The Sources and Patterns of Terrorism in Islamic Law

 

THE VANGUARD

Journal of the Military Intelligence Corps Association

 

The Sources and Patterns of Terrorism in Islamic Law

By William Gawthrop

The views expressed in this paper for those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any entity of the US Government.

 

"There was a nearly incomprehensible misconcep- tion about the nature of the military problem. Lacking a criteria for judgment, officials often misunderstood, and therefore often misstated, the issues." -- Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy

 

This paper identifies the sources and patterns of ter- rorism in Islam and proposes a framework for a response. The United States is confronted with an ideological threat requiring a response using a lever of national power that has no tradition of success in American Foreign Policy. Of the four levers of national power (diplomatic, ideo- logical, military and economic) the United States has tra- ditionally used three (diplomatic, military and economic) to defeat its adversaries.

The Ideological lever has largely been neglected. The two primarily ideological wars in American history are the Revolutionary War and the Cold War and in each the United States successfully responded with a combi- nation of diplomatic, military and economic power. An argument can be made that the Revolutionary War and Cold Wars were characterized by Ideological exchanges but in neither case were American ideological tools orga- nized, synchronized and focused against enemy centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities or exploitable seams.

Today, the United States, and an increas- ing number of other governments, are be- leaguered by an expanding array of states, groups, and individuals whose goals, actions and norms are animated by Islamic values. This places the defenders in the unenviable position of having to fight, at the strategic level, against an idea.

 

A FRAMEWORK

 

Currently, the United States is engaged in two countries (Afghanistan and Iraq) and is experiencing a groundswell of insurgent activity in each. Elsewhere across the globe, an increasing number of Governments are addressing the rising levels of "criminal" ac- tivity animated by Islamic values (Belgium, England, Germany, France, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Russian, So- malia, Sudan, The Netherlands, and

others). The insurgent environment is characterized by a wide variety of groups (Al-Qaida, Hamas, Hezbollah, or any number of "pop-up" organizations), state spon- sors (Iran, formerly Afghanistan, and others), as well as "homegrown" and "freelance" individuals whose opera- tions range from centralized planning and execution to instances of autonomous, decentralized, self actualiza- tion.

The analytical challenge is to create a framework that portrays the threat in understandable terms and gives insight to a solution. As depicted in Figure 1, one such framework consists of organizing the analytic picture into the three traditional levels of war: tactical, opera- tional, and strategic.

Tactical – The tactical level is the insurgent environ- ment, whether it be in a specific country or region, and the primary response force is law enforcement or the military.

Operational – The operational level (hostile or fa- cilitating groups, nongovernmental organizations and charities, and nation-states) is addressed primarily by the military; diplomacy and economic initiatives having failed in the case of Afghanistan, Iraq, Al-Qaeda, and other pop-up organizations.

Strategic – The strategic level hosts the forces that animate the tactical and operational elements. Those forces are the strategic themes in Islam which consists of: The Example of the Prophet; the Koran; the Haddiths; Islamic Law; the Pillars of Faith; Jihad; World View; and, Just War Traditions. Within each of these themes are drivers that constitute the sources of terrorism in Islam.

 

SOURCES OF TERRORISM IN ISLAM

 

The drivers or sources of terrorism in Islam reside in a

Figure 1. Threat Description – Traditional Levels of War.

9number of key, and closely interwoven, Islamic themes. Each of these themes is central to the core values of Islam and its orthodoxy and adherence to these themes is obligatory for the pious and devout.

Mohammad's influence is manifested three fold as the author of the Koran, the subject of the Haddiths, and by his personal example. These three elements (Mohammad, the Koran, and the Haddiths) form the basis of Islamic Law.

 

Mohammad

 

Mohammad, both in his capacity as a military and religious leader, established a strategic objective of political (as well as religious) imperium and he left behind a rudimentary warf- ighting doctrine articulated in the Koran, elaborated on in the Haddiths1, codified in Islamic Law and reinforced by cur- rent interpretations in the modern era. As late as early 2006, the senior Service colleges of the Department of Defense had not incorporated into their curriculum a systematic study of Mohammad as a military or politi- cal leader. As a consequence, we still do not have an in-depth understanding of the war fighting doctrine laid down by Mohammad, how it might be applied today by an increasing number of Islamic groups, or how it might be countered.

 

The Koran

 

Mohammad's Koranic verse commanding Jihad with a view toward a strategic endstate is Sura 8:39.2

Sura 008.039: Yusufali: And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah altogether and ev- erywhere; but if they cease, verily Allah doth see all that they do. Pickthal: And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is all for Allah. But if they cease, then lo! Allah is Seer of what they do. Shakir: And fight with them until there is no more persecution and religion should be only for Allah; but if they desist, then surely Allah sees what they do.

Mohammad's views are elaborated on in Surah 8, Al-Anfal, of the Koran. Yousuf Ali, the translator for the principle version of the Koran that the US Military uses, comments, "In this chapter (Sura 8) we have the lessons of the Battle of Badr enforced in their larger aspects; (1) the question of war booty; (2) the true virtues necessary for fighting the good fight; (3) victory against odds; (4) clemency and consideration for one's own and for oth- ers in the hour of victory.3

 

The Haddiths

 

Mohammad's mindset is further revealed from the Haddith recorded by Sahih Al-Bukhari, and narrated by

Ibn Umar. "Allah's Apostle said, 'I have been ordered (by Allah) to fight against the people until they testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and that Muhammad is Allah's Apostle, and offer the prayers per- fectly and give obligatory charity, so if they perform that, then they save their lives and property from me except for Islamic Laws and then their reckoning (accounts) will be done by Allah.' "4

This utterance by Mohammad has neither been coun- termanded nor abrogated leaving it a mandate into the 21st Century. For Non-Muslims, Mohammad's mindset is a source for terrorism.5

Islamic Law

Islamic Law is based on The Example of Mohammad, the Koran, and the Haddiths and is refracted through the lenses of four major Sunni Schools6 and a lesser number of Schools within the Shia Tradition.7

The Jurists, using the rules of war embedded in the Ko- ran, the Haddiths and the Example of Mohammad, give clear guidance on combat, combat support and combat service support obligations to the fighter, and those who can directly and indirectly support him. The Sunni views are contained and discussed, but not limited to, the fol- lowing legal texts: The Distinguished Jurists Primer,8 The Riyad-us-Saliheen,9 and Reliance of the Traveller.10

Each text discusses Jihad in detail citing a number of Koranic verses as the basis in Law for attacking Non-Mus- lims. For example, The Distinguished Jurists Primer rests its analysis on the laws justifying Jihad on the following Koranic Suras: 2:190, 2:216, 4:95, 8.1, 8:39, 8:41, 8: 61, 8:67, 9:5, 9:29, 9:122, 17:17, 40:25, 47:4, 48:17, 59:6, and 59:10. Reliance of the Traveller cites Sura 2: 216, 4:89, 4:95, 9:29, 9:36, 9:41, 9:111, and 61:10- 13. The Riyad-us-Saliheen cites Sura 2:216, 4:95-96, 9: 36, 9:41, 9:111, and 61:10-13. Common to all three of the legal texts are 2:16 and 4:95. Sura 2:216 obliges the fighter and Sura 4:95 motivates the non-fighter.

Sura 002.216:11 Yusufali: Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not. Pickthal: Warfare is ordained for you, though it is hateful unto you; but it may happen that ye hate a thing which is good for you, and it may happen that ye love a thing which is bad for you. Allah knoweth, ye know not. Shakir: Fighting is enjoined on you, and it is an object of dislike to you; and it may be that you dislike a thing while it is good for you, and it

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may be that you love a thing while it is evil for you, and Allah knows, while you do not know.

Sura 004.095:12 Yusufali: Not equal are those believers who sit (at home) and receive no hurt, and those who strive and fight in the cause of Allah with their goods and their persons. Allah hath granted a grade higher to those who strive and fight with their goods and persons than to those who sit (at home). Unto all (in Faith) Hath Allah prom- ised good: But those who strive and fight Hath He distinguished above those who sit (at home) by a special reward. Pickthal: Those of the believers who sit still, other than those who have a (disabling) hurt, are not on an equality with those who strive in the way of Allah with their wealth and lives. Allah hath conferred on those who strive with their wealth and lives a rank above the seden- tary. Unto each Allah hath promised good, but He hath bestowed on those who strive a great reward above the sedentary. Shakir: The holders back from among the believers, not having any injury, and those who strive hard in Allah's way with their property and their persons are not equal; Allah has made the strivers with their property and their persons to excel the holders back a (high) degree, and to each (class) Allah has promised good; and Al- lah shall grant to the strivers above the holders back a mighty reward.

The Distinguished Jurists Primer,13 Riyad-us-Salihee,14 and Reliance of the Traveller,15 clearly identify combat, combat support and combat service support roles for the Muslim community when one initiates Jihad. There is unambiguous legal guidance upon whom support to Jihad is obligatory; conditions affecting the obligation; identification of the persons to be fought; the scale of harm that may be inflicted on the enemy; conditions for the declaration of war; the identification of the number from whom retreat is not permissible; permissions for truce; and, the two reasons for waging war (to force the conversion to Islam and to secure the payment of the "jizya").

 

Pillars of Faith

 

Of the five Pillars of Faith,16 one directly facilitates warfighting: zakat, or alms giving. There are eight oblig- atory disbursements for zakat: The Poor, Those Short of Money; Zakat Workers; Those Whose Hearts are to be Reconciled; Those Purchasing their Freedom; Those in Debt; Those Fighting for Allah; and, Travelers Needing Money. Three of these categories support insurgency –

•              The obligatory disbursements for those whose hearts are to be reconciled constitute a funding mecha- nism facilitating the establishment of Islamic footholds in non-Muslim areas and the consolidating of those foot- holds to increase Islamic influence.17

•           The obligatory disbursements for those fighting for Allah constitute a funding mechanism for combat, combat support and combat service support operations. The precise characteristics of the funding process and the amount of money involved is presently unknown, but the enabling doctrine is in place and ideally suited for supporting autonomous, decentralized, asymmetrical military operations.18

•           The obligatory disbursements for travelers need- ing money defrays personal expenses and transportation costs associated with individual movement to and from conflict zones.19

 

Jihad20

 

Jihad is considered among an increasing number of Muslims to constitute a Sixth Pillar of Faith and this en- joys considerable theological inertia. Mohammad com- manded Jihad (Sura 8:39) proclaiming a divine mandate, personally led 27 attacks and sent his armies out 47 more times against non-Islamic communities averaging about seven operations per year.21 Quoting directly from the Encyclopaedia (sic) of Jihad:

"The Scholars of Fiqh (jurisprudence) have agreed that jihad in Shara'ee terms means 'to fight in the Path of Allah or anything aiding this course' A more detailed understanding of the term Jihad has been explained by the four major schools of Fiqh as follows.

 

Maliki Fiqh: "The Muslims are to fight with the Kuffar to advance Allah's religion."

Shafi'ee Fiqh: "The meaning of Jihad in Shara'ee terms is to make utmost effort in fighting in the Path of Allah.

Hanbali Figh: "Jihad means to fight against the unbelievers." (Fadhail-e-Jihad).

Hanafi Fiqh: "Jihad means to be involved in fighting in the Path of Allah by one's life, wealth and speech." It is further explained "to call the unbelievers towards the true religion of Islam and to fight against them, if they are unwilling to accept this true religion."22

Islam's World View

Islam divides the world into two spheres variously called the Abode of Islam, House of Islam or dar al-Islam and the Abode of War, House of War or dar al-harb. There can be no peace between the two until dar al-Islam conquers and as-

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Figure 2. Power Assessment – Sources and Patterns.

 

similates its adversary. Accommodation and compromise are impermissible and fighting is obligatory.

 

Islam's Just War Traditions

 

There are four commonly discussed Just War Traditions: Ju- daic, Christian (or Catholic), Realist and Islamic. The Just War Theory is comprised of three elements: Jus ad bellum which addresses the justice of resorting to war; jus in bello which ad- dresses conduct in war; and, jus post bellum, which addresses the justice of post war peace.

Assessing the justification for resorting to war requires an understanding of the elements of jus ad bellum; Just Cause, Right Intention, Proper Authority and Public Declaration, Last Resort, Probability of Success, and Proportionality. A compari- son of the four traditions supports an argument that the Judaic, Christian and Realist Traditions of War are passive defensive while Islam is Offensive Aggressive.23    Invariably, the ques- tion is raised about the nature of the Crusades and the answer is that the Crusades were a delayed response to Jihad

 

Recommendations for a Response

 

"McNamara's    Defense           Department      and      Bundy 's White House were gluttons for analysis. Both men were of extraordinary intelligence. What they lacked was a criteria to assess a challenge so at variance with the American experience and American Ideology." – Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy

Based on the above abbreviated overview, there is evidence to support the contention that sources of ter- rorism in Islam may reside within the strategic themes of Islam: The Example of the Mohammad; the Koran; the Haddiths; Islamic Law; the Pillars of Faith; Jihad; World View, and Just War Traditions. The issue now is assessing how to counter "an idea."

Developing a policy response is prob- lematic because the analytical community does not have a commonly accepted or understood framework for quantifying the threat. Islam is an idea; an ideology, and it is not readily or easily susceptible to diplomatic, military, or economic leverage. As an idea, however, it is more susceptible to the information or ideological lever of power and this requires insight to where the lever should be applied. Figure 2 portrays the sources of power animating Islam.

Islam's political trinity consists of its Holy Texts, the Clerics (who interpret the Texts and serve as community leaders and "spiritual" advisors for fighters and fighting

groups), and the People. Each of the three elements is tightly interwoven with Islam's strategic themes. Within each element are centers of gravities, critical vulnerabili- ties and exploitable seams that, when fully identified, become potential themes for a defensive information campaign.

Centers of Gravity – These constitute sources of strength that may or may not present themselves as suitable informa- tion targets.24 The centers of gravity for Islam itself are Mohammad, the Koran, and to a lesser degree, the Haddiths. Fracturing a center of gravity is a shorter (but sometimes more difficult) route to success but an indi- rect method for attacking a center of gravity is approach- ing it through its critical vulnerabilities.

 

Critical Vulnerabilities – These are "soft spots" that, if exploited, may induce a deteriorating cascade effect upon the target. Critical vulnerabilities of the Koran, for example, are that it was uttered by a mortal; por- tions were ghostwritten by others; portions were lost or redacted, and it was revised and re-issued by another mortal. Similar vulnerabilities may be found in Moham- mad's character as a political and military leader, the character of other Clerics in the Modern Era, as well as the topics addressed in the Haddiths.

Exploitable Seams – Exploitable Seams are elements of Strategic Culture which can be thought of as "Love- Hate" relationships that bind the three elements (Holy Texts, Clerics, and the People) together. For example, within the American experience, there is the love-hate relationship between the People and the Government. Americans love the Constitution but hate big govern- ment. Another love-hate relationship, successfully ex- ploited by North Vietnam, was the dichotomy between an anti-military bias and the tradition of the citizen sol- dier. By exploiting the seams binding the People to the Government and the Military, North Vietnam was able

 

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to fracture the Political Trinity of the United States. The same process may be applicable in the "Global War on Terrorism".

The identification of information or ideological cen- ters of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, and exploitable seams produces Information Themes which become the fodder for a yet to be realized Information Lever of National Power. Presently, the adversary has the upper hand in using a global network of information outlets ca- pable of delivering Islamic themes penetrating otherwise inaccessible recesses of the Islamic Community.

If the United States, Moderate Muslim governments, and the Non-Muslim world seek to engage ideological adversaries on their own ground, they will have to de- velop, use and maintain the full range of capabilities in the Ideological component of National Power, and ad- dress Islam's strategic themes directly.

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Endnotes

 

1. From the Haddith, recorded by Sahih Al-Bukhari, Muhammad is quoted as saying: "I am commanded by Allah to go and fight all the people of the world until they confess there is no God but allah, and I am his messenger, and to pray five times a day and to give alms. And if they do that, their blood will be spared from me." This command has not been revoked, abrogated, or modified. See Mark A. Gabriel, Islam and Terrorism: What the Quran Really Teaches About Christianity, Violence, and the Goals of Islamic Jihad, (Charisma House, Lake Mary, FL. 2002); 79. 2. http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/008.qmt.html#008.039, accessed 30 June 2006 3. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Quran (Amana Publications, Baltimore, 2002): 413 4. University of Southern California-Muslim Student Association Compendium for Muslim Texts http:// www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/ 002.sbt.html#001.002.024, accessed 29 June 2006 5. "Will you listen to me, O Quraysh? By Him who holds my life in His hands I bring you a slaughter." Muhammad to his detractors while circumambulating the Kaba on the third circuit. Reported by Amr ibn al-As in Karen Armstrong, Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet (Harper Collins: San Francisco, 1992); 124. 6. The four schools are Hanifi, Maliki, Shafie, and Hanbali. 7. The remainder of this assessment will address the Sunni Law Traditions. 8. Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurists Primer (Vol I and II), Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK:(1994) 9. Yahya, al-Imam Abu Zakariya, Riyad-us-Saliheen, Darussalam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia:(1998) 10. al-Misri, Ahmed ibn Naqib, Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law, Amana Publications, Beltsville, MD, 1994. 11. University of Southern California-Muslim Student Association Compendium for Muslim Texts http://

www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/002.qmt.html#002.216, accessed 29 June 2006. 12. University of Southern California-Muslim Student Association Compendium for Muslim Texts http:// www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/quran/004.qmt.html#004.095, accessed 29 June 2006

13. Ibn Rushd: 454-487 14. Yahya: 976-1016 15. al-Misri: 599-605 16. The Five Pillars of Faith are: Testimony of Faith (Kalima), Prayer (Salat), Fasting (Sawm), Almsgiving (Zakat), and Pilgrimage (Hajj).

17. Those Whose Hearts Are To Be Reconciled: Must be Muslim. Given to ensure propagation of the faith in initial stages. If recent converts and are alienated from their kin. Those to be reconciled include: Chief personages of a people (with weak or fledgling institutions needing economic support to improve or whose peers may be expected to enter Islam); Heads of a people who collect zakat for Islam from Muslims living near them who refuse to pay it; Heads of a people who fight an enemy for Islam at considerable expense and trouble to themselves. See al-Misri: 270-271.

18. Those Fighting for Allah: Those engaged in Islamic military operations for whom no salary has been allotted in the army roster. Given enough to suffice them for the operation even if affluent of: weapons; mounts; clothing; expenses; and, for the duration of the journey, round trip, and the time they spend there. Current interpretation and practice has been to provide expenses in supporting such person's family during this period. See al-Misri: 272.

19. Travelers Needing Money. One who is passing through a town in Muslim lands where zakat is collected or whose journey was not taken for the purpose of disobeying Allah, if such a person is in need, he is given enough to cover his personal expenses and transportation, even if he possesses money back home. See al-Misri: 272

20. For a more detailed discussion of Jihad, see Stephen P. Lambert, Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct, Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2005, and Islam: The Peaceful Religion in Perpetual War, Joint Military Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, 2003.

21. Gabriel, 78. 22. R.K. Pruth, editor, Encyclodaedia of Jihad, Anmol Publications PVT, LTD, New Delhi, 2002, Vol 1, page 57-58 23. See first, Ibn Rushd, The Distinguished Jurists Primer (Vol I and II), Garnet Publishing, Reading, UK: (1994), 464. "The Muslim jurists agreed that the purpose of fighting the People of the Book, excluding the (Qurayshite) People of the Book and the Christian Arabs, is one of two things: it is either for their conversion to Islam or the payment of the jizya." See also: Fred M. Donner, "The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War", in Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds, Greenwood Press, New York (1991), 51. "Against states of the dar al-harb the legitimate ruler of the Islamic empire, in juristic theory, was justified in making war at any time; indeed to wage jihad in an effort to subdue the dar al-harb and to incorporate it into the dar

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al-islam was seen as a religious duty of the imam/caliph." See also: A. J. Coates, The Ethics of War. Manchester University Press, New York (1997), 46. "Legitimate domination has one true foundation – Islam - and the recognition of non-Islamic states on anything other than a temporary and pragmatic basis is impermissible. This fundamentalist approach yields a starkly adversarial and conflictual view of the present state of humanity. The use of force to bring about the triumph of Islam is unambiguously and enthusiastically proclaimed. War is not a necessary evil, but a fundamental obligation or 'neglected duty". Far from war posing a threat to religious observance,

' religion without war is a crippled religion' (Ayatollah Khomeini), and jihad or holy war is the essence of Islam, as the fundamentalists understands it." 24. See, Izzo, Lawrence L. LTC. "The Center of Gravity is Not an Achilles Heel." Military Review (January 1988): 76-77. See also Mendel, Wm W., and Lamar Tooke. "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity." Military Review (June 1993): 2-11; Vego, Milan. Enter of Gravity." Military Review (April- March 2000): 23-29

 

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