Putin's War in Crimea Could Soon Spread to Eastern Ukraine And nobody-not the U.S., not NATO-can stop him

Putin's War in Crimea Could Soon Spread to Eastern Ukraine And nobody-not
the U.S., not NATO-can stop him
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116810/putin-declares-war-ukraine-and-us-
or-nato-wont-do-much


BY JULIA IOFFE

Vladimir Putin has asked the Federation Council-the upper chamber of
Russia's dummy parliament-to authorize the use of force not just in Crimea,
but "on Ukraine's territory until the socio-political situation is
normalized." And though American spies and the Washington Post categorically
ruled this out just days ago, this was not entirely unexpected. The
situation is changing rapidly, but here are some initial thoughts.

Why is Putin doing this? Because he can. That's it, that's all you need to
know. The situation in Kiev-in which people representing one half of the
country (the Ukrainian-speaking west) took power to some extent at the
expense of the Russian-speaking east-created the perfect opportunity for
Moscow to divide and conquer. As soon as the revolution in Kiev happened,
there was an unhappy rumbling in the Crimea, which has a large Russian
population and is home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. It was a small
rumbling, but just big enough for Russia to exploit. And when such an
opportunity presents itself, one would be foolish not to take it, especially
if one's name is Vladimir Putin.

We didn't think Putin would do this. Why, exactly? This has often puzzled me
about Western analysis of Russia. It is often predicated on wholly Western
logic: surely, Russia won't invade [Georgia, Ukraine, whoever's next]
because war is costly and the Russian economy isn't doing well and surely
Putin doesn't want another hit to an already weak ruble; because Russia
doesn't need to conquer Crimea if Crimea is going to secede on its own;
Russia will not want to risk the geopolitical isolation, and "what's really
in it for Russia?"-stop. Russia, or, more accurately, Putin, sees the world
according to his own logic, and the logic goes like this: it is better to be
feared than loved, it is better to be overly strong than to risk appearing
weak, and Russia was, is, and will be an empire with an eternal appetite for
expansion. And it will gather whatever spurious reasons it needs to insulate
itself territorially from what it still perceives to be a large and growing
NATO threat. Trying to harness Russia with our own logic just makes us miss
Putin's next steps.

Pessimism always wins. One of the reasons I left my correspondent's post in
Moscow was because Russia, despite all the foam on the water, is ultimately
a very boring place. Unfortunately, all you really need to do to seem
clairvoyant about the place is to be an utter pessimist. Will Vladimir Putin
allow the ostensibly liberal Dmitry Medvedev to have a second term? Not a
chance. There are protests in the streets of Moscow. Will Putin crackdown?
Yup. There's rumbling in the Crimea, will Putin take advantage and take the
Crimean peninsula? You betcha. And you know why being a pessimist is the
best way to predict outcomes in Russia? Because Putin and those around him
are, fundamentally, terminal pessimists. They truly believe that there is an
American conspiracy afoot to topple Putin, that Russian liberals are
traitors corrupted by and loyal to the West, they truly believe that, should
free and fair elections be held in Russia, their countrymen would elect
bloodthirsty fascists, rather than democratic liberals. To a large extent,
Putin really believes that he is the one man standing between Russia and the
yawning void. Putin's Kremlin is dark and scary, and, ultimately, very
boring.

Remember the U.N.? Russia loves the U.N. Anytime the U.S. or Europe want to
do anything on the world stage, Russia pipes up, demanding the issue be
taken to the U.N. for the inevitable Russian veto. As Steven Lee Meyers,
Moscow correspondent for the New York Times, pointed out, Russia does not
seem to even remember that the institution exists today. Ditto for all that
talk of "political solutions" and "diplomatic solutions" and "dialogue" we
heard about in Syria. In other words, what we are seeing today-Russia's
unilateral declaration of war-is the clearest statement yet of Russia's
actual position: Putin empathizes with Bashar al-Assad as a fellow leader
holding his country back from the brink and doing the dirty work that needs
to be done to accomplish that, and the U.N. is just a convenient mechanism
for keeping nay-sayers with large armies at bay.

As I wrote earlier this month, Russia, like the U.S., projects its own
mindset onto the rest of the world. So when you hear Putin and his foreign
minister Sergei Lavrov and the talking heads on Russia Today crowing about
American cynicism and machinations, well, keep in mind whom they're really
talking about.

Speaking of America. Today's meeting of the Federation Council was an
incredible sight to behold. Man after Soviet-looking man mounted the podium
to deliver a short diatribe against...you name it. Against Ukrainian
fascism, against Swedes, and, most of all, against America. One would think
that it wasn't the illegitimate government in Kiev occupying Russian
Crimea-which, lordy lord, if we're going to get ethnic, let's recall who
originally lived there-but the 82nd Airborne. The vice speaker of the
Council even demanded recalling the Russian ambassador to Washington.
America was amazingly, fantastically behind events in Kiev and proved
utterly inept at influencing them, and yet none of that seemed to matter.
America, the old foe, was everywhere, its fat capitalist fingers in every
Slavic pie. Watching the Federation Council, where few of the speakers
seemed to be under the age of 60, I couldn't escape the feeling that this
was an opportunity for Russia not just to take back some land it's long
considered its rightful own, but to settle all scores and to tie up all
loose ends. You know, while they're at it.

Double standards. This is another howl you often hear rending the skies over
Moscow: Western double standards. But let's get real for a second. We've
spoken already about the U.N., but what about the holy Russian mantra of
non-interference in a nation's internal affairs? When it comes to Syria, to
take a most recent example, the fight between Assad and the rebels is
something only the Syrians can sort out. Ditto every other country in the
world-unless it's in Russia's backyard, where Russia still experiences
phantom limb syndrome. The internal issues of former Soviet republics, you
see, are not truly internal issues of sovereign nations. This is because, by
Stalin's very conscious design and very deliberate border drawing and
population movement, most former Soviet republics are ethnic hodgepodges. So
Ukraine has a sizable Russian population. Ditto Estonia, ditto Georgia,
ditto Kazakhstan. And, according to Putin's unspoken doctrine, anywhere
Russian citizens are determined to be at risk, Mother Moscow can intercede
with force on their behalf.

In other, blunter words, Russian ethnicity and citizenship trump national
sovereignty. At the very least, they provide a convenient pretext for
territorial expansion, as they did in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where
Russia was also ostensibly protecting Russian citizens-also newly minted for
the occasion. Just this week, for instance, Russia introduced a law to make
it easier for Ukrainians to get Russian citizenship-you know, to give Russia
someone to protect.

Russia manufactured this crisis to create a pretext for a land-grab. There
are now protests swinging Russian flags and hailing Russia's glory not just
in Crimea but all over the Russian-speaking east of Ukraine. I was just in
Donetsk, Yanukovich's hometown, on Monday. It was calm, calmer than calm.
There were a couple dozen people guarding the Lenin statue in the center of
the city from vandals, but that was it. A muckety-muck in the city's
administration told me, "If they send new people in to replace us, we'll
leave peacefully, we won't try to hang on." The same was the case in
Simferopol, in Crimea. And then, out of nowhere, men with unmarked uniforms
were taking over government buildings and airports, and huge demonstrations
were pumping on town squares all over the regions. The Kremlin often refers
to "a well-organized informational war" when their enemies broadcast
something they don't like on repeat. And now, looking at the alarmist,
blanket coverage on Russian television-now all loyal to the Kremlin-about
fascists and radicals staging a coup in Kiev, it's hard to think of a better
term. This was indeed a well-organized informational war.

Neither America nor NATO can stop this. They've shown they won't in Georgia,
because nobody wants to start a war with nuclear-armed Russia, and rightly
so. So while Washington and Brussels huff and puff about lines and
sovereignty and diplomacy, Russia will do what it needs to do and there's
not a thing we can do about it.

Russia's next target is eastern Ukraine. Because pessimism conquers all,
don't bet that Putin is going to stop once he wrests Crimea from Kiev's
orbit. Eastern, Russian-speaking Ukraine-and all its heavy industry-is
looking pretty good right now. And if you're thinking "Why would Putin take
eastern Ukraine?," well, you haven't been reading very carefully.

==========================================
(F)AIR USE NOTICE: All original content and/or articles and graphics in this
message are copyrighted, unless specifically noted otherwise. All rights to
these copyrighted items are reserved. Articles and graphics have been placed
within for educational and discussion purposes only, in compliance with
"Fair Use" criteria established in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.
The principle of "Fair Use" was established as law by Section 107 of The
Copyright Act of 1976. "Fair Use" legally eliminates the need to obtain
permission or pay royalties for the use of previously copyrighted materials
if the purposes of display include "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research." Section 107 establishes four criteria
for determining whether the use of a work in any particular case qualifies
as a "fair use". A work used does not necessarily have to satisfy all four
criteria to qualify as an instance of "fair use". Rather, "fair use" is
determined by the overall extent to which the cited work does or does not
substantially satisfy the criteria in their totality. If you wish to use
copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you
must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml

THIS DOCUMENT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS
PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS.