Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30:1–14, 2007
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/10576100601049928
Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda
PAUL CRUICKSHANK
Center on Law and Security
NYU School of Law
New York, New York, USA
MOHANNAD HAGE ALI
Al-Hayat
London, UK
Drawing on new sources, the authors argue that Abu Musab al Suri (real name
Mustafa
SetmariamNasar), now inU.S. custody, is the principle architect of Al
Qaeda's post–9/11
structure and strategy. His vision, which predated 9/11, of transforming Al
Qaeda from
a vulnerable hierarchical organization into a resilient decentralized
movement, was
largely the formula Al Qaeda adopted after the collapse of the Taliban. The
authors
show how Setmariam, whose ideas have been disseminated widely on the
Internet and
whose disciples have gravitated to leadership positions in the international
jihad, has
influenced Al Qaeda's post–9/11 strategy, targeting, and doctrine.
In early November 2005 Pakistani police forces conducted a raid in Quetta in
the south
west of Pakistan, killing one man and arresting another. The man that was
arrested was
Mustafa Setmariam Nasar also known by his nom de guerre Abu Musab al Suri, a
Syrian
Jihadist with Spanish citizenship who spent a considerable part of the 1990s
living in the
London suburb of Neasden. A London Islamist told the authors he had been
traced to an
address after his wife had tried to reach him by phone from Qatar.1 This is
the man that for
a few days after the London bombings was being labelled in news reports as
the suspected
mastermind behind the attacks.2 The reports were wrong. Setmariam did not
operationally
direct the attacks. He did not know the bombers. Yet arguably his
contribution to these
attacks and others was greater still. In a statement that Setmariam made in
August 2005
titled "Message to the British and European peoples and governments after
the bombings
of July 2005," that was only posted on jihadist websites on 2 December 2005
one month
after his arrest, Setmariam stated: "I swear to God that I have in me a joy
stronger than the
joy of the farmer who sees the harvest of his fruits after a long planting
and efforts and
patience throughout decades of building."3
His claim should be taken at face value. Setmariam's arrest is one of
themost significant
but unheralded breakthroughs in the war on terrorism. This is because no
other individual
has done more to conceptualize Al Qaeda's new strategy after 9/11. The
morphing of
Received 9 January 2006; accepted 20 February 2006.
Address correspondence to Paul Cruickshank, The Center on Law and Security,
NYU School
of Law, 110 West 3rd St., Room 224/5, New York, NY 10012, USA. E-mail:
cruickshank@
juris.law.nyu.edu
1
2 P. Cruickshank and M. H. Ali
Al Qaeda from an organization with its own Afghanistan-based bureaucracy,
hierarchies,
and modus operandi into an ideological umbrella for more loosely tied
jihadists around
the world, is by now a familiar story. This development has mostly been
explained in
terms of the external pressures on, and opportunities available to, Al Qaeda
after 9/11.
The loss of its training camps in Afghanistan and the killing or capture of
much of its
pre-9/11 senior leadership meant that if Al Qaeda was to continue to be
relevant it had to
switch toward inspiring and steering jihadist groups, often only loosely
affiliated with bin
Laden's organization. In this regard, the power of the Internet, or the
video cassette aired on
Al-Jazeera, was ruthlessly taken advantage of, but so too was the
unpopularity in the Islamic
world from 2002 of the move toward war in Iraq, a move that was seen to
corroborate Al
Qaeda's central claim of a worldwide plot to oppress Muslims. And the new
environment
made necessary a new form of terrorist attack that emerged in Bali,
Istanbul, Madrid, and
London, undertaken by much more locally rooted Jihadis, acting in tighter
"homegrown"
groups, with loose and difficult-to-trace ties to the on-the-run Al Qaeda
leadership.
The "new Al Qaeda" or "Al Qaeda 2.0" or "Al Qaeda the movement" has not,
however,
been a merely spontaneous evolution. It has had its intelligent design too.
And nobody
has been more important in this regard than Setmariam. A veteran of the
Afghan war
against the Soviets, whose red hair and pale complexion had allowed him to
blend easily
into European societies in the 1990s, Setmariam ran Al Qaeda–funded training
camps in
Afghanistan from 1998 to 2001 and had once sat on the Shura Council of Al
Qaeda, before
fleeing Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.4 For some time the
prevalent view among
Western intelligence services was that he had gone to Iraq to work with Abu
Musab al
Zarqawi.5 In 2004 a Spanish newspaper obtained a leaked June 2004 memo from
U.S.
Central Command in Dubai stating that the U.S. military believed that
Setmariam might be
acting as deputy and mentor to the Jordanian terrorist.6 It now appears that
he spent most
of his time in hiding in Pakistan, possibly spending some time in Iran in
the period after
the fall of the Taliban.7 This is the view of Fuad Hussein, a journalist
from Jordan, who
in 2005 wrote a biography of al Zarqawi. Fuad Hussein probably knows al
Zarqawi better
than any other journalist, having got to know the terrorist leader well when
they shared
a prison wing in Jordan in the mid-1990s. Fuad Hussein told the authors that
Setmariam
"had not travelled to Iraq but [had been] in Pakistan from where he posted
new items to
Jihadist websites every day."8 In Pakistan, Setmariam appears to have been
on the run. His
will, dated December 2004, and posted on jihadist websites describes how "we
are moving
around with what God has given us, moving from one hideout to another with
the enemies
of God chasing us."9
Setmariam himself denies a direct relationship with al Zarqawi. In a
December 2004
statement, he stated, "I emphasize my denial that I worked with Sheikh Abu
Musab al
Zarqawi. This was an honor that I did not have since I did not get the
chance to go to Iraq
in view of my solitude."10 Rather than go to Iraq, Setmariam, in the three
years after the
fall of the Taliban, spent a substansial amount of time writing a 1,600-page
book, "The
Call for Global Islamic Resistance" which was widely posted on jihadist
sites in late 2004.
In Setmariam's words, "I dedicated my time during my solititude to focus on
the nature
of upcoming confrontations and battles [being] one of the remaining jihadist
specialists in
the field."11 His tract represented the culmination of his thinking on how
the international
jihad should be strategically and tactically fought.
Setmariam's influence over the direction of Al Qaeda, however, dates back
much
longer. In the late 1980s, he was one of those pressing bin Laden to take a
more hostile
line toward Saudi Arabia.12 And in the late 1990s he ran the Al-Ghuraba camp
in a
semi-independent way from the Al Qaeda leadership, determined to press home
his own
Abu Musab Al Suri 3
conception of jihadist strategy. Rather than concentrate on the
indoctrination of the rank
and file, Setmariam focused on training the future recruiters of Al Qaeda:
the masterminds
of future operations. The lectures he gave in Afghanistan were filmed and
disseminated
widely across the Muslim world. Some of these videotapes have been uncovered
by police
in the houses and mosques of jihadist sympathizers in various European
countries.13 But the
authors have had the opportunity to reviewvideotapes of his complete lecture
series recently
discovered in Afghanistan.14 They reveal that as early as 2000, Setmariam
was pressing a
future generation of operatives and recruiters toward a new modus operandi,
one that bears
striking similarity to the evolution of the structure and strategy of Al
Qaeda after 9/11.
***
Mustafa Setmariam Nasar was born in Aleppo, Syria in 1958, where he studied
mechanical engineering, before joining the Islamic Combat Vanguards, which
was
connected to the SyrianMuslim brotherhood, to fight against the Allawite
Ba'ath regime.15
The current head of the Syrian Muslim brotherhood, Ali Bayanoni, told the
authors
that even at an early age Setmariam was known as an "extremist."16 Setmariam
was
trained by Egyptian officers in Cairo and by officers who had deserted the
Syrian army
in Jordan, in an era of bitter conflict between Syria and other Arab
regimes. According
to jihadi websites, during this period Setmariam developed a specialization
in explosives
engineering, urban warfare, and "special operations."17 He also had a spell
being trained
in a camp in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In his book "The Call for Global Islamic
Resistance"
he recalls his experience there:
I joined a training course which prepared the Muslim Brotherhood's military
branch cadres during the Jihad and revolution against Hafez Assad's regime.
I was 22 years old and that was in the Iraqi army's Racheed camp in Baghdad
in 1980. The trainer was a righteous man from the old guards who pledged
allegiance to Sheikh Hassan al Bannah [the founder of theMuslim brotherhood]
at 17. He acompanied Sayyid Qutb [the leading ideologue of the jihadist
movement], and then spent the rest of his life outside Egypt. I recall that
the first thing he said [was] "Are you Muslim brotherhood members." We all
said "yes." Then the trainer said while pointing at his neck "you will all
get
slaughtered, do you approve of that?" Then we happily and joyfully said "we
approve Sir." He then turned to the chalkboard and wrote the title of his
very
first lecture: "Terrorism is a duty and assassination is a Sunnah [an action
ordained by the Prophet Mohammed]."18
Many of Setmariam's companions were indeed slaughtered during the Syrian
regime's
bloody crackdown in the Hama confrontations of 1982. After this, Setmariam
split with the
SyrianMuslim brotherhood, in protest to their ties with secular parties like
the Iraqi Ba'ath
Syrian branch and the Syrian Communist Party. He moved to France where he
lived for
three years before setting up a residence in Spain taking jobs as a
tradesman and working
as a journalist for Islamist publications.19 He married a Spanish convert to
Islam, Elena
Moreno, in 1987, with whom he has had three children.20 His aim, though, was
still to
revive the jihad in Syria and his efforts took him to Peshawar in 1988 where
he met Sheikh
Abdullah Azzam, the chief recruiter of Arabs to join the Afghan jihad. Azzam
persuaded
Setmariam to join their number. He met bin Laden and became involved with
the early Al
Qaeda, which he acknowledged in a statement posted on jihadist websites in
December
2004:
4 P. Cruickshank and M. H. Ali
I had the honor to know Sheikh Osama since 1988. I had the honor to become
a member of al Qaeda and work with the organization until 1990 during which
I trained some of the Al Qaeda vanguards. I taught martial and military
science
at al Qaeda camps and the camps of all Afghan Arabs. I specialized in making
explosive devices and the carrying out of special operations and
guerillawarfare
in cities in which I received advanced training in Iraq, Egypt and Jordan.
Kamal el Helbawi, who ran a Research Institute documenting the Afghan war,
remembers
Setmariam from his time in Peshawar, "His book the Syrian Experience on the
Islamic
movement in Syriawas being distributed for free and became very popular.He
had extremist
ideas, takfiri ideas. He was accusing the Islamic movement of being too
lazy. His ideas
were popular amongst the hardliners who saw him as a pioneer."21
After three years in Peshawar, Setmariam decided to return to Europe at a
time when
bin Laden and Al Qaeda were decamping to the Sudan. In "The Call to Global
Islamic
Resistance" he states, "In 1991, I left Afghanistan to [return to] my
residence in Spain
and I practically lost contact with them until 1996 when we met as guests of
the Taliban."
Back in Madrid, Setmariam befriended fellow Syrian Imad Eddin Barakat
Yarkas, who on
26 September 2005 was sentenced to 27 years for holding a command role in Al
Qaeda and
collaborating with the 11 September plotters.22
In 1994 Setmariam decided to move to London, which, with its more tolerant
attitude,
was developing as a hub of radical Islamism. According to Spanish court
documents,
Spanish police videotaped his wife carrying furniture into a car Setmariam
was borrowing
from Yarkas for the move.23 In London, Setmariam and his family moved into
the drab
London suburb of Neasden.24 Setmariam had been asked to go to London by
Sheikh Qari
al Jazaeri, the founder of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) that at the time
was waging a
violent campaign against the Algerian government. The men knew each other
from the
days of the Afghan war and Qari wanted Setmariam to help with the media side
of the
group's operations.25 Setmariam's links to the GIA prompted the British
police to arrest
him in connection with a series of bombings of the Paris metro by the GIA in
the summer
of 1995 but lacking evidence they let him go.
From his house in Neasden, Setmariam helped to edit the GIA's newsletter "Al
Ansar,"
which was run by Abu Qatada, a radical Jordanian cleric and spiritual head
of Al-Zarqawi's
then fledgling terrorist organization Al Tawhid.26 One issue of the
publication carried a
fatwah from Abu Qatada calling for the killing of wives and children of
those that opposed
the Islamist line in Algeria.27 Setmariam, was also showing a penchant for
hard-line views.
He later described how:
I had the honor to support the jihad against the government of apostates in
Algeria from 1994–1996. I had the honor to disassociate myself from everyone
who deviated from the right path.28
Setmariam was also developing a repuation of being extremely calculating. A
prominent
London Islamist told the authors, "Setmaraianwas aMachiavellian. For him the
end justifies
themeans. He is nice when he needs to be, otherwise he is not."29 Kamal el
Helbawi told the
authors "London was a place a lot of militants came through, some people
moved forward,
he moved backwards."
In 1996 Setmariam ventured back to Afghanistan where he met bin Laden again.
That summer he helped set up an interview between British Journalist Robert
Fisk and Al
Qaeda's leader.30 Returning to London he set up a company called the Islamic
Conflict
Abu Musab Al Suri 5
Studies Bureau in 1997. That spring he escorted CNN journalists Peter Arnett
and Peter
Bergen from London to Afghanistan to meet bin Laden to record Al Qaeda's
leader's first
television interview. Peter Bergen, who communicated with Setmariam in
French, told the
authors "Setmariam was intelligent, intense and well informed and very very
serious. I
came to admire his intellect. Of course, when I was dealing with Setmariam
in 1997 he
gave no hint of his radical, militant views."31
In 1998 Setmariam returned to Afghanistan to settle there with his family
permanently.
On leaving Europe he could reflect how his time there had benefited his
strategic thinking.
He felt he had a handle on the West's ways and weaknesses and that he could
impart this
knowledge to other jihadis. He would later state:
I am one of the few Jihadis who understand the Western culture and
mentality.
This is for several reasons. One of them is I lived in the West for fifteen
years.
I developed friendships and relationships in those societies and read lots
of
historial and sociological information.32
Setmariam, in his statement of December 2004, explains what he did when he
settled in
Afghanistan:
I had the honor to emigrate to Dar al Islam (home of Islam), Afghanistan,
when this home was established. I had the honor to announce my pledge
of allegiance to the Prince of the Believers Mullah Mohammed Omar in
April 2000. I worked as a mujahid in the Defense Ministry of the Taliban.
For this purpose I established the Al-Ghuraba camp. In it I trained many
Arabs and non Arabs. I worked with the information Ministry of the
Islamic Ministry of Afghanistan when I was in charge of the Arabic section
there. I wrote in official newspapers and prepared supportive programs for
Radio Kabul in Arabic. I established the Al-Ghuraba Center for Studies
to disseminate jihadist thought and the call for global resistance. I wrote
thousands of pages in ideology, political, military and martial science and
shariah studies. During 25 years I recorded hundreds of audio cassettes and
videotapes.
According to Baker Atyani, Al Aribiya's bureau chief in Islamabad, Pakistan,
who
interviewed bin Laden in June 2001, Setmariam became particularly close to
Mullah Omar
on his return to Afghanistan. According to Atyani in the late 1990s
Setmariam was "not
known as an al Qaeda person."33 Despite being involved with the embryonic Al
Qaeda of
the late 1980s, Setmariam now wanted to establish a certain amount of
independence. In
some ways he was a rival to bin Laden in this period: a figure already very
well respected
among the Arab Afghans with his own clout. Bin Laden's claims to leadership
of the whole
jihadist movement and burgeoning international profile agitated Setmariam.
In a 19 July
1999 letter to Ayman al Zawahari found by Wall Street Journal Reporters on
an Al Qaeda
computer, Setmariam complains:
The strangest thing I have heard so far is Abu Abdullah (bin Laden) saying
he wouldn't listen to the Leader of the Faithful (Mullah Omar) when he asked
him to stop giving interviews. I think our brother (bin Laden) has caught
the
disease of screens, flashes, fans and applause.34
6 P. Cruickshank and M. H. Ali
Noman Benotman, a Libyan jihadist, confirmed the tension between the two
men, "before
9/11, [al Suri and Bin Laden] hated each other. Al Suri didn't like bin
Laden's leadership
because he said, "bin Laden is a dictator" and he even called him "a
Pharoah."35
It was only after 9/11 and the U.S. offensive in Afghanistan that Setmariam
gave bin
Laden his full backing:
When I met Sheikh Osama, for the last time in November 2001 during the
battles to defend the emirate, we pledged allegiance to the Prince of the
Faithful
[Mullah Omar]. I pledged to Sheikh Osama that I will persist in Jihad and
the
war against the enemy.36
Setmariam claims hewas kept in the dark over the 9/11 plot, "only learning
about the attacks
through the media."37 He may well be telling the truth. Suspicions over his
involvement
in the plot center on his close relationship with Yarkas who according to
the Spanish
authorities set up a key planning meeting in the northeastern Spanish region
of Tarragona
in July 2001 and the fact that German Federal Police discovered that while
he was living
in London in the mid-1990s, Setmariam had received $3,000 from Hamburg
businessman
Mamoun Darkazanli, who admitted to knowing Mohammed Atta, the lead 9/11
hijacker.38
As yet however there is no concrete evidence linking him to the plot. Indeed
the 9/11
Commission Report does not mention his name at all.
Ironically, it appears Setmariam gave bin Laden his full backing after 9/11
despite
deep reservations about the consequences of the attacks. According to a
London Islamist
the authors spoke to, "Setmariam was one of the staunchest critics of 9/11
because Osama
[bin Laden] did not get Mullah Omar's permission. Setmariam had pledged
allegiance
to Mullah Omar and felt that the fall of the Taliban had resulted in the
collapse of the
Islamic caliphate."39 In his 2004 book Setmariam stated that "occurrences
resulting from
September 11th have negatively affected Muslims." He lists the negative
consequences
as:
(1). The destruction of the Emirate in Afghanistan. (2). The American attack
on
Islam and Muslim people in the name of combating terrorism after September
11th. (3). The occupation of Iraq . . . the Jihad movement rose to glory in
the
1960s and continued through the 1970s and 1980s and resulted in the rise of
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan but was destroyed after 9/11.40
Despite the negative consequences of 9/11, Setmariam recognized that the
international
jihad needed its figureheads. His public praise since for bin Laden has
therefore been
voluminous and he now calls the September 2001 attacks "heroic and
glorious."41
Setmariam's objections were strictly strategic in that he felt that the loss
of training camps
in Afghanistan was too high a price to pay for an attack that did not fully
paralyze the
United States. In fact he stated in a January 2005 posting on a jihadist
website,
I feel sorry because there were no weapons of mass destruction in the planes
that attacked New York andWashington on 9/11.We might have been relieved
of the biggest number possible of voters who elected Bush for a second
term!42
Setmariam had a great fascination with the destructive impact of weapons of
mass
destruction. His training in the 1980s, including time in Saddam Hussein's
Iraq, had allowed
him to build up a certain expertise. According to theU.S. government, while
in Afghanistan,
Abu Musab Al Suri 7
Setmariam assisted Al Qaeda's WMD chief, an Egyptian called Abu Khabab
al-Masri, in
training Al Qaeda recruits in the use of poisons and chemicals at the
Derunta training
camp.43 A letter from Abu Khabab to Al Qaeda operatives found in Afghanistan
after the
fall of the Taliban revealed a preoccupation with developing "dirty bombs":
As you instructed us you will find attached a summary of the discharges from
a
traditional nuclear reactor, amongst which are radioactive elements that
could
be used formilitary ends. One can use them to contaminate an area or to halt
the
advance of the enemy. It is possible to get more information from our
Pakistani
friends who have great experience in this sphere.44
It was a preoccupation that Setmariam shared, until his arrest a worrying
fact for Western
security services and probably the most important factor in the issuing by
the U.S.
authorities, on 18 November 2004, of a $5 million reward for information
leading to
his capture or killing. Setmariam responded to the issuing of this reward in
a December
2004 by stating that an attack on the United States using weapons of mass
destruction was
"eventually possible and has now become necessary":
[One] option was to destroy the United States by means of decisive strategic
operations with weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons if mujahidin are able to obtain them in cooperation with
those who possess them, purchase them—or manufacture and use primitive
atomic bombs or so called dirty bombs. I believe that the adoption of the
slogan
dirty bombs for a dirty nation is not free of justice. Let the radiation
harm the
American people who vote for the killing, destruction and expropriation of
the
people's resources, and [the] malignant narcissism to control others. After
all,
we will just say that we regret the radiation.45
In Afghanistan Setmariam developed a reputation as a hard-liner even within
the jihadist
fold. One fellow jihadist remembers that on occasion he personally tracked
down and
killed individuals who had abandoned his group.46 The videos of the classes
he gave
at the al Ghuraba training camp, which were then distributed around the
world, make
chilling viewing. At one point he tells the future jihadi recruiters "Kill
wherever and don't
make a distinction between men, women and children."47 Although in his
December 2004
statement Setmariam spoke of the need not to target the innocent, his
conception of those
that need to be "hit" is exceptionally wide: "the Crusaders, Christians,
Jews and lapsed
Muslims."48 Setmariam also had a strong antipathy for the Shia. In
videotapes recovered
from the flat of an Algerian terrorist cell in Naples in 2000, Setmariam
rejects any form
of cooperation between Sunnis and Shia, pointing to the "negative influence"
that Shiite
groups like Hezbollah have had on the Palestinian struggle.49 This anti-Shia
line would
later play well among Sunni Iraqi insurgents downloading Setmariam's
speeches from
jihadi websites.
***
It is as a strategic thinker that Setmariam has made his most critical
contribution to the
jihadist movement. He brought in what he considered to be the "best and the
brightest"
of the new generation of jihadists to his Al Ghuraba training camp in
Afghanistan and,
according to Baker Atyani, was able to entice several members of Al Qaeda to
his camp.
Al Ghuraba received funds from bin Laden but was independent from the other
Al Qaeda
camps.50 Several recruits came from Europe and were dispatched back there
after they
8 P. Cruickshank and M. H. Ali
had received their training.51 Setmariam later recalled that: "Among those I
supervised
and trained at al Ghuraba were Arabs and foreigners including Britons born,
raised and
resident in Britain and others from different Western countries, including
some American
Muslims."52
It was at Al Ghuraba that Setmariam articulated a new strategic concept for
jihad.
The videotapes of his lecture series from the summer of 2000 were recovered
recently
in Afghanistan. They contain over twenty hours of footage focused on
Setmariam, clad
in white Islamic garb, standing in front of a table and blackboard
addressing his class,
the obligatory Kalashnikov to one side. What is immediately striking is how
articulately
and intelligently Setmariam makes his arguments. His assumption is that his
audience is a
highly educated one.
Setmariam's new strategic concept was that "individual terrorism" needed to
replace
the hierarchically orchestrated terrorism of Al Qaeda. He explained to his
class why this
was necessary:
We ask the Muslim youth to be a terrorist. Why do we ask for such individual
terrorism? First because secret hierarchical organizations failed to attract
Muslims. The youth fear joining such an organization because if there is a
mistake then the authorities will reach them. Second because we need to give
the youth the chance to play a role without being part of an organization.
Some
youth don't want to join an organization and don't know how to act on their
beliefs. Third due to pressure from the Jews, Crusaders and lapsed Muslim
regimes.53
Setmariam then launched into a critique of Al Qaeda's hierarchical
structure. He drew a
diagram indicating howeasy itwas to round up a cell structure inwhich many
cells are traced
back to a leader (see Figure 1)."In the new stage," Setmariam told his
future recruiters, "You
should form a brigade and work directly. I advise your brigade doesn't
exceed tenmembers.
You shouldn't expand or form too many. In case you are caught, they are all
caught."54
Setmariam recognized that there would need to be a great amount of
mobilization to
achieve his vision of a mass participation jihadist movement. The
"prototype" he would
later state in his 2004 book was the "Palestinian Intifada but on a broader
basis which
includes the Islamic world, with its arm reaching the home of the American
invaders and
their infidel allies from every race and place."55 To encourage such popular
participation,
Setmarian introduced his Al Ghuraba lecture course by saying he wanted to
distribute
videotapes of the couse to teach individuals how to incite Muslims to become
jihadists.
"This should be done," says Setmariam, by "highlighting Jewish-Crusader
oppression of
Muslims." Also, he says that dwelling on the "degeneracy of the Western
world"—"its
sin, gays and lesbians"—is a good way to incite Muslims. Attacks should take
place in the
Figure 1. Setmariam's depiction of Al Qaeda's cell structure.
Abu Musab Al Suri 9
country of residence of jihadis. The criteria for targets, Setmariam says,
are: (1) "where it
hurts the enemy and costs him the most" and (2) "where it awakens Muslims
and revives
the spirit of Jihad and resistance." The aim he says "is to spread a
Jihadist cancer to face
the bad cancer of the world order."56
In the years since 9/11, Al Qaeda has evolved in remarkably similar lines to
Setmariam's
vision. Facing an onslaught against its organized structures, the loss of
its training camps,
but also the opportunity of a new cause c´el`ebre in Iraq, Al Qaeda has
morphed into a
broader-based and looser movement. The terrorist strikes in Bali,
Casablanca, Istanbul,
Madrid, and London were all initiated by exactly the sort of small locally
recruited cells
for which Setmariam was calling. They represent a change in approach to the
centrally
organized attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 and the 9/11 attacks.
In both these
instances operatives were parachuted in from Afghan training camps to carry
out the strikes.
They were also directed at targets (tourism and transport infrastructure)
whose destruction
would have a signicant economic "cost."
To make this newindividual terrorism "orderly" Setmariam recognized in his
2004 tract
that "wonderful individual initiatives" needed to be "directed" through
strategic guidance,
either from him or other Al Qaeda leaders and "invested" with "a state of
general unity"
or in other words be credited to Al Qaeda.57 Bin Laden, al Zawahiri, and Al
Qaeda leaders
have certainly acted according to this advice. It now appears Al Qaeda
leaders had a hand
in supporting the locally recruited cell that carried out the 7 July
bombings in London. In
other cases they have merely telegraphed their desire for attacks, for
example, on European
allies of the U.S. invasion on Iraq, and when they did take place, in nearly
every instance,
bin Laden or al Zawahari have quickly claimed credit. Setmariam is adamant
that each
jihadi operation, however autonomously initiated, should work to further the
overall cause.
In his videotaped Jihadist lectures he says:
If a Muslim is in Britain and doesn't want to leave his job or university
and
go and fight Jihad on the front, what he can do is call the press agency and
tell them, "I'm from the global Islamic resistance" and claim responsibility
for
whatever action is being done around the world.58
It is possible to argue that Al Qaedawould have evolved in this
directionwith or without Setmariam's
input. Just because he saw the future more clearly than others does not mean
that
he had a decisive role in changing jihadist strategy. The authors' research,
however, has led
to the conclusion that Setmariam's ideas have made a very significant
impact. Many of the
recruits he trained in the Al Ghuraba camp are now engaged in recruiting
jihadis around the
world. For example, Amer Azizi, a protegee of Setmarian's at the Al Ghuraba
training camp
is wanted by Spanish authorities in connection with the 9/11 plot, theMadrid
bombing, and
helping to build up theAlQaeda organization in Spain. Azizi is thought to
have then traveled
to Iraq towork with AbuMusab al Zarqawi in Iraq.59 But it is through
Internet postings of his
works and statements from Pakistan that he has been most impactful, not
least because his is
themost cogent and best articulatedwork on the strategy and tactics of
jihad. Fuad Hussein is
in no doubt, "he has had a big influence. I monitor the Islamist websites
every day and every
day there are always new posting of Setmariam's research, writings, chapters
of his books
and tapes. He has had a big impact. He has big credibility because they [the
jihadists] know
his history. People read this in Iraq, the Arab world, in Europe and all
over the world."60
Although the authors do not have proof, it is likely that perpetrators of
terrorist attacks
in the recent years have been exposed and influenced by Setmariam's postings
on jihadi
websites. His teachings are likely making an impact on the tactics of the
Sunni insurgency
10 P. Cruickshank and M. H. Ali
in Iraq. His hard anti Shia line and his links with Abu Qatada, Zarqawi's
spiritual mentor,
have given him great kudos. It is in Iraq that his vision of "thousands,
even hundreds of
thousands of Muslims participating in Jihad" has taken on a reality.61 So
too has his vision
of a loosely structured Jihadist effort. Iraqi and American officials have
told the New York
Times that the insurgency consists of possibly as many as a hundred groups,
each with
separate leaders, that often act on their own or come together for a single
attack.62
Iraq is also becoming what Setmariam refers to as "an open front," a
necessary area
for the effort of "individual terrorism" around the world because it offers
a "recruitment
environment" and a "safe haven."63 The fact that Iraq is becoming a breeding
ground
and exporter of terrorism was brought home with Zarqawi's 9 November 2005
attack on
international hotels in Amman, Jordan.
With regard to recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Fuad Hussein says that
"it is quite
possible that the Jihadis involved with theMadrid and London bombings were
reading this
material." Setmariam, in his statement reacting to the London bombings,
explains that he
had long urged an attack on the London Underground:
[In my teachings] I have mentioned vital and legitimate targets to be hit in
the enemy's countries based on on the principle of equal treatment in case
they target [our] civilians which they have done so historically. Among
those
targets that I specifically mentioned as examples was the London
Underground.
[Targetting this] was and still is the aim.64
There is also a startling similarity between Setmariam's jihadist doctrine
and the locally
initiated recruitment for the Madrid and London attacks. In his 2004 tract
Setmariam
outlined how a "builder" should form cells. This individual should be "an
active individual
with a security, cultural and religious eligibility, able to influence a
wide circle of friends."65
In Madrid the well-connected Tunisian immigrant Sarhane Fahket and the
Moroccan
immigrant Jamal Zougam built up their own jihadist group. Fahket was a
succesful real
estate agent and Zougam ran a mobile phone shop. In Dewsbury, in the north
of England,
Mohammed Siddique Khan, a respected primary school teacher drew three
impressionable
young Muslims into a jihadist cell.
The fit with Setmariam's model of individual terrorism is not perfect, of
course. In both
the Madrid and London attacks the local group reached out for help and
guidance to more
experienced jihadist or Al Qaeda operatives. The Madrid bombers had
connections with
several leading European jihadis including members of the Moroccan Fighting
Group and
may have been financed in part by Abu Qatada, the spiritual leader of Al
Zarqawi's terrorist
group.66 And the London bombers made trips to Pakistan, where their leader
Mohammed
Siddique Khan was filmed in an Al Qaeda video production.67 But the
important point is
that in their prototype form, the cells were formed autonomously.
The Madrid and London bombers might well have also taken Setmariam's advice
on
training, "it could be in secret houses, apartments or gyms." In fact
Setmariam especially
stresses gyms as a good place for jihadis to meet and train. "The leader of
the cell should
undergo with the rest of the members of the cell an intensive fitness
program in one of the
violent sports."68 It was in a gym in the small town of Beeston in the north
of England that
the London bombers used to congregate. And in Madrid, the bombers rented an
apartment
to conduct their training regime.
There have been claims that Setmariam played a more direct role in
orchestrating the
Madrid bombings. The Spanish authorities want to question him on his links
with those
involved in the operation, although they acknowledge they do not yet have
the evidence
Abu Musab Al Suri 11
to directly tie him to the attacks. The investigating judge Balthazar Garzon
has issued an
indictment against a Moroccan prot´eg´ee of Setmariam, Amer Azizi, for
involvement in the
Madrid plot. Azizi trained in Setmariam's Al Ghuraba camp and is now thought
to have fled
to join al Zarqawi's network in Iraq.69 Setmariam himself in his December
2004 statement
denied that he participated in the Madrid plot, "In June 2004, I sent a
statement to leading
Spanish newspapers to underscore the fact I had nothing to do with the
attack."70
Setmariam's exact links to the perpetrators of the Madrid attacks will
emerge over
time. He certainly knew some of the dramatis personae involved, from his
time living in
Spain and also his relations with Abu Qatada who is suspected of financing
and assisting
Al Qaeda affiliates in Spain. However, the fact that he had been hiding in
Pakistan since the
collapse of the Taliban makes it very unlikely that he was directly
involved. The Jordanian
journalist Fuad Hussein, who has close contacts with Al Qaeda leaders, says,
"Setmariam's
role was to give advice. He was not operationally involved. He did not have
control of the
movement."
It was a strategist and online teacher, however, that Setmariam posed the
greatest threat
against the West. His arrest has removed the jihadist movement's most
articulate thinker.
Despite the fact his tapes and writings will continue to influence jihadis,
this is no small
breakthrough. Setmariam was a dangerous man, determined to push Al Qaeda
toward use
of weapons of mass destruction against the United States and her allies.
Setmariam has
encouraged jihadis to adopt brutal methods in order to achieve their goals
and has scant
regard for civilian life.
Indeed, developments in another Spanish legal case, the April 1985 bombing
of a
restaurant popular with U.S. servicemen near the Torrejon de Ardoz air force
base near
Madrid, which killed 18 Spaniards, point to a possible early involvement at
the coal face
of terrorism. When old photos of him were widely circulated after the London
bombings
on an initial suspicion of his involvement, Spanish police realized that his
features exactly
matched those of a man seen sitting at the restaurant with a sports bag at
his feet who
left just before the explosion. Spanish authorities have reopened the case
and will seek
Setmariam's extradition on charges of participation in this attack.71
Setmariam's August 2005 statement, posted in December 2005 is his last and
most
chilling. His previous hope, expressed in his December 2004 statement, had
been that the
Europeans might embrace bin Laden's 2004 offer of a truce. Somewhat
absurdly, in August
2005, he still had faint hopes that "wise men such as Crown Prince Charles,
Ken Livingston
and George Galloway" or the "Spanish government" might be able to influence
Europe in
this regard. But his call is for renewed attacks and alarmingly he states
that Britain, the
country in which he settled, the "historical fortress of injustice" should
be the number one
target.72
About Blair's claim that there is no link between the bombings and the Iraq
and Afghanistan invasion, I say that we incited our followers and fought,
and
we will continue our war against America and it's aggressive allies,
especially
Britain until they withdraw their armies from our countries and leave us
alone
to reform the corruption of the rulers who were imposed by them. Did you
understand the reason behind the London bombings or do you need what we
are now preparing for you?73
His last strategic insight is that with the United States and its allies
bogged down in Iraq
the moment was right to unleash a new wave of terror:
12 P. Cruickshank and M. H. Ali
I reiterate my call for mujahadin who are spread in Europe and in our
enemies'
countries or those able to go there, to the signifcance of moving fast to
hit
Britain, Italy, Holland, Germany, Japan, Australia, Russia and France and
all countries who have a military presence in Iraq, Afghanistan or the Arab
peninsular or to hit their interests in our contries and all over the world.
And let
all the sleeping cells awaken now because the war is in its peak and the
enemy
is about to collapse with the evidence for this now being clear. Those who
sleep
now may not be able to participate when they awaken.74
Notes
1. Setmariam's wife Elena Moreno confirmed her husband's arrest to Spanish
reporters in
December 2005, stating: "I have recently received a phone call from a person
in whom I have
complete confidence who has confirmed to me that Setmariam was held when the
news broke
around 3 November last . . . he has disappeared and I do not know exactly
whose hands he is in."
See "Wife of Spanish al Qaeda suspect slams official silence on husband's
location," El Mundo
(Spanish Daily), 27 December 2005. As of January 2006 Pakistan's government
has not officially
acknowledged the arrest; however, Pakistani officials do acknowledge the
arrest privately. Two U.S.
counterterrorism officials toldCNNanonymously on 4November 2005 that
Setmarianwas in custody.
See "Officials: al Qaeda Operative Captured, CNN News Website, 4 November
2005. Available at
www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/11/04/pakistan.terrorarrest/index.html
2. For example, Patrick Hennessy, David Harrison, and Daniel Foggo, "Foreign
Terrorist Cell
was behind London Bombings," Sunday Telegraph (London), July, 10 2005, Nick
Fielding and Gary
Walsh, "Top Suspect," Sunday Times (London), 10, July 2005.
3. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, dated August 2005 and posted on Jihadist
websites on
2 December 2005.
4. Katherine Shrader, "Wanted Muslim extremist hopscotches the globe
connecting terrorists,"
Associated Press, 3 August 2005.
5. For example, see Lorenzo Vidino, "Another Dynamic Duo," National Review,
21May 2004.
6. Pedro Arnuero, "Mastermind of 3/11 is Now Organizing Attacks in IraqWith
Al-Zarqawi,"
La Razon (Spanish Daily), 20 November 2004.
7. Katherine Shrader, "Wanted Muslim extremist hopscotches the globe
connecting terrorists,"
Associated Press, 3 August 2005.
8. Fuad Hussein, phone interview by authors to Amman, Jordan, 29 November
2005.
9. Setmariam's will was posted on the Al-Safnat Jihadi Internet forum on 4
November 2005.
10. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, December 2004. The statement was
originally posted by
Abd-al-Tawab al-Shami, who called himself the office manager of the
"Al-Tahrir forum." The posting
also announced the opening of a website for Abu-Musab al-Suri
(www.abumusab.cjb.net) with "the
largest jihad encyclopedia," and other books by Abu-Musab al-Suri.
11. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, December 2004.
12. As Setmariam recalls in "The Call for Global Islamic Resistance,"
published on jihadist
websites in December 2004.
13. See, for example, Lorenzo Vidino, "Another Dynamic Duo," National
Review, 21 May
2004.
14. The videotapes containing Setmariam's complete Jihadist lecture series
were handed to the
veteran war cameraman Peter Jouvenal by an Afghan contact. They were
reviewed by the authors in
August 2005 in London.
15. See Murad al Shishani, "Abu Musab al Suri and the Third Generation of
Salafist Jihadists,"
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 11 August 2005.
16. Ali Bayanoni, interview by authors, November 2005.
17. Setmariam is profiled on the Tawhid (monotheism) & Jihad website,
http://www.
tawhed.ws/a?i=78.
Abu Musab Al Suri 13
18. AbuMusab al Suri, "The Call for Global Islamic Resistance," published on
jihadist websites
in December 2004.
19. Setmariam provides details on his life in France, Spain, and the U.K. in
his August 2005
Statement, posted on jihadist websites on 2 December 2005.
20. "Al Suri's wife confirms his arrest in October," Asharq Al-Awsat (Saudi
Daily), 27 December 2005, available at
http://www.asharqalawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&
issue=9891&article=340315&search= 20% 20% &state=true
21. Kamal el Helbawi, interview by authors, London, November 2005.
22. See Lorenzo Vidino, "Another Dynamic Duo," National Review, 21 May 2004.
23. Katherine Shrader, "Wanted Muslim extremist hopscotches the globe
connecting terrorists,"
Associated Press, 3 August 2005.
24. Nick Fielding and Gary Walsh, "Top Suspect," The Sunday Times (London),
10 July 2005.
25. Al Suri's profile, Tawhid (monotheism) & Jihad website,
http://www.tawhed.ws/a?i=78
26. Nick Fielding and Gary Walsh, "Top Suspect," The Sunday Times (London),
10 July 2005.
27. For example, see Mark Honigsbaum and Alan Travis, "Al Qaida's Spiritual
Ambassador
faces return to Jordan," The Guardian (London), 12 August 2005.
28. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, December 2004, posted on jihadist
websites.
29. The Islamist in question was interviewed in London by the authors in
November 2005. He
requested anonymity.
30. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, August 2005, posted on jihadist websites
in December
2005.
31. Peter Bergen, interview by the authors, January 2006.
32. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, August 2005, posted on jihadist websites
in December
2005.
33. Baker Atyani, phone interview by authors to Islamabad, Pakistan, 29
November 2005.
34. Allan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, "A Computer in Kabul Yields a
Chilling Array of al
Qaeda memos," Wall Street Journal, 31 December 20001 and Alan Cullison,
"Inside al Qaeda's Hard
Drive," The Atlantic Monthly, September 2004.
35. Noman Benotman was interviewed by Peter Bergen in June 2005 in London;
see Peter
Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al Qaeda's Leader
(New York: Free
Press, January 2006).
36. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, December 2004, posted on jihadist
websites.
37. Ibid.
38. The Tarragona meeting was held between Mohammed Atta and Ramzi
Binalshibh. The
9/11 Report was not able to substantiate the Spanish claim that it was
organized by Yarkas's group.
See Final Report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon
the United States
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 547 (footnote 145). On Setmariam's links
with Mamoun
Darkazanli see John Crewsdon, "Syrian Born Fugitive in Spanish Terror Probe
also is sought by
U.S.," Chicago Tribune, 12 July 2005.
39. The Islamist in question was interviewed in London by the authors in
November 2005. He
requested anonymity.
40. AbuMusab al Suri, "The Call for Global Islamic Resistance," published on
jihadist websites
in December 2004.
41. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, December 2004, posted on jihadist
websites.
42. Statement by Abu Musabl al Suri, posted 25 January 2005 on jihadist
websites.
43. "Rewards for Justice" website, posted 30 November 2004, available at
www.rewardsforjustice.net
44. Roland Jacquard, L'Archive Secret`es d'al Qaida (Paris: Jean Picollec,
2002), p. 291.
45. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, December 2004, posted on jihadist
websites.
46. The jihadist in question has requested anonymity.
47. Abu Musab al Suri, jihadist training videos, dated August 2000.
48. Ibid.
49. Lorenzo Vidino, "Another Dynamic Duo," National Review, 21 May 2004.
14 P. Cruickshank and M. H. Ali
50. Katherine Shrader, "Wanted Muslim extremist hopscotches the globe
connecting terrorists,"
Associated Press, 3 August 2005.
51. Balthazar Garzon, Spain's Chief Counterrorism Investigating Judge,
stated in his 2004
indictment of Setmariam that "in 1998 Nasar left London for Afghanistan to
train young Muslims
from France, Italy and Spain who were reinstated in their respective
countries as 'sleepers,' waiting
for orders from the organization." See John Crewsdon, "Syrian Born Fugitive
in Spanish Terror Probe
also is sought by U.S.," Chicago Tribune, 12 July 2005.
52. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, dated August 2005 and posted on jihadist
wesbites on
2 December 2005.
53. Abu Musab al Suri, jihadist training videos, dated August 2000.
54. Ibid.
55. AbuMusab al Suri, "The Call for Global Islamic Resistance," published on
jihadist websites
in December 2004.
56. Abu Musab al Suri, jihadist training videos, dated August 2000.
57. AbuMusab al Suri, "The Call for Global Islamic Resistance," published on
jihadist websites
in December 2004.
58. Abu Musab al Suri, jihadist training videos, dated August 2000.
59. See "Spain: A commememoration week for the Attacks' victims," al-Hayat
Newspaper,
7March 2005, available at http://www.daralhayat.com/world
news/europe/03-2005/Item-20050306-
7929bd39-c0a8-10ed-0022-da17e840cb5d/story.html
60. Fuad Hussein, phone interview by authors to Amman, Jordan, 29 November
2005.
61. AbuMusab al Suri, "The Call for Global Islamic Resistance," published on
jihadist websites
in December 2004.
62. Dexter Filkins, "Profusion of Rebel Groups help them to survive in
Iraq," New York Times,
2 December 2005.
63. AbuMusab al Suri, "The Call for Global Islamic Resistance," published on
jihadist websites
in December 2004.
64. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, dated August 2005 and posted on jihadist
websites on
2 December 2005.
65. AbuMusab al Suri, "The Call for Global Islamic Resistance," published on
jihadist websites
in December 2004.
66. Several members of the Madrid cell, including Jamal Zougam, visited Abu
Qatada in
London in the years prior to the attacks. When British police raided
Qatada's home in 2001 they
found cash worth $296000, including a quantity of Spanish pesetas. See Peter
Bergen and Paul
Cruickshank, "Clerical Error: The Dangers of Tolerance," The New Republic, 8
August 2005. Also
Phillipe Naughton, "Cleric accused over Madrid released as Spain grieves,"
The Times (London),
11 March 2005.
67. Mohammad Sidique Khan appeared in a videotape produced by Al Qaeda's
propoganda
unit "Al Sahab" (the Clouds) that aired on Al-Jazeera on 1 September 2005.
68. AbuMusab al Suri, "The Call for Global Islamic Resistance," published on
jihadist websites
in December 2004.
69. "Spain: A commememoration week for the Attacks' victims," al-Hayat
Newspaper,
7March 2005, available at http://www.daralhayat.com/world
news/europe/03-2005/Item-20050306-
7929bd39-c0a8-10ed-0022-da17e840cb5d/story.html On Azizi suspected to be in
Iraq see Daniel
Trotta, "Two Fugitives Loom Large in Spain's Al Qaeda Fight," Reuters, 2
July 2005.
70. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, December 2004, posted on jihadist
websites.
71. "High Court Reopens 1985 Islamic Terrorist Case," available at
www.thinkspain.com,
9 November 2005.
72. Statement by Abu Musab al Suri, dated August 2005 and posted on jihadist
websites on
2 December 2005.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.

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