May Day report slams police

== 62-page report, authored by former Los Angeles Police Deputy Chief

Michael Hillmann,

 

May Day report slams police

 

An independent review of the violence that rocked Seattle's business core

during last year's May Day protests found that officers were confused over

who was in charge and when they could use force to stop the violence.

 

By Mike Carter and Steve Miletich

 

Seattle Times staff reporters

 

 

An independent review of the violence that rocked Seattle's business core

during last year's May Day protests is highly critical of the Police

Department's planning for the event, saying officers were confused over who

was in charge and when they could use force to stop the violence.

 

The 62-page report, authored by former Los Angeles Police Deputy Chief

Michael Hillmann, was released by the Police Department on Tuesday along

with its own much-delayed internal after-action report on the May Day

response.

 

Hillmann's report makes 38 recommendations and lists a litany of failures

that allowed widespread violence and vandalism during a noontime march that

left store and car windows smashed.

 

The department has refused to release a third document, a blistering

memorandum written by the May Day incident commander, Capt. Joe Kessler,

that, according to sources, pointed to flawed planning and interference by

Assistant Police Chief Mike Sanford.

 

Seattle Police Chief John Diaz, who had commissioned Hillmann's report, is

to appear before the City Council's public-safety committee Wednesday. Diaz

was unavailable for comment Tuesday.

 

City Councilmember Bruce Harrell, chairman of the committee pressing for the

after-action report, said his office received both reports Tuesday without

advance notice.

 

Mayor Mike McGinn's spokesman referred questions to the Police Department.

 

In a statement, police spokesman Sgt. Sean Whitcomb said both reports found

officers performed professionally throughout the events that day.

 

"However, there was confusion regarding event expectations. The lack of

clarity had a negative impact on our response when a brief period of intense

and orchestrated violence erupted," Whitcomb said.

 

He said the department acknowledges that employees assigned to future

demonstrations need to have "clearly defined expectations, equipment

appropriate to the task at hand and the training necessary to deliver

effective public safety services during dynamic, rapidly evolving events."

 

Whitcomb said the department is working to ensure that the "experience

gained from May Day 2012 is applied to May Day 2013 as well as any future

events our city faces."

 

Hillmann's report concluded police lost control of the protest for several

hours that day. Although most of the thousands of protesters marched

peacefully that day, groups of black-clad anarchists broke windows, threw

fire bombs and vandalized the William Kenzo Nakamura U.S. District

Courthouse.

 

Citing planning gaps and deployment problems, Hillmann dryly concluded the

department's response "was not a shining example of successful crowd

management and protection of property."

 

"The 'mayhem' that resulted ... significantly damaged the credibility of the

Police Department with the community because of the 'appearance of

inability' to protect the downtown," Hillmann wrote.

 

He placed blame both on the department's lackadaisical response to the

scheduled protests - it didn't start planning until April 24 - and the

execution of conflicting plans that "were described as being made up as they

(SPD) went along."

 

Conflicting orders

 

Officers complained they were given conflicting orders by Sanford and

Kessler over when to engage the protesters, how to make arrests and when to

employ force, particularly the use of pepper spray, Hillmann concluded.

 

He said officers were universally critical of the actions of Sanford's

spur-of-the moment decision to rush into the crowd in shirt sleeves to make

an arrest, requiring officers to rescue him.

 

As a result, Hillmann said, everyone interviewed for his report said

Sanford's actions resulted in his rescuers having to use force against the

protesters to extricate him.

 

Sanford acted because he believed others in command were not directing

officers to stop what was occurring, Hillmann wrote.

 

Hillmann also took Kessler to task for not being more engaged as incident

commander and for failing to adapt to changing circumstances.

 

Sanford was lauded for his foresight in creating initiatives on

crowd-control preparation - contained in the department's "20/20 Vision"

reform plan released in March 2012 - that Hillmann found unprecedented and

refreshing.

 

At the same time, Hillmann wrote, the department failed to integrate those

initiatives during the May Day response, leaving officers confused and

incident command "unclear."

 

The department, aided by an emergency proclamation by McGinn allowing the

confiscation of potential weapons, was able to regroup and take control

later in the day, Hillmann said.

 

A number of officers interviewed expressed concerns that their actions and

tactics were under the microscope of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which

at the time had determined the department's officers routinely engaged in

excessive use of force.

 

The Police Department was involved in testy negotiations with the DOJ at the

time, which led to a settlement agreement in July requiring the department

to carry out sweeping reforms.

 

In a remarkable finding, Hillmann said the SPD rank-and-file had not

received any crowd-management tactics training since the 1999 World Trade

Organization protests that paralyzed those meetings.

 

Hillmann's report said Kessler was not adequately involved in the planning

of the response for which he had been placed in charge.

 

In the memo the department has not made public, Kessler wrote that Sanford

unveiled a novel plan before the protests that, while reasonable on paper,

never had been subjected to testing or training, according to sources

familiar with the memo.

 

Sanford also was warned that not enough officers were assigned to the

protest, a problem exacerbated by a decision to stagger May 1 roll calls at

different times and locations, the sources said of the report.

 

Hillmann, too, found that staggered roll calls at multiple locations

"contributed to personnel not being on the street well in advance of

protesters showing up and/or being able to respond as needed."

 

Combined briefings

 

He recommended that the department consider the use of combined briefings

centrally located and well in advance of events to allow early deployment.

 

Sanford presented information to commanders April 24 and during May 1 roll

calls that was interpreted as a "hands off approach" to crowd management,

including "no enforcement, invisible deployment" and no use of pepper spray,

the report said.

 

"According to civilian interviews, the lack of overt police presence in the

downtown area was described as a huge change in past practice," Hillmann

wrote.

 

Mike Carter: mcarter@seattletimes.com or 206-464-3706. This story contains

information from The Seattle Times' archives.

 

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