Shabaab's betrayal of Omar Hammami - In English this time!

 

Shabaab's betrayal of Omar Hammami - In English this time!

April 14, 2013          

http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=1048

 

After being frustrated by the Arab world ignoring his revelations about the

bad behavior of Shabaab in Somalia, Omar Hammami posted an English version

of his demise via a Twitter link today.  In January, I suffered through some

miserable Arabic translation nightmares to write the post "Hammami Reveals

Deceit, Dissension and Death in Shabaab and al Qaeda!", but now all can read

of his demise and betrayal by al Shabaab in the English version at this

link.

 

Back in January, Omar hoped to reach the Muslim world and maybe al Qaeda by

publishing his latest troubles in Arabic hoping to appeal to that audience -

since his previous YouTube calls for help broadcast in a mix of English and

Arabic fell on deaf ears in the Arab World.  Again, it appears Omar's Arabic

revelations from January didn't find much audience amongst al Qaeda's

mainstream.  However, Omar's American audience, despite this being Omar's

home country which he despises, has read and paid attention to Omar's

plight.  In January, Omar didn't seem thrilled about myself and others in

the West reading his Arabic pronouncements.

 

Screen Shot 2013-01-11 at 9.08.40 AM

 

But today, it appears Omar has changed his tune, reaching out in English

this time.  Omar so desperately wants an Arab audience, but maybe he's

realized his biggest audience is in his native country.  Here's some clips

from Omar's English version of the document.

 

On Godane (Abu Zubayr):

 

    As for Abu Zubayr's entrance into the whole affair, well, his background

is a bit unclear because he was in Pakistan during the days of the Russian

occupation and no one knows with certainty if he really participated in the

Jihaad or if he just sat in Peshawar.

 

On Somalis and their distrust of al Qaeda:

 

    history has proven that the Somalis generally do not want any influence

from al-Qaa'idah or foreigners in their internal affairs.

 

On al Qaeda fomenting fractures with Shabaab as much as Shabaab creating

fractures between local Somali (Ansar) vs. Foreign Fighters (Muhajirs)

 

    It is here that I blame the brother s from al-Qaa'idah to some degree

(and I mean Abu Talhah as-Sudaani, Abu 'Abdallaah, Fazul, and an-Nabhaan)

because, despite have pure intentions (as we see it, but Allaah is their

Reckoner), there developed a sense of competition between them and the

brothers of the Salaah ad-Diin camp.

 

Al Qaeda's shift to focus on Kenya as anticipated in this document here in

2007:

 

    Eventually, and probably because of such divisiveness, the brothers from

al-Qaa'idah went to Ras Chiamboni to focus on training Kenyan Somalis to do

outside operations.

 

On al Qaeda's lack of strategy in Somalia:

 

    Here I don't know what to say about the actions of the brothers from

al-Qaa'idah. They split up amongst themselves without executing any real

strategy.

 

and on this one, I have nothing to add.  See the closing of the document..

 

    And it seems I was duped by the slogans and the pretty words, and I

hadn't yet learned the realities,

 

-----------

Translation of History

http://selectedwisdom.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Omar-Hammami-Betrayal-D

ocument.pdf

After praising and thanking Allaah and sending Salaah upon the Prophet:

Dear brothers,

Peace and Allaah's mercy and blessings be upon you

It is necessary that you know a few bitter realities. The brothers from

al-Qaa'idah have spent two decades in Somali without being able to change

the situation very much despite putting forth great effort. This has to do

with the Somali disposition which refuses any outside influence and refuses

advice from others. Rather, instead, they are the people of Makkah and they

are the most knowledgeable of its valleys, and no one understands leadership

like them!

Also, as you know, the Jihaad has passed through many stages since the fall

of the Siyad Barre's regime. The leaders of the Jihaad in its early stages

were ash-Shaykh Hasan Turky and ash-Shaykh Hasan Dhaahir Uways. They used to

cooperate with the brothers upon the principle of "cooperation upon

righteousness and piety" (so long as the affairs were controlled by them).

That period saw the likes of al-'Uyayri and al-Miqrin grace the land of

Somalia. It also saw the likes of Abu Hafs al-Misri and Fazul (as he

mentioned in his historical biography).

The group which represented the Somali Mujaahidiin at that time went by the

name of al-Ittihaad al-Islaami and they opened fronts in (Gedo), (Bosaso),

(Mogadishu), and (Ogaden). Abu Talhah as-Sudaani was also around at that

time in Bosaso according to what I have heard from the Ansaar.

Then, after some losses and after the appearance of the Americans, Ittihaad

took the decision to disperse and bury their weapons (while the main reason

for this decision was really the plotting of a few Suruuris and some of the

leaders who were seeking personal gain). So they dispersed, but the Jihaad

still continued in Gedo and Ogaden for a while and also in Mogadishu (where

BlackHawk down happened) and ash-Shaykh Hasan Turky had his training camp in

Ras Chiamboni, which was being funded by al-Qaa'idah.

Then, after a while, Hasan Dhaahir Uways began a group called al-'Itisaam,

which was like al-Ittihaad in every aspect, but it didn't bring forth any

fruits. However, Hasan Dhaahir Uways was also trying to call the tribes to

support the Sharii'ah around that time and those activities of his led to

the creation of the Islaamic Courts which latter united under the name Union

of Islaamic Courts in 2006.

This makes up for the first stage of Jihaad in Somalia which can be

described as having a large presence for al-Qaa'idah operatives, and which

can also be described as having a real role for al-Qaa'idah (so long as the

internal affairs were in the hands of Hasan Turky and Hasan Dhaahir).

As for the new stage, it is best denoted as the rise of the men who used to

be students of Hasan Dhaahir Uways to the seat of power. From them is Abu

Mansuur Mukhtaar Robow, Adam Haashi 'Ayrow, and others. The difference

between them and Hasan Dhaahir is that they went to Afghanistan and took in

some of the global ideology (because the Jihaad in Somalia was completely

local in the first stage).

As for Abu Zubayr's entrance into the whole affair, well, his background is

a bit unclear because he was in Pakistan during the days of the Russian

occupation and no one knows with certainty if he really participated in the

Jihaad or if he just sat in Peshawar. Then he went to Hargeisa where he used

to call to Jihaad and the correct creed, and he tried to begin Jihaadi

activities there. But the nature of Somaliland is different than the nature

of the South from the perspective of having more order and extreme love for

the Kuffaar. So he was forced to leave for the South and he met up with Adam

Haashi 'Ayrow and they opened a new training camp in Mogadishu that went by

the name of (Salaah ad-Diin). This took place between the years 2001 and

2006 and it more than likely took place around 2002 or 2003.

According to what I understand from the Ansaar, Abu Zubayr used to be the

leader of those Mujaahidiin from the beginning of the Salaah ad-Diin

training camp's founding. Adam Haashi 'Ayrow wasn't the leader, rather he

was the deputy or the head of military.

The objective behind this camp, despite having been affected by the ideology

of al-Qaa'idah to some degree, was simply to train to engage in Jihaadi

activities in Somalia alone. After some time they managed to take control

over some important places in Mogadishu and the warlords began to fear them.

Rather, even the Americans became afraid and they hurried to finance those

criminals against the Mujaahidiin in order to have them captured or killed.

But Salaah ad-Diin wasn't the only camp or group in the field at that time.

There was the camp of Ras Chiamboni and some other smaller camps in

Mogadishu (like Yaqshid and Mu'aadh bin Jabal) and al-Qaa'idah was also

present.

It is here that I blame the brother s from al-Qaa'idah to some degree (and I

mean Abu Talhah as-Sudaani, Abu 'Abdallaah, Fazul, and an-Nabhaan) because,

despite have pure intentions (as we see it, but Allaah is their Reckoner),

there developed a sense of competition between them and the brothers of the

Salaah ad-Diin camp. However, the main blame is still to be laid on the

Ansaar for this because they don't accept help nor do they accept for anyone

to work under any other group but their own, but it would have been best for

al-Qaa'idah to work in Somalia only for the purpose of doing outside work

from the very beginning.

The important point here is that many Somali youth began to gather around

Abu Talhah as-Sudaani because of al-Qaa'idah's fame and methodology, and

that caused some form of jealousy in the hearts of the Salaah ad-Diin camp.

It was even said to me that Abu Zubayr was actively looking for a Fatwa to

kill Abu Talhah from that early stage. And Allaah Knows best the truth of

the matter.

Eventually, and probably because of such divisiveness, the brothers from

al-Qaa'idah went to Ras Chiamboni to focus on training Kenyan Somalis to do

outside operations. Despite attempts from some (like ash-Shaykh Fu'aad) to

unite the Salaah ad-Diin camp and al-

Qaa'idah, it wouldn't happen until around 2006 when the big fighting took

place and the Courts were formed. It was at this juncture that they joined

together under the name (ash-Shabaab). This is, however, before the

establishment of (Harakah ash-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin) in the year 2008 which

is really just the Salaah ad-Diin camp.

It is important to note here that the connection between the brothers of

al-Qaa'idah and ash-Shaykh Hasan Turky was not because Hasan Turky had a

pure methodology, rather he was actually a bit Ikhwaani and had some

nationalist and tribal influences (may Allaah pardon us and him). But he had

ardent love for the Muhaajiriin (so long as those around him didn't have an

effect on him) and he had great respect for the brothers of al-Qaa'idah. He

would listen to them and he trusted them. Therefore, when we say the Ras

Chiamboni camp we must understand that there was Hasan Turky and his agenda,

and the agenda of those from his tribe around him, and there was also

al-Qaa'idah and their plans and activities.

So the brothers from al-Qaa'idah (along with their new trainees) left along

with Hasan Turky's men to go to Mogadishu in order to take part in the war.

And I put some blame on the brothers here once again, because the situation

hadn't changed during those years with regards to the jealousy in the hearts

of Salaah ad-Diin, and history has proven that the Somalis generally do not

want any influence from al-Qaa'idah or foreigners in their internal affairs.

So it would have been better for them to continue to train and plan and it

would have been sufficient to send Hasan Turky and his men to Mogadishu to

engage in the local Jihaad. But I fear that Hasan Turky wanted to have a

share of the future power and leadership positions by taking an active part

in the fighting so he urged the brothers from al-Qaa'idah to take part along

with him under the pretence of not letting the Mujaahidiin down. And Allaah

Knows best the secrets of the hearts.

During those battles there was still a sense of competition by the two

groups (despite the united ranks for the most part due to the crisis at

hand) because Abu 'Abdallaah as-Sudaani mentioned to me a few occasions

where it is clear that he was competing with Adam Haashi in a few of the

battles. At any rate, once the fighting was over and the time came to split

up the positions, the situation returned to being one of bitter animosity

all over again.

Here I don't know what to say about the actions of the brothers from

al-Qaa'idah. They split up amongst themselves without executing any real

strategy. While Salaah ad-Diin was taking leadership positions with vigor

(as Abu Zubayr was the secretary of Shaykh Shariif, and his current deputy

was the head of internal security, and so forth) Abu Talhah and Abu

'Abdallaah were focused on fighting the occupier with huge armies (similar

to conventional warfare). They left the positions behind in Mogadishu to

fall in the hands of those who do not agree with them on many issues of

methodology and strategy. This ended up leading to those leaders leaving the

army hanging whenever Abu 'Abdallah refused the orders of Shariif to halt

and he continued to advance toward (Baido). Shariif's response to that

disobedience was to stop the funding of the army and leave them to depend on

war booty alone (while each leader in Mogadishu had a nice car from the war

booty and a good salary). Before all of that though, once Abu Talhah finally

realized the game, he took a huge army of Somalis and some Muhaajirs (and I

was with them although I didn't understand the situation at the time) and he

went to (Kismayu) where the Ras Chiamboni camp declared their independence

from

the Courts and they declared (Jubba) as their base (and this could also be

from the reasons why Abu Talhah was assassinated, may Allaah have mercy on

him). As for Fazul and an-Nabhaan, they sought to get close to Shaykh

Shariif (and by default the men from the Salaah ad-Diin camp) in order to

get the necessary funding to do outside operations.

It was in such a precarious situation that the news of the retreat was heard

and the people of personal benefit took the money and the positions and ran,

leaving the army in a complete frenzy. Everyone was forced to then live

alongside the people they long disliked in the forest (and that might have

caused some people to choose to settle the score with such people, and

Allaah Knows best). Abu Zubayr was with Abu 'Abdallaah as-Sudaani in the

forest for a while before he returned to the cities at an early stage, once

the Ethiopians had left the forest.

Then Abu Zubayr and his group came to visit us in Ras Chiamboni, after Abu

Mansuur al-Bayhani had left Somalia, and I sat with him (because I had met

with him previously when he was from those in charge of the army during the

battle of Jilib, despite his poor decision making and despite not personally

taking part in the fighting) but I didn't understand the politics that were

going on at the time. In reality, they had come at that time in order to

come to terms with Ras Chiamboni because all of Somalia was in the hands of

the enemy and they didn't want to enter along with the secularists in

Asmara. But Hasan Turky refused their requests and he entered along with the

Asmara group. The men from the Salaah ad-Diin camp left to go back to the

cities which were under the control of the bandit who goes by the name

(Inda'ade) who used to protect them from the Ethiopians and the Murtaddiin.

Inda'ade used to fight the Ethiopians in some tough battles and Abu

'Abdallaah as-Sudaani used to like him because of that, but he was only

after his personal benefit and he eventually apostatized and is a murtadd

till today, and from Allaah help is sought.

And everyone knows the rest of the story after that.

The point of all of this is to inform you that competition in Somalia

(between the Somalis themselves, between the Somalis and al-Qaa'idah, and

between al-Qaa'idah themselves) is something very natural and unfortunately

it still continues.

Also, despite the claims of some of the Somalis that they are on the Global

Jihaad bandwagon, their actions in the past and in the present indicate that

they only want to work inside Somalia for local objectives. And they don't

depart from Somalia except to do that which is in the benefit of Somalia,

not the benefit of the Global Jihaad. Also, despite their claims of being

upon the ideology of al-Qaa'idah, they are the ones who forced al-Qaa'idah

out of Somalia, and if truth is to be said, Hasan Turky and Hasan Dhaahir

Uways (despite some of their horrendous errors) were better in their

cooperation with the men of al-Qaa'idah than these new people.

It was necessary for me to explain this situation, and these realities,

after the letter which I disseminated through the internet about the

methodology of Harakah ash-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin after my departure from

the Ras Chiamboni camp. And it seems I was duped by the slogans and the

pretty words, and I hadn't yet learned the realities, just as the men of

al-Qaa'idah didn't know them with certainty until their death was nigh.

May peace and Allaah's mercy and blessings be upon you.

And may Allaah send peace and Salaah upon Muhammad and his family and

companions,

And the last of our calls is: all praises are due to the Lord of the worlds.

 

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