Ansar al-Sharia International and the politics of self-sacrifice
Banner Icon Arab Spring Jibreel Delgado offers an overview of the emerging
Islamic powerhouse Ansar al-Sharia, warning that any escalation in state
violence, torture and imprisonment without trial can only lend credence to
the Supporters of Sharia.
The name “Ansar al-Sharia” (Supporters of Islamic Law) has become ubiquitous
as a number of political Salafist groups throughout the MENA region, and
particularly in Arab Spring countries, have taken up the label. They are
connected primarily by their allegiance to the legal opinions of a select
number of controversial clerics of the jihadist bent such as the Jordanian
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. This most likely has something to do with one of
the final directives of Osama Bin Laden for his al-Qaeda organization to
rebrand itself with a name that more clearly expressed its connection to the
Islamic world. Of the ten names he offered as suggestions, none of them
mention the word “sharia.” The majority of them emphasize unifying the
Muslim community with three explicitly identifying the liberation of al-Aqsa
mosque as the ultimate goal.
CONTEXT Bassem Aly: Salafists are lucky
But more important than the mere changing of names for marketing purposes is
the very clear change in strategy that Bin Laden had been calling for and
that Ansar al-Sharia International (ASI) represents. Within the documents
found in the Bin Laden compound in Abbottabad, one can find harsh criticisms
of the Pakistani Taliban and other regional jihadist groups affiliated to
al-Qaeda Central (AQC) for their obsession with fighting local enemies and
their exaggeration of the “barricade” argument. The barricade argument
refers to a debate within classical Islamic Law regarding to what extent
collateral damage leading to the death of non-combatants is allowable in
proportion to the importance of a specific enemy target. Bin Laden argued
for revisions that would take into account the exponentially higher number
of civilian casualties that modern warfare causes as opposed to pre-modern
warfare. Doubtless, most of these criticisms find their origins in the
reckless tactics used by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq and Jordan.
State torture fuels the political culture of self-sacrifice
Bin Laden’s directive that his followers learn to deal with the Muslim
masses with “kindness, forgiveness, patience” and to “not tax them beyond
their ability” is reflected generally in the methods and approach used by
ASI. Whereas the “Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI) might have been forbidding
music and cigarettes, ASI, for the most part, have steered clear of hisba
(enforcement of public morality) activities involving the use of force,
instead handing out literature, providing food, water, clothing, and other
basic necessities to the neediest of their respective countries. While they
have used similar methods in Yemen, Tunisia, and the other countries where
they have appeared, the results have been different depending on the varied
circumstances existing within each country.
Yemen
The last communiqués from Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen (AAS) came in October and
December of last year, discussing US plans to “occupy” Yemen, a clear
implementation of Bin Laden’s order that AAS focus on American military and
other US targets instead of bogging themselves down in clashes with security
forces or houthis. With the name “Supporters of Islamic Law,” and through
marriage and tribal alliances, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was
able to recruit other militant groups and large numbers of Yemenis into the
fold. From March 2011 to June 2012, AAS was able to establish emirates
throughout Abyan and Shabwa provinces, providing water, electricity, sewage
pipes, trash collection, policing and security, and a number of sorely
needed provisions to one of the most impoverished and neglected parts of the
nation.
By mid-2012, AAS had withdrawn from direct control of the area and reverted
to guerilla warfare, after a surge from the Yemeni military supported by US
drones strikes. The reason they gave for their withdrawal, that they wished
to prevent the further destruction of Abyan and murder of its people at the
hands of Saleh’s army and its US backers, was a prime piece of propaganda
handed to them by the state—the credibility of which was only heightened by
the fact that, after more than 2 billion-dollars-worth of property damage
and thousands displaced by the military campaign, many of the basic services
provided by AAS are not being provided by the central government.
As late as May of this year, towns in southern Abyan have seen a spate of
hit and run attacks on security forces as AAS slowly increases its public
presence, ready to retake control of the areas that remain neglected by the
current coalition government.
Tunisia
After the May 19 clashes between police and Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia
(AST), arrests of Tunisian Salafists and suspected members of AST have
increased. Previous confrontations include what started as a demonstration
outside the US embassy in September of 2012, degenerating into violence
between police and AST with both sides claiming that the other provoked the
violence. Founded in early 2011 by Abu Ayad al-Tunisi, AST is about the same
age as its Yemeni counterpart, making it, along with AAS, the oldest of AS
organizations. Through its video releases, showcasing their humanitarian
activities, AST laid out the format in which most other AS groups would
operate.
Early on, the leadership of AST emphasized the fact that post-Ben Ali
Tunisia was a place of preaching the message of a “purified” Islam and not
armed rebellion. Abu Ayad, now in hiding, discouraged Tunisian Salafists
from leaving the country to participate in the Syrian Civil War, calling on
them to remain in Tunisia and join AST in their charity work, developing an
Islamic-oriented trade union to counterbalance the leftist unions that are
currently dominant. Abu Yahya al-Shinqiti, an elder Mauritanian of the
Sharia Committee of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM), on the eve of
the May 19 clashes, warned AST against falling into violence provoked by
police brutality, calling them to “patience and wisdom.”
Libya
Ten months after the deadly attack on the US Consulate and CIA annex in
Benghazi, the Battalions of Ansar al-Sharia (ASB) continue to patrol the
streets, providing security and humanitarian aid that the Libyan army is
incapable of providing. ASB grew out of the militias engaged in the 2011
Libyan Civil War. Later that year, they sparked controversy by demolishing
Sufi shrines in Benghazi and Tripoli. ASB, since that time, have not
performed any more demolitions, most likely due to the negative attention it
brought upon them and the general unpopularity of the demolitions
themselves. Instead they have focused on the main tactics of ASI, providing
charitable services to the community. So long as the Libyan government is
unable to provide basic services to the citizens of Benghazi, it is
difficult to imagine that a well-armed, well-trained and well-funded militia
that does not tax residents will be driven out any time soon.
Morocco
The last major event regarding Ansar al-Sharia in Morocco (ASIM) was in
early November of last year, when a number of AS members were arrested on
charges of plotting to attack government buildings, public figures, and
tourist attractions. The group had announced its formation on September 17,
posting a brief document online outlining their doctrine and goals.
According to the document, their focus would be only preaching for full and
immediate implementation of Islamic Law and against secularism. Armed action
against the Moroccan government was deemed illegitimate.
Keeping the document in mind, and being aware of the underlying goals of
ASI, it is doubtful that the charges of planning domestic terrorist attacks
are anything more than fabrications. However, allegations of recruiting
Moroccan youth for combat in actual conflict zones are probably true. ASIM
does not seem to stand a chance of surviving. The senior Afghan veterans,
Salafist prisoners and torture victims, and politically activist Salafi
scholars have thrown all their support behind the Committee for the Defense
of Islamist Detainees (CCDDI). The CCDDI focuses all their attention on
protesting the torture of Islamist prisoners and not on changing the nature
of the state or on calling for a pan-Islamic Caliphate, which is the primary
focus of ASIM.
Egypt
With its July 6th announcement to train and arm itself in response to the
ouster of Egyptian President Mohammad Mursi, Ansar al-Sharia in Egypt (ASE)
has been touted as the newest group to take on the name. Though this current
armed formulation of ASE, centered in the Sinai, can be called “new,” Ansar
al-Sharia Misr has been the alternate name of al-Taliah al-Salafiyah
al-Mujahediyah (The Struggling Salafist Vanguard) since mid-2012. ASE was
founded by Afghan-Arab veteran Ahmad ‘Ashush after being released in 2011
along with a number of Salafi-Jihadists in the wake of the Arab Spring.
Upon the release of Muhammad al-Zawahiri, younger brother of al-Qaeda
Central’s leader Ayman, he immediately became the more prominent and visible
figure of the group. The Sinai branch of ASE, perhaps ironically, most
likely finds its origins during the 2012 negotiations for a truce between
the Egyptian army and armed Sinai Salafists that were mediated by none other
than Muhammad al-Zawahiri himself, with government officials facilitating
al-Zawahiri’s travel to the peninsula. Statements following the Egyptian
army’s ousting of Mursi called not to armed confrontation but to mass
rallies and “a jihad of the pen” through the press. ASE in the Sinai claims
that the purpose of training and arming themselves and fellow religious
Egyptians is for the sake of self-defense against attacks initiated by the
army and the “baltagiya.” As the military and mobs continue to refine and
perfect the recipe for radicalization through the massacre of protesters in
Cairo, the argument of self-preservation gains a semblance of validity.
Conclusion
ASI has as its long-term goals, after the current dawa (preaching) stage,
hisba followed by jihad against Western hegemony in the region. All three
terms are filled with a religious significance sacred to a much larger
portion of the Muslim population than just those who identify with the label
“Salafi.” Were all those who have been lumped together under this term to
openly disavow it, as many have, one is still left with a large number of
organized, ultra-conservative Sunni Muslims angered by the very real
corruption, repression and brutal torture that Arab regimes inflict upon
their opposition. Eliminating Salafism or Salafi-Jihadism will not eliminate
these sentiments. The fact that the largest Islamist opposition group in
Morocco is the Sufi-oriented Justice and Benevolence Party shows this to be
the case.
Mitigating further radicalization and escalation of violence by Salafist
groups requires the curbing of violence and torture inflicted by the
governments and security agencies of the MENA region against its citizens.
False confessions extracted through torture have been a matter of fact in
Morocco, against both Salafists and non-Salafists, along with every other
country where ASI is present. Political Salafists and Islamists have been at
the forefront of making the public aware of prison torture, providing them
with a level of cultural capital that they can use to position themselves as
the inheritors of those martyrs and preachers who suffered for their faith
in the early years of Islam.
The first martyr of Islam was said to have been an African slave woman named
Sumayya. After enduring torture at the hands of the Meccan polytheists, she
was stabbed in her genitals whereupon she died. Today, we find similar
stories emanating from prisons throughout the MENA. State torture fuels the
political culture of self-sacrifice, monopolized by Islamists, and makes
Arab regimes the counterparts of Islamic history’s earliest villains, while
Salafis become the most worthy successors of Islam’s greatest heroes. Any
escalation in state violence, torture, and imprisonment without trial can
only lend credence to the worldview espoused by ASI, with the potential to
greatly increase the number of supporters of the Supporters of Sharia.
The views expressed are the author's own and do not necessarily represent
those of Your Middle East. A version of this article was originally
published on SISMEC.
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