fruitless, but often counter-productive.

In 1999, I wrote an article entitled "Why Arabs Lose Wars," which has
appeared a number of times in other periodicals and has had a rather
long shelf life on the internet. Some considered it as stereotypical,
but it was derived from my many years of being with or observing Arab
armies, including the civil war between the Jordanian Arab Army and the
Palestinian Liberation Organization.[1] Other than the Jordanian
experience, my store of knowledge comes from more than two years of
daily interface with the Egyptian ground forces as an Army Attaché and a
number of temporary duty assignments with Gulf military establishments,
including an assignment to the British-officered Trucial Oman Scouts
before the emergence of the United Arab Republic. I have combined these
on-the-ground observations and experiences with over 40 years of
collecting as much information as possible on the military culture and
way of life of Arab militaries.

As the Middle East Seminar Director for over 18 years at the John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, I have interviewed literally
hundreds of my former U.S. Army Special Operations personnel, reviewing
their experiences with various Arab military establishments. Since
retiring from government service, I continued as a consultant working
with military personnel deploying to the Middle East. The most salient
observation I have drawn from my observations and study of Arab military
establishments has been to convince me that little of significance has
happened to change the deeply embedded character of the Arab military
mindset.[2]

From these many conversations and discussions, I found little has
evolved in the Arab military culture in the years since I wrote the
article that would cause me to change the conclusions I reached.
Moreover, they sharpened my belief that there is indeed a distinct Arab
military tradition and that our attempts to recreate it in our image are
not only fruitless, but often counter-productive. When we write
articles on how to improve Arab military effectiveness, to me it smacks
of condescension and leftover colonialist thinking, however well
intended the suggestions may be.[3]

The article I wrote focused on conventional war and the Arab impediments
to conducting it successfully against Western type forces. Yet as the
Iraqi insurgent war against the coalition forces dragged on with
continuing violence, an obvious degree of effectiveness was visible on
the part of the Iraqi insurgents,[4] and it was becoming apparent that
the demonstrated ineffectiveness of Arab armies in conventional warfare
did not apply to the parameters of unconventional warfare. The
insurgents displayed initiative and imagination[5] in their tactics that
were rarely displayed in their conventional war making. Reviewing the
historical record, Arab unconventional war effectiveness in the modern
era has presented a much more positive picture. Through the Arab
resistance against the Italians, French, and Spanish in North Africa as
well as the guerrilla warfare against the British in Aden, Iraq, and
Palestine, the Arabs demonstrated a proficiency lacking in their
conventional warfare operations.[6]

THE ARAB AS UNCONVENTIONAL FIGHTER

As I examined what in fact made the difference between the Arab
insurgent or guerilla fighter and the conventional soldier, I surfaced a
number of factors. Among them was that the Arab guerilla usually had
leadership sharpened by battle as well as experience and exuded the
confidence that motivated others to follow him--as opposed to a
conventional unit commander most likely picked by the regime for
political reasons.[7] Moreover, the Arab guerilla was apt to be with
those of his own ethnic group, clan, or tribe--once again as opposed to
a conventional unit of diverse, urban/rural, tribal, or sectarian
differences. The officers almost always came from the dominant ethnic
group, such as the east bank Jordanians versus the Palestinians in
Jordan, the Sunnis in Iraq versus the Shi'i soldiery, or the Christian
Maronite officers in Lebanon.

The unconventional Arab soldier is fighting within his element with
people he trusts. In admittedly simplistic terms, it boils down to the
concept of fire and maneuver--the idea that an attacking soldier
exposing himself to enemy fire can count on those who support him to
provide covering fire, and that his life has meaning to his superiors.
If there is a lack of trust in officers and one's fellow soldiers, the
willingness to expose oneself to attack is missing.[8] My observation
was that they trusted soldiers in their own unit but not those in
neighboring units.

The stark differences between the Arabs' capabilities in conventional
and unconventional war led me to the next step. Thinking about the long
history of Western presence and involvement with the militaries of the
Arab world, and the fact that for the most part the Western powers tried
to create an Arab military in their own image, what has been the
result? More importantly, perhaps, has the Western military influence
been adverse to Arab effectiveness in war in general?

CONTINUITY IN THE ARAB MILITARY CULTURE

Reading the passages from the River War by Winston Churchill on the
remaking of the Egyptian Army with the infusion of British training and
officers reminded me of our effort, now dwindling, to remake Saddam's
army. As Churchill wrote, under the new army, "The recruits were
treated with justice. Their rations were not stolen by officers. The
men were given leave to visit their villages from time to time. When
they were sick they were sent hospital instead of being flogged. In
short, the European system was substituted for the Oriental."[9]

Exactly 100 years later, I was observing the Egyptian army, and I
realized, in reality, how little things had changed. The officers did
not steal from their men, but they used them as indentured servants
working on their farms and cared very little for their rations, which
usually consisted of bread, some onions, a little dried fish, beans,
tea, and sugar. Watching a truck roll into the unit area with the cargo
bed piled high with bread being held down by soldiers standing or
sitting on it, gives some idea on the care that went with their
rationing. Moreover soldiers could buy supplemental food items from a
sort of unit-level Post Exchange in which very often the unit officers
would retain the profits.[10] I did not see soldiers flogged, but I did
witness soldiers being slapped and pushed around.

The Egyptian officers were not barbarians or uncaring brutes. It was
and is a way of life inculcated by centuries of living in a specific
environment. The Egyptian soldier expected nothing more. I once asked
an Egyptian officer why the officers got into their autos and drove off
to Cairo on Thursday afternoons, leaving their soldiers stranded in the
desert and having to hope they could hitch a ride to Cairo on a passing
truck. His answer was that to give them a ride or in any way assist
their way into Cairo would only perplex and confound them. The same
concept that officers have privileges and are fools not to take
advantage of them is pervasive throughout the Arab world. For example,
in the U.S. Army and British Army, traditionally the officers eat after
the last soldier has gone through the mess line. Not so in the Iraqi
army[11] nor among the Bedouin troops of the Israeli Defense Forces,[12]
and certainly not in the Egyptian army I served with. Yet again, as
indicated by the IDF officer training with the Arab troops, the soldier
does not expect anything more from the officer. The thought occurs then
that if officer and soldier are content with the practice, why attempt
to change it?

As Churchill wrote those many years ago, "Under pressure of local
circumstances there has been developed a creature who can work with
little food, with little incentive, very long hours under a merciless
sun."[13] The truth of this was brought home to me by watching soldiers
with bricks on their backs toiling in summer heat during Ramadan, with
only a wet rag to moisten their lips. In stark contrast, the scene
reminded me of our helicopters bringing in ice and beer during my
Vietnam tour or the extensive establishment of post exchanges and other
amenities in the many "green zones" throughout Iraq.

THE RAPID EVAPORATION OF WESTERN INFLUENCE

The rapidity with which Western influence evaporates is further shown in
the Egyptian case by the rapidity with which the earlier French
influence had disappeared. Churchill was not the first to overestimate
the influence of his nation on the Egyptian military culture. He made
much of the positive effects of the French influence on Egyptian
society. In commenting on al-Jabarti's observations, Shmuel Moreh cited
the profound French influence on the Egyptian military in terms of
modern weaponry and tactics.[14] However, it may have seemed then, by
the time of the British attempts to develop a new Egyptian army, little
if any French influence remained. Today French influence in Egypt is
negligible.

As P.J. Vatikiotis noted in his seminal study of the Egyptian army,[15]
for centuries the people of Egypt were generally excluded from military
service. It was not until the reign of Khedive Muhammad Sa'id that
some Egyptians obtained officer rank, and not until 1936 that larger
numbers of officers came from the general Egyptian society. As
Vatikiotis observed, the officer corps of Egypt was drawn mostly from
the lower middle class, who had no other hope of achieving a better
station in life. As the social origins of the officer class broadened,
their attitude toward political issues closely coincided with Egyptian
society in general, including the propensity to blame others for their
failures. George Kirk wrote that the humiliating defeat of the Egyptian
army in 1948 was blamed on all sorts of reasons, few having to do with
reality, most being of the "stabbed in the back" rationale. The chief
villain, according to Nasser and his colleagues, was Britain.[16] Most
of the reasons lie in the fact that it had been 66 years since the
Egyptians had gone into battle under their own commanders. Their
inexperience and "...congenital unwillingness to accept responsibility
was among the primary reasons for their defeat."[17]

The turn to the Soviets in 1955 came with promises of huge deliveries of
military equipment and later, after the defeat of 1967, the advisors to
train the Egyptians on how to use it. The Russians carried out most of
their promises, mostly to salvage their pride and credibility in the
region.[18] It seemed a new spirit had been infused into the Egyptian
military. Sadat wrote of his confidence in the Egyptian preparations
for the 1967 war, but with the outbreak of the war he gradually learned
the dismal truth. He was embarrassed when he saw huge crowds
celebrating a "victory" as portrayed by the Nasser propaganda machine.
This turned into dismay as the Egyptian Field Forces commander, General
Hakim Amer, tried to blame it on American armed intervention.[19]
Egyptian officers told me that following that war, there was so much
public resentment against the army--and particularly its officers--that
they tried to avoid wearing their uniforms whenever possible.

With renewed massive Soviet equipment assistance, and a determination to
redress the previous humiliations, the Egyptians rebuilt their army,
absorbing Soviet instruction on weapons and tactical employment, but
also taking Soviet doctrine and weaponry designed primarily for a
European war and adapting them to Egyptian methods and military
culture.[20] In the final analysis, the Egyptians carefully used Soviet
assistance but ensured that it was compatible with the Egyptian level of
military proficiency and military culture. They thus "Egyptianized" the
Soviet doctrine and training.[21]

The Russians confined their instruction to improving operational and
tactical military proficiency, avoiding subjects pertaining to military
ethos and values.[22] The Egyptians, for the most part, tended to
eschew close relations with the Soviets, apparently an arrangement that
suited the Soviets as well. With two very competent generals, Sa'd
al-Shazli, the chief of staff, and Muhammad Abd al-Ghani Gamasy, the
chief of operations, the Egyptians did very well without the Russians.[23]

PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE EGYPTIAN ARMY

My personal observations of the Egyptian feat of crossing the canal
were the result of a visit made to Egypt in 1977 with the U.S. Army
assistant chief of staff of Intelligence. As the Egyptians had made a
decision to turn to the West, the Egyptians were opening up to us (to a
degree, of course). To a U.S. contingent of officers, including myself,
they showed many of the intelligence documents used in the preparation
of the crossing of the Suez. I was amazed at the detail of the
schematics. They were drawings made in pen, longhand, with every detail
of the Israeli defenses shown, including the taps on the fuel lines
designed to turn the Suez into a fiery inferno. All the main
strongpoints of the Bar-Lev line of Israeli defenses along the Suez had
been carefully pinpointed. A combination of strong commanders, troops
carefully prepared, a will to win infused in the military, an excellent
strategic deception plan,[24] and more than a little Israeli hubris,
resulted in what the Egyptian public and army considers a victory. The
humiliations of 1948, 1956, and 1967 were erased.

Following the 1973 war, my observations were that the Egyptian army
returned to a business as usual and standards declined. The Egyptian
army and its commanders became enmeshed in the economy of Egypt, with
defense industries making washing machines and other consumer
goods.[25] The army increasingly set itself apart from the people. The
regime went to great lengths to ensure the loyalty of the junior officer
corps, providing subsidized housing and automobiles. The old plagues of
nepotism and wasta[26] returned. Weapons and equipment the Egyptians
were--and still are not ready--to assimilate logistically were being
bought from diverse sources based on factors other than need or logistic
sustainability.[27]

Having gone through French, British, Soviet, and now American
involvement with their military, it is evident that the pervasive and
powerful Arab/Egyptian culture seeps back in as soon as the advisors
leave. So today, the Egyptian army retains some vestiges of the British
influence, more of the Soviet, and about the same amount from the United
States. None of it is pervasive or permanent. In the midst of the "Arab
Spring," the Egyptian army is still operating primarily as a regime
preservation institution--albeit under new management--with all the
detriment to soldering that this factor produces.[28]

THE IRAQI ARMY EXPERIENCE

In the case of the Iraqi military, the vaporous influence of Western, or
even Soviet influence, is to a degree even more dramatic. The Iraqi
army, originally a creation of the British after World War I, seems to
have had every factor in its favor to create a permanent effect. The
prime mover among the Iraqis was Jafar Pasha al-Askari, whom Gertrude
Bell described as a man of "integrity and moderation."[29] He comes
through the pages of his memoirs as an Anglophile with a great deal of
admiration for the British military. He became known as the father of
the Iraqi Army.[30]

Less than 20 years later, the Iraqi Army, infected by the new surge of
Arab nationalism with German encouragement, was fighting the British in
World War II. Their performance was mediocre.[31] Following the Second
World War, the pan-Arab nationalism of Nasser and Communism pushed Iraq
in a different direction. Soviet influence in Iraq as well as Egypt
became paramount. Soviet influence was again overlaid on a British
framework. As in Egypt, the combination proved to be unwieldy and
excruciatingly complex. Iraq participated in both the 1967 and 1973 wars
with Israel. In both cases their performance was marginal at best.

However, they created an image of aggressiveness and militancy. In the
1967 war, they were the only allies that came to the aid of the
Jordanians on the Palestinian front;[32] and in the 1973 war, the Iraqis
made an 800-mile trip across the desert with two divisions to assist the
Syrians. That was impressive, but both the Israelis and Jordanians were
unimpressed with the Iraqi army's battle performance.[33]

The inept performance of the Iraqi army against the Iranians,
particularly in the early stages of the war, has been fully chronicled
in the Institute for Defense Analyses study of the war.[34] Basic
concepts of strategy and tactics were ignored. Of course many of the
generals blamed it all on Saddam, much as the German generals blamed
their defeats on Hitler. There was plenty of blame to go around from
top to bottom. In fact, tribal culture seems to have had an inordinate
amount of influence on Saddam's conduct of the war. While there was
ample residue of the Soviet footprint illustrated by warehouses of older
equipment, unused field manuals, and some older officers enthusing about
the Soviet military education, there was little to indicate any overall
Western or Soviet influence in the tactical or strategic planning or
execution of their operations.[35]

Of course against tribes or small minorities such as the Assyrians, or
weak foes such as the Kuwaitis, they performed well enough (and
brutally). However, despite decades of war against the Kurdish rebels,
they were never able to subdue them. In essence, after all the years of
training by the British and the Russians, very little was absorbed into
their military system. The Iraqi army labored under the same problems
and cultural blinders evident in all Arab armies. These included a
predilection to confuse facts with wishes, inability to coordinate
combined arms operations, logistics problems, lack of professional
non-commissioned officers, and a lack of cohesion between officers and
enlisted men.[36] With the Iraqis one could also add an attitude of
superiority over their Arab and Iranian neighbors.[37]

With the disappearance of American advisors and technicians from Iraq,
the paltry eight or nine years during which Americans were closely
involved with training the Iraqi Army will have little lasting effect or
influence. As many of the Saddam-era officers began returning to the
units, there was an improvement in effectiveness but also a return to
the old Iraqi mindset.[38] Our advisors also noted a greater reluctance
to incorporate American logistics procedures and training methods. The
reluctance, however, was always expressed with the usual Arab
politeness, which American advisors and or senior American officials
sometimes confused with acceptance.[39] This is a predictable trend in
that the Iraqi army was considered a noble profession among the officers
and was considered so by most of the general populace, including the
Shi'a (but not the Kurds). This is understandable given the many years
of deep propagandizing of the role of the military profession.[40]

A point to remember in addressing the temporal nature of Western or
Russian influence throughout the Arab world, but particularly in Iraq,
is the successive waves of officer replacements based on political or
regime preservation measures.[41] There has seldom been a long period
of officer corps stability in Arab military history.

WESTERN VERSUS RUSSIAN TRAINING AND LOGISTICS SYSTEMS

At this point, the issue of Western versus Eastern European,
particularly Russian, should be considered. The Russian system of
training, doctrine, and logistics differs considerably from the Western,
at least in their application in the Arab world. From my observations
and the observations of others,[42] the Russian system is more
compatible with Arab culture in a number of ways. Their logistics
system is predicated on less operator maintenance, with greater reliance
on depot maintenance. The non-commissioned officer (NCO) is not as
important in the Russian system and certainly the paranoia and secrecy
of the Soviet system was much more in keeping with the Arab style. The
author often heard from the Egyptians that Soviet equipment was easier
to repair and keep operable. Our equipment was often termed
"delicate." On the other hand, just as the Iraqis did, they often
blamed their reverses in battle on the better Western equipment of their
adversaries or on some failure of their outside support.[43]

At this point the American influence on the Iraqi military is rapidly
dwindling and will gradually disappear. We were there much too short a
period to have any lasting effect. It is unfortunate because the U.S.
officers who served with the Iraqis and trained them, although they
experienced the usual frustrations of working with Arab militaries, also
expressed admiration for their bravery and willingness to learn.[44]

THE SAUDI EXPERIENCE

In terms of the amount of time U.S. military advisors have spent on the
ground with Arab counterparts, Saudi Arabia has the distinction of
hosting the U.S. military for the longest period. The U.S. involvement
with the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) was organized as the United
States Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia (USMTSA) in 1953. The
U.S. involvement with the Saudi National Guard began in 1973, organized
as the Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG).[45] The British were heavily
involved with what was then called the "White Army" before we began
training them. The Saudi system presents a prime example of how Arab
regimes divide Western training missions to minimize Western influence.
Access is always carefully regulated and no one foreign nation is
allowed or granted exclusive control over the military supply or
training of the Saudi military forces. The equipment has a wide
diversification or origin. For instance, their tank inventory is
composed of U.S., French, and German armored vehicles. The British
train the elite units of the Saudi National Guard. Weapons systems have
also been supplied by Great Britain, Sweden, Brazil, and China. One can
imagine the logistical and training nightmare in keeping these diverse
training systems and inventory operational.

In the case of the U.S. involvement, the two training organizations are
controlled by different U.S. military organizations. There is little if
any coordination between the two organizations, a circumstance insisted
upon by the Saudis.[46] The SANG is a regime protection force, with
troops drawn primarily from the Saudi family's historical domain in the
tribal Nejd. Their number one mission is to protect the regime, from
the Saudi army if necessary. The training mission has long been
outsourced to the Vinnell Corporation, using mostly retired officers and
NCOs. There are also many regular U.S. Army officers and NCOs involved
in their training, and have been for many years.

Since involvement with Saudi training began in the 1950s, we have
trained literally thousands of Saudi officers in U.S. courses. We have
sent a like number of our officers there to train the Saudis. With many
of these, I was able to communicate during or after their deployment.
Certainly top-level unclassified reports on the state of the Saudi
forces are difficult to find, as are candid articles by their U.S. army
and corporate trainers in official publications.

In keeping with the Arab distrust and "divide and rule," there are still
other Western militaries or police forces involved with the Saudis, such
as the British training SANG in riot control. Moreover, as in most Arab
countries, they maintain an inventory of many types of Western
equipment, really a mishmash of equipment, often purchased based more on
political rationale, or for corrupt personal reasons.[47] The diversity
of equipment creates a horrendous logistics problem, particularly for a
country such as Saudi Arabia with a weak indigenous logistic infrastructure.

It should be pointed out that there has been a great deal of improvement
in the military effectiveness of the SANG, and many of the advisors
speak well of their more recent performance. They are far and away
better soldier material than the RSLF, whose mission is predicated on
defending from external threats.[48] Not coincidently, their combat
units are stationed far away from the center of Saudi Arabia, and moving
them involves approval from various levels of the Saudi bureaucracy, all
of which are coup-preventive measures. Both Saudi organizations are
completely dependent on outside support for logistics and maintenance.
While the RSLF has been in combat, most recently in 2009 with the Houthi
tribesmen on the Yemeni border, their performance, based on the
available information, was less than stellar.[49] The same could be
said for their performance in the 1991 Gulf War.[50] On the other hand,
the SANG has not been tested in combat at all. They were marginally
involved in the 1991 Gulf war, but not at all in the Houthi rebellion.
They did move into Bahrain to help a fellow Sunni regime survive a Shi'i
uprising, and they have been used to quell Shi'i disturbances in the
eastern province of Saudi Arabia.[51]

The same problems that afflict all Arab armies are even more pronounced
in the Saudi military: refusal to take responsibility, fragmented
command relationships, avoidance of "dirty hands" work on the part of
the officers, little responsibility delegated to NCOs, etc. As an
astute former member of the SANG training cadre once remarked to me, "To
the Saudis, the army is a job, nothing more." Another told me his cohort
commander asked him to rate his officers so as to avoid any
unpleasantness should a subordinate take issue with his evaluation.[52]
The Saudi commander would simply blame it on the American officer. Over
the years, all these anecdotes paint a mosaic of the problems with which
an American advisor must contend.

They labor under the principle of scarcity.[53] There is simply not
enough of what we value to go around. Those who are quick and powerful
get the most. As a facet of this cultural trait, Arab militaries tend to
hoard supplies at every level, and, unfortunately, at the end of the
food chain, those who need it the most are least likely to get what they
need. Parts and ammunition are conserved as if there is no hope of
resupply and a final decisive battle is close at hand.[54]

In Iraq, very often, Iraqi units would buy the parts they needed for
their vehicles, even though the parts were available at a higher level
unit. The principle at work here is the all-important trappings of
power.[55] To a supply officer managing a supply depot, the repair
parts and equipment are his personal responsibility. The power to give
or deny is his source of power. To let the supplies go easily is a
diminishment of his power.[56] This is was the story from Cairo to
Baghdad. Units starved for parts, with depots loaded at near-capacity
levels.

CONCLUSION

As Bernard Lewis pointed out, one of the aspects of Western and Soviet
influence on the Islamic and Arab world was, unfortunately, to provide
the ideological foundations and coercive tools for dictatorial
regimes.[57] As Elie Kedourie wrote, while the constitutionalist spirit
failed to thrive in the Arab world, the "enlightened absolutism" of
Western governments, with their penchant for centralized control,
blended more easily with the Arab autocratic tradition.[58]

More to the point, it was the new and much more invasive coercive
apparatus of the state that appealed to the rulers of the Arab world.
From the Lebanese Kata'ib imitators of the Italian Black Shirts to the
Iraqi and Syrian facsimiles of the Gestapo and KGB, the power of the
state was made more pervasive by the doctrine of the Ba'th party and
other socialist parties with an "Arab face."

The Arab militaries of today came into existence under colonial
rule.[59] For the most part they were colonial creations, but they were
not created, as the modern Arab historian would claim, as part of a
divide-and-rule policy. Unintentionally, they provided a way for the
lower middle class to move up in static, class-conscious society.[60]

The difference between the village people and Bedouin of the desert is
significant, as is the culture of Egyptians from that of Iraqis, but
nevertheless the social class composition of the Arab militaries
contains overriding commonalities, promoted by the impact of military
cross-training within the Arab League, and similar educational programs
at the university level. The infusion of mass pan-Arab communication
has also had a unifying effect in attitudes on the Arab societies, and,
consequently, the militaries of the Arab world. From my observations
over the years, the commonalities of the Arab culture far outweigh the
differences.

In summary, the Arab world has resisted deeper Western influence on Arab
military traditions for a number of reasons. First is the rapid turnover
of officers as a result of recurring coups (or regime fears of one). As
a layer of officers begins to absorb Western military values, they are
dismissed, not just because of the Westernization but rather because
with each regime change, they are considered politically unreliable.
This has been particularly true in Iraq and Syria, and to a certain
extent in Egypt and Jordan as well. The new regime in Egypt is gradually
remolding the army leadership to be more compatible with the Muslim
Brotherhood. Under former Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, an officer
suspected of fundamentalist sympathies was carefully watched.

Second, the regime leadership constructs political barriers to keep
Western influence at a minimal or acceptable low level. This is done to
ensure that Western political values are not too deeply embedded, as
exemplified by the classic divide-and-rule policies of the Saudis. The
Egyptians and Iraqis were also careful to insure that Soviet influence
did not become entrenched within their militaries.[61]

Third, despite decades of demonstrated military weakness compared to
Western militaries, there is a still a feeling of superiority over the
West,[62] particularly among the more educated elite and the military
leadership, often accompanied by a dose of occidentosis.[63] This
phenomenon is found in the documents of al--Qa'ida and Hizballah, and
harkens back to the time of the Arab conquests. Islam was the religion
of the Arabs and a mark of caste unity and superiority.[64]

Fourth, the burden of historical baggage weighs heavily on the Arabs,
and more so than the military. Once the greatest military power on
earth, crushing the enemies of Islam beneath them, conquering and
incorporating peoples of all colors and religions into their orbit,
today they have experienced humbling defeats by people once their
vassals. How can this be explained? Only by a return to a past, real or
imagined, and by denial of the impediments to true modernization, using
the blame game to explain defeats.[65] This has been explained by
enumerating the factors that contribute to the Arab burden of history.
Among these is the inability to absorb Western concepts, which have been
introduced to the Arab world but to this point have been overcome by the
strength of radicalized notions of Islamic law, and oversimplification
of modernization.[66]

Last, the strength of a pervasive Arab culture--which I have attempted
in the core of this article to show--must, along with political
ramifications, be impervious to the quick-fix solutions so popular in
the West and particularly in the United States. As a number of scholars
have pointed out, the malaise within the Arab culture requires solutions
from within, and attempts to graft Western culture onto the Arab society
have failed. [67] Some commentators have seen the reserved response of
the militaries in Tunisia and Egypt toward demonstrators as a
consequence of U.S. and Western influence. Unfortunately this has little
validity.[68] It was far more a result of military leaders correctly
assessing where their best interests lie.

Imparting Western values and soldierly ethos to the Arab armies has
been, as someone once observed, like teaching dance steps without the
music. They memorize the steps but never get the tempo or the rhythm of
the Western military traditions. While there is some evidence that
Arab soldiers historically performed better under European officers,
there is no evidence that the tradition of command ethos outlived the
departure of the officers.[69]

Recently there has been a great deal of punditry on the "wrong army"
being trained by the Western powers in Afghanistan, the argument being
that the Afghan army has been trained more for conventional war than
unconventional. That really misses the point. Just as we have done in
the Arab world, we attempted unsuccessfully to graft our military
culture onto an impermeable society.

NOTES

[1] Norvell B. DeAtkine, "Why Arabs Lose Wars," Middle East Quarterly,
Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 1999),
http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars.

[2] As Director of Middle East Studies at the JFK Special Warfare Center
and School for 18 years, one of my additional duties was the country
orientation training of teams deploying to the Middle East. I kept in
contact with many of these officers and soldiers, during or after their
deployments, particularly to get their insights. Other than my own
observations, these are the core of my analysis of the Arab militaries
in this article.

[3] A basic problem I have found over the years is that senior Arab
military officers do not readily accept the premise that they need help,
especially from the West. They tend to look elsewhere for answers to
any failure. I once gave a talk to Arab military attachés at the
Virginia Military Institute, using a diplomatic version of my article on
why Arabs lose wars. At the conclusion, only one attaché came up to talk
to me. He said that the problem was not so much why the Arabs lose but
rather why they do not accept that they have lost.

[4] Anthony Cordesman and Sara Bjerg Moller, "Iraq's Evolving
Insurgency" (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, December 2005),
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/050805_iraqi_insurgency.pdf. It
should also be pointed out that, despite the huge size of the Iraqi
conventional forces with ample equipment, the only effective Iraqi force
against the Americans in 2003 was the Fidayin Saddam, a militia force.
Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Cobra II, The Inside Story of the
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), p. 580.

[5] Ahmad S. Hashim, "Why the Insurgency Won't Go Away," Boston Review,
October/November 2004, http://bostonreview.net/BR.5/hashim.php.

[6] Youssef Aboul-Enien and David Trandberg, "Arab Thoughts on the
Italian Colonial Wars in Libya: Rediscovering Arab Insurgency Tactics
and Military History," Small Wars Journal, March 6, 2012,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/arab-thoughts-on-the-italian-colonial-wars-in-libya.

[7] Norvell B. DeAtkine, "The Arab as Insurgent and Counterinsurgent,"
in Barry Rubin (ed.), Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle
East (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 24-40.

[8] Yehosshafat Harkabi, "Basic Factors in the Arab Collapse During the
Six Day War," Orbis, No. 11 (Fall 1967), pp. 678-79.

[9] Sir Winston Churchill, The River War, reprint (Doylestown, PA:
Wildside Press, undated) of original The River War: Historical Account
of the Reconquest of the Soudan (1899), p. 77.

[10] The cantonment areas in which the Egyptian soldiers lived were
austere and devoid of amusements or sporting facilities. Many were
simply the cantonment area in which the Egyptian Army dug in after the
1973 war. Little if anything had been done to improve their living area
since that time.

[11] Wesley Gray, Embedded; A Marine Corps Advisor Inside the Iraqi Army
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), p. 109.

[12] Lazar Berman, "Understanding Arab Culture," Small Wars Journal
(April 2008), pp. 7-8.

[13] Churchill, River War, p. 77.

[14] Shmuel Moreh, "Napoleon and the French Impact on Egyptian Society
in the Eyes of Al-Jabarti," in Al-Jabarti's Chronicle of the French
Occupation; 1798 Napoleon in Egypt. Translated by Shmuel Moreh
(Princeton: Marcus Weiner, 2006) pp. 183-200. Equally impressed with the
imprint of French influence on Egypt was the historian A.Z. (only his
initials were used) in his book The Emancipation of Egypt written in
1905, Nook version (Charles River Editors, undated), pp. 3-5. He wrote
of the imprint of the French language into "the very soul of Egypt."

[15] P.J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1961).

[16] George Kirk, "The Role of the Military in Egypt," in The Military
in the Middle East (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1963), p,
75. Saddam Hussein loyalists came up with the same excuse for the Iraqi
army in the 1991 war. Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam
Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2008), p. 248.

[17] Kirk, "Role of the Military," p. 75.

[18] Dasni Asher, The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War,
translated by Moshe Tlamim (Jefferson NC: McFarlane and Company, 2009),
p. 67.

[19] Anwar el-Sadat: In Search of Identity; An Autobiography (New York:
Harper Colophon Books, 1977), pp. 174-75.

[20] Asher, The Egyptian Strategy. Asher concludes that top to bottom
assistance of Soviet advisors at every level helped the Egyptians
assimilate Soviet doctrine for the 1973 war. Egyptians dispute this
completely. In a symposium after the war, the Egyptian commanders, other
than one cursory thanks for Soviet support, do not even mention Soviet
involvement or help. The Book of the International Symposium on the 1973
October War (Cairo: Egyptian Military Sector Military Sector, 1975).
After reading and listening for many years, it is my belief that Israeli
authors give the Soviets too much credit and the Egyptians take too
much. The lower ranking Egyptian officers tended to be more appreciative
of Soviet efforts.

[21] Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter that
Transformed the Middle East (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), p. 344.

[22] Some Egyptian officers felt the Soviet training was better in that
they did not bother with subjects such as civil-military relations or
the role of a non-commissioned officer, etc. Others complained Americans
complicated subjects too much. However, they also stated that the
Soviets were always difficult to deal with and heavy handed in their
methods of instruction.

[23] Lt. General Saad el Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (Washington
D.C.: American Mideast Research, 1980), passim. By his and other
accounts, Shazly turned the training of the Egyptian army around. He
concentrated on the small unit commanders, instituted better treatment
of soldiers, athletic competition, adventure training, and "ate sand,"
spending a lot of time in the field with the troops. An excellent
source for study of the Egyptian high command has been written by
American naval officer, Lt. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein in Infantry
Magazine, March/April 2004; Infantry Magazine, July/August, 2006; and
Military Review, January/February 2003.

[24] Uri Bar-Joseph, "Israel's 1973 Intelligence Failure," in P.R.
Kumaraswamy (ed.), Revisiting the Yom Kippur War (London: Frank Cass,
2000), pp. 24-25.

[25] Shana Marshall, "Egypt's Other Revolution: Modernizing the
Military-Industrial Complex," in Jadaliyya, February 12, 2012,
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4311/the-military.

[26] The use of a go-between to secure contracts, jobs, a decent
education, or even sometimes a marriage partner.

[27] There are acres covered with older Soviet model tanks, older
American M-60's, and now even M-1's. Warehouses are full of end item
equipment that are of dubious usefulness.

[28] Other than observations of the author and other U.S. officers
involved in Egyptian training, this material is drawn from my
presentation "Cultural Implications of the Gulf War: Observations on
American Coalition Warfare with Arab Allies," presented to the
International Studies Association, Mershon Center, October 1994.

[29] Georgina Howell, Gertrude Bell: Queen of the Desert: Shaper of
Nations, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux), p. 362.

[30] Jafar Pasha al-Askari, A Soldiers Story: From Ottoman Rule to
Independent Iraq, Translated by Mustafa Tariq Al-Askari (U.K.: Arabian
Publishing, 2003), p. 185.

[31] Robert Lyman, Iraq 1941: The Battles for Basra, Habbaniya,
Fallujah, and Baghdad (Kent U. K.: Osprey Publishing, 2006), pp. 90-91.

[32] Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War (Oxford; Oxford University Press,
2002), p. 226.

[33] Information gathered by the author during briefings provided by
the Jordanian Army as part of a post 1973 war "lessons learned" survey
in Amman, 1974. It was unusual in that the Jordanians were laudatory of
the Syrians and dismissive of the Iraqis. There has always been a close
relationship between the Iraqis and Jordanian army.

[34] Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, and Thomas Holaday, with Mounir
Elkhamri, Saddam's War: An Iraqi Military Perspective on the Iran-Iran
War, McNair Paper 70 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2009).

[35] While Saddam drew heavily upon the Soviet style of centralized
control mechanisms and coercive instruments of political power, because
of his fear of Communist party subversion, he kept the Soviets at arms
length, sending some officers, but not many, to schools in the Soviet
Union. Soviet equipment came with trainers, but short shrift was given
to the logistics aspect. Much was inoperable after a short interval of use.

[36] Much of my information on current conditions in the Iraqi military
comes from observations of an American Arab who spent three years with
the Iraqi army. His observations are referred to as Jamil's notes. As he
still is employed with Arab forces elsewhere, he prefers his name not be
used. Drastic punishment was meted out to Iraqi soldiers to keep them
obedient. An Arabic speaking American NCO gathered Iraqi battalion
journals after the 1991 war, and it was not unusual to see that up to 15
soldiers in a single battalion had been executed for homosexuality,
desertion, disloyalty, consorting with enemies of the state, etc.

[37] Woods et. al, Saddam's War, pp. 5-8.

[38] Jamil's notes.

[39] In the author's experience, it was a common and frustrating
experience when senior American officials took Arab generosity and
politeness for agreement to a policy being discussed. One example was
the American military delegation to Egypt being convinced that Egypt
would agree to a plan to establish a CENTCOM forward at Ras Banas.
Nothing could have been more preposterous.

[40] Surprisingly, I found this to be true even among the Shi'a who
suffered at the hands of Iraq's military. Decades of propaganda had
entrenched the image of a victorious and noble army in the minds of the
people. See Sami Shawkat, "The Profession of Death" in Sylvia Kedourie
and Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1964), pp. 97-99. This speech to
secondary students in Baghdad became a famous rallying cry for militant
Arabism.

[41] See Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary
Movements of Iraq (London: Saqi Books, 2004), p. 1011.

[42] The seminal study of Soviet influence on Arab militaries is in
Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth Pollack, "Armies of Snow and Armies of
Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries," Middle
East Journal Vol. 55 (Autumn 2001). In this article, I only point out
some differences.

[43] There is little doubt that the Soviet training and logistics
systems were more in accordance with Arab military culture. The duties
and authority of non-commissioned officers, logistics philosophy,
security emphasis, deception planning, and many other aspects of the
Soviet systems fit more closely with the Arab. See DeAtkine, "Why Arabs
Lose Wars." Passim. Nevertheless Arabs were never very effusive in their
opinion of Soviet military support. The Egyptians alternately thanked
their Russian political leaders for support while spreading rumors their
support was less than that of the Americans. Vadim Kirpitchednko in
Richard B. Parker (ed.), The October War; A Retrospective (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 2001), p. 47.

[44] Typical was one American officer who summed it up this way.
"Overall I respected their attempts to secure and conduct operations
given their circumstances." Their circumstances were poor living
conditions, lack of logistic support, and ill-trained junior officers
and NCO's, but they had a former Saddam army commander who was
charismatic and kept the unit going. American Captain in email to
author, June 3, 2012. The American Arab with the Iraqi troops was also
very laudatory of the Iraqis courage. Jamil's Notes.

[45] Anthony H, Cordesman, "Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century: The
Military and Internal Security Dimension. V. The Saudi National Guard."
Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 30, 2002.
Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Sippel, USA, "Saudi Arabia; The Changing
Paradigm and Implications for the United States Military Training
Mission," The DISAM Journal (Summer 2003),
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Archives/Web%20Journal%2025-4.pdf.

[46] The DOD component for SANG is the Army Materiel Command (AMC)
while the USMTSA is a component of CENTCOM. In the earlier days of our
training these organizations, mixing even socially between the two
organizations was frowned upon. The two Saudi organizations have no
grass roots cross or joint training. The Iraqi Military was similarly
organized to protect the regime by institutionalizing competing forces.
Norman Cigar, Saddam Hussein's Road to War: Risk Assessment,
Decisionmaking, and Leadership in an Authoritarian System, No. 5,
(Quantico, Virginia: USMC Command and Staff School, 2004), p. 26.

[47] Christopher M. Blanchard "Background and U.S, Relations," 7-5700,
Congressional Research Service, April 30, 2009, pp. 18-19.

[48] An American retired officer who has spent many years with the
Saudis paints a more optimistic picture but also observes: "SANGers
(Saudi SANG personnel) show deep ability to select and adapt what they
like from the U.S. Those Saudis who returned from attending CONUS
military courses or university programs at first seem to be big fans and
imitators of U.S. methods, although the home culture becomes another
story." Email to author, July 12, 2012. Over the years, the author has
observed the same story: An eager young officer returns from the United
States filled with enthusiasm and a desire to put into his job what he
has learned, only to crash into the brick wall of the home military culture.

[49] The Saudi losses in dead and missing as well the conditions set
down by the Houthis would indicate the Saudis came out second in a
battle they were happy to get out of. The Houthis at the end of the day
were still on Saudi soil.

[50] Scot Williams, "The Battle of Al-Khafji," Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, CA, June 2002.

[51] American officer with many years experience with the Saudis. Email
to author, July 12, 2012.

[52] Though declining, there is still a problem with tribal ties taking
precedence over military rank, e.g., a captain from a noble tribe may
take exception to orders from a major from a sheep herding tribe.

[53] Dr. Gary Weaver, American University, Washington D.C., from a
series of lectures presented at JFK Special Warfare Center and School to
the Regional Studies Class, over the years from 1991 to 2005.

[54] While many Egyptian units were complaining of spare parts shortage,
and blaming U.S. lack of speed in the logistics system, there were caves
along the Nile River housing huge inventories of Russian and American parts.

[55] In my time with the Egyptian army, when a unit used up its limited
allotted spare parts, a small item such as a road wheel for a tank
required the signature of a brigadier general.

[56] Jamil's Notes. This was equally true in the Iraqi army.

[57] Bernard Lewis, Faith and Power: Religion and Politics in the Middle
East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 198.

[58] Elie Kedourie, Democracy and the Arab Political Culture (Washington
D. C.: Washington Institute, 1992) p. 104.

[59] James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East,
5th Edition (New York: Longman, 2000) p. 174.

[60] Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, pp. 463-81.

[61] As one who has worked closely with Arab armies, it should be noted
that our friends in the Arab world are also careful to keep us at a
respectable distance. As the Arab proverb goes, today's friends are
tomorrow's enemies.

[62] The feeling of superiority, as described by Bernard Lewis in his
many historical accounts of the clash of the West and the East, was
still evidenced in the thinking of Saddam Hussein in his view of an the
impeding war between the United States and Iraq. See, for instance,
Kevin M. Woods, David D, Palkki, and Mark E. Stout Eds. The Saddam
Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime 1978-2001 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), pp. 194-95.

[63] A belief among the Arab elite that the West brought a moral
infection to the East rendering them hapless and defenseless. See David
Pryce Jones, The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs (London:
Paladin Books, 1990), pp. 385-86.

[64] Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), p. 41. See also Jacques Berque, Cultural
Expressions in Arab Society Today, Translated by Robert W. Stookey
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973), p. 322.

[65] Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong: Western Impact and the Middle
Eastern Response (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 158-59.

[66] Hillal Khashan, "History's Burden," Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 5,
No. 1 (March 1998), pp. 41-48,
http://www.meforum.org/385/the-arab-worlds-travails-historys-burden.

[67] This is a major theme in Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palace of the
Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998).

[68] Majors William Parsons and William Taylor, "Arbiters of Social
Unrest: Military Responses to the Arab Spring," paper on line from The
U.S. Air Force Academy, 2011,
http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/Research%20Papers/2011/Arbiters%20of%20Social%20Unrest-.

[69] That has been the story of the British officers with the Egyptian
Army and Jordanian Arab Legion.

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